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1 Introduction 
 
The success of the human species has been attributed to our ability to navigate the social 
world: we exchange ideas, we collaborate, we compete, we build networks, we learn from 
one another and teach each other, and we support each other – in brief, we constantly 
interact and understand one another through social interaction. Surprisingly, empirical 
research on social interaction has largely focused on tasks in which participants are passive 
observers and evaluators of static social stimuli while being detached from the actual 
interaction. This has caused a somewhat ironic situation in which social cognition is 
examined in the absence of dynamic social interactions (i.e. offline) in what has been termed 
‘isolation paradigms’ (Becchio et al., 2010). Although this approach has generated vital 
insights into human social cognition, recent claims emphasized that the active engagement 
with others in interaction (i.e. online) plays a particular role in understanding other minds 
(Schilbach et al., in press) and might underlie the development of our ability to think about 
others, rather than the other way round (Reddy and Morris, 2004).  
Social cognition and the underlying neural systems have often been related to the 
disambiguation of other person’s behavior (Brown and Brüne, 2012; Frith, 2007). However, 
there is more to the participation in social interactions than the extraction of information 
about an interaction partner. This becomes evident by considering how much time we spend 
interacting with others: We gossip with our colleagues at work and chat with business 
partners before actually getting down to business. We invite friends for dinner or meet them 
for a drink at the bar. We engage in small talk with the sales staff at our local grocery store, 
even though these people are strangers. If we did all that merely to obtain information about 
our conspecifics or to predict their behavior, social interaction would be quite a tedious and 
tiresome process. Most readers will agree that this is not the case and that, quite on the 
contrary, they commonly experience social interaction as enjoyable and satisfying. Realistic 
studies of social interaction should therefore consider both dynamic and motivational 
aspects of interaction. 
One major reason why such studies are scarce is the lack of suitable empirical 
methods balancing ecological validity and experimental control. This thesis hence has 
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strived for an understanding of the cognitive mechanisms and neural processes involved in 
online social interaction by following a methodological as well as an empirical goal. First, 
an interactive eye-tracking setup was developed which allowed participants to engage in 
gaze-based interactions with virtual agents in real-time. Gaze was chosen for the 
operationalization of social interactions due to its key role in non-verbal communication and 
its easy accessibility (study 1). Subsequently, this setup was used to scrutinize the dynamic 
parameters of social gaze and to evaluate the perception of other person’s gaze behavior as 
mediated by virtual characters (study 2). This was a prerequisite for the empirical objective 
of this thesis: the construction of a realistic, gaze-based interaction paradigm allowing the 
investigation of the factors contributing to our perception of an interaction as social and the 
underlying neural mechanisms. This paradigm – a ‘non-verbal Turing test’ – required 
participants to distinguish human and computer interaction partners based on a virtual 
agent’s gaze behavior. The experience of social interaction was therein not defined a priori, 
but emerged based on the interaction dynamics. This allowed for an unconstrained 
assessment of participants’ subjective experience of being engaged in a social interaction 
(study 3). These developments finally permitted addressing the neural basis of the 
motivation to engage in social interactions and their rewarding nature in a combined eye-
tracking and fMRI experiment (study 4). Prior to the discussion of these studies, an 
introduction is given into the concepts of offline and online interaction, into social gaze as a 
means to investigate online interaction, and into the neural mechanisms underlying our 
understanding of others. 
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2 Observation vs. Participation: The Distinction between 
Offline and Online Social Cognition 
 
One of the major research agendas in social and developmental psychology is the 
investigation of why and how we understand the mental states of others, a capacity 
commonly referred to as mentalizing (Frith and Frith, 2006) or Theory-of-Mind (ToM) 
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978). However, there is a fundamental distinction in the way in 
which the underlying processes can be studied. In a recent theoretical account, Schilbach 
and colleagues have used the terms ‘offline’ and ‘online’ social cognition to denote this 
distinction (Schilbach et al., in press). Previous research paradigms have largely 
concentrated on the study of subjects’ understanding of other minds without emotional 
engagement and participation in a real social interaction. In analogy to internet terminology, 
this socially disconnected mode of cognition has hence been referred to as offline social 
cognition. In contrast, situations in which an individual is emotionally involved with another 
individual and engaged in a reciprocal social interaction with that individual have been 
referred to as online social cognition. 
 
2.1 Offline Social Cognition 
In customary offline tasks, behavioral or physiological measures are applied to inform 
conclusions about social-cognitive processes while subjects are passive spectators either 
observing someone performing actions or interacting with another person. This basically 
divides the study of offline social cognition into two branches – action observation and 
mentalizing.   
 
2.1.1 The First-Person Perspective: Observation of Actions and the Mirror Neuron 
System 
Whether we observe a single agent acting on an object or an interaction between two agents 
influences which perspective we take in order to understand the mental states of the agents 
(Vogeley and Fink, 2003). In the first case, action observation endows us with a first-person  
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perspective from ‘inside’ the agent performing the action (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010). 
Neurally, this is supported by the so-called mirror neuron system (MNS), a network 
consisting of frontal as well as parietal brain areas (Fig. 1). The frontal component of the 
MNS encompasses the posterior region of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the inferior 
region of the precentral gyrus (PCG). The parietal part entails the inferior parietal lobule 
(IPL) including the inferior parietal sulcus (IPS). Neurons in these areas are active both 
during the execution of a given action and the observation of another agent performing this 
action (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992) and hence are believed to coalesce the perception and 
execution of movements (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Importantly, when these 
movements are goal-directed, they are commonly referred to as motor acts. In non-human 
primates, mirror neurons do not simply encode the physical or spatial properties but rather 
the goal of these movements, i.e. the motor acts. For example, when the goal of a movement 
was to grasp an object, the neuronal output of neurons of the MNS was not significantly 
affected by the exact way the fingers were moved or by the tool which was used to grasp the 
object (Rochat et al., 2010; Umiltà et al., 2008). Although in humans the MNS seems to 
encode movements per se as well as motor acts (Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Gazzola et al., 2007; 
Figure 1. Social brain network and mirror neuron system. Depicted are the key regions involved in social cognition 
in a medial and lateral view of the brain. See text for details and abbreviations (adapted from Blakemore et al, 2008). 
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Liu et al., 2007), there is common acceptance that the MNS supports the understanding of 
the goals and intentions underlying the motor behavior of another agent via low-level 
processes in areas of the motor and parietal cortices (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010). 
Considering that movement “is the only means we have to interact with both the world and 
other people” (Wolpert et al., 2001 p. 487), it can be assumed that the evolution of a system 
dedicated to the understanding of actions and their underlying intentions has been of great 
significance for the phylogenetic development of the human brain. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that the MNS might only support the comprehension 
of familiar actions taking place in stereotypic contexts. A study by Brass et al (2007) 
examined the neural correlates of action observation using stimuli with unfamiliar transitive 
actions (i.e. complex movements involving objects) in non-stereotypic contexts with varying 
plausibility. For example, they showed images of a person pushing a light switch with their 
knee while their hands were free, implausibly occupied, or plausibly occupied. Thereby, the 
difficulty of understanding an action was manipulated. Results indicated that understanding 
the intention of novel actions in implausible contexts requires a different mechanism than a 
simple mapping of these actions onto motor representations in the MNS. When the 
plausibility of an action was low, there was significantly increased activation of the superior 
temporal sulcus (STS) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). This was corroborated by 
findings demonstrating that the observation of simple, intransitive actions (e.g. minimal 
finger movements) only recruited the MNS when the context was plausible, but correlated 
with activation of the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) when the same actions were observed 
in an implausible context (Liepelt et al., 2008). The STS, mPFC, and TPJ are key 
constituents of the so-called ‘social brain network’ (» Chapter 2.1.2) and recruited whenever 
mental states need to be actively inferred across a range of social-cognitive tasks (Frith and 
Frith, 2006). Offline social cognition therefore does not only rely on a first-person grasp of 
motor intentions, but also on a context-sensitive inferential system (De Lange et al., 2008).  
 
2.1.2 The Third-Person Perspective: Mentalizing and the Social Brain Network 
In contrast to the observation of actions exerted by a single individual, the observation of an 
interaction between two individuals has been suggested to endow us with a third-person 
perspective on the mental states that drive and emerge during interactions (Frith and Frith, 
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2006). Mentalizing about others from a third-person perspective encompasses the active 
inference of their desires, goals, intentions, or motivations regarding objects and persons in 
the environment. The empirical study of this branch of offline social cognition does not rely 
on the presentation of pictures or movies of motor acts, but involves multiple forms of 
verbal and non-verbal stimuli depicting static or dynamic social scenes (cf. Carrington and 
Bailey, 2009). The prototypical structure of a mentalizing task is pertinently illustrated by 
false-belief tasks, which require the understanding that what one knows or believes might be 
different from what another person might know or believe (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). In 
the famous Sally-Anne-Task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), two dolls named Sally and Anne 
are introduced to children. In a brief comic strip, Sally hides a marble in a basket. After 
Sally has left the room, Anne takes the marble out of the basket and hides it in a box. 
Children are then asked whether Sally will search for the marble in the basket or in the box. 
In order to pass the task, a child needs to abstract from its own knowledge, adopt the 
perspective of Sally and indicate that she will look for the marble in the basket. This is taken 
as a proof of intact and fully developed mentalizing abilities. Children younger than four 
years indicate that Sally will look in Anne’s box. This demonstrates that they are unable to 
understand that another person has beliefs about the world differing from their own and 
suggests a distinct developmental time course of mentalizing capacities.  
 
2.1.2.1 The Role of the mPFC in Mental State Attribution 
Earlier work in social neuroscience has borrowed from the structure of false-belief tasks to 
construct text vignettes or comic strips depicting social interactions which require the 
attribution of mental states by active inference (Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; 
Gobbini et al., 2007; Happé et al., 1996; Vogeley et al., 2001). Although different prefrontal 
and temporal cortical areas showed enhanced activity during mentalizing, only the mPFC 
was consistently recruited in all of these studies. It has therefore been considered as the hub 
of the so-called social brain network (SBN) which subserves our capacity to think about the 
thoughts of others (Amodio and Frith, 2006). Recently, a more complete picture of its 
functional segregation has emerged. The dorsal mPFC seems to be involved in more explicit 
and cognitively more demanding aspects of mentalizing. These include mental state 
inferences about people dissimilar to us (Mitchell et al., 2006), anchoring mechanisms and 
adjustment processes in cases where others’ mental states differ from our own (Tamir and 
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Mitchell, 2010), and the encoding of communicative intentions that need to be interpreted in 
a social context as compared to personal intentions (Walter et al., 2004). On the contrary, the 
ventral mPFC is engaged in implicit aspects of mentalizing, such as reasoning about people 
we perceive as similar to ourselves as well as the comprehension of the affective states of 
others (Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz, 2007). However, although these results indicate 
a prominent role of the mPFC in mentalizing, other studies have cast doubts on the specifity 
of mPFC activation.  
 
2.1.2.2 The Role of the TPJ in Deducing the Content of Mental States 
Studies by Saxe and colleagues (for an overview see Saxe, 2006) emphasized the relevance 
of the TPJ in differentiating the actual content of other people’s mental states. In a study by 
Saxe and Kanwisher (2003), more elaborate categories of stimuli were used to isolate 
mentalizing from other thought processes regarding human behaviors. These categories 
involved mentalizing, human actions, physical inferences, and physical descriptions. In the 
central experiment of the study, stories about people which required thinking about either 
the desires (mentalizing) or the physical properties (non-mentalizing) of the protagonists 
were compared. Results showed that TPJ activity was increased only when the mental states, 
but not the physical properties, of a person had to be taken into account. In a later study, the 
activity of the right TPJ was selectively modulated by thinking about the mental states, but 
not by thinking about the social backgrounds of people (Saxe and Wexler, 2005). Other 
regions previously implicated in mentalizing (i.e. the left TPJ or the mPFC) did not display 
differential activation, thereby suggesting that only the right TPJ is truly selective for 
mentalizing in the strict sense of understanding the discrete intentions of another person. 
Interestingly, the strong functional specification of the right TPJ for understanding mental 
states in adulthood develops rather late in childhood (i.e. between 6 and 11 years). In 
contrast, the mPFC displays an early sensitivity for reasoning about mental states but shows 
less developmental change and is less specifically activated during mentalizing in adulthood 
(Saxe et al., 2009). In the authors’ words, this implies that “the basic cognitive signatures of 
domain-specifity may be in place long before the brain systems underlying these processes 
have reached an adult-like state” (Saxe et al., 2009, p.1207). In a meta-analysis of 
mentalizing studies, Van Overwalle and Baetens (2009) suggested that the TPJ is mainly 
engaged in the inference of transient goals, beliefs, or desires, while the mPFC is recruited 
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by more spontaneous trait inferences or additional deliberative reasoning. Nonetheless, there 
is not yet a unifying account of how the interplay of these regions enables mentalizing.  
 
2.1.2.3 Beyond and Below Mentalizing: Other Components of the Social Brain Network 
There are several other brain areas associated with the SBN that have been found active 
during mentalizing tasks. However, their activation was less consistent across these tasks, 
but was associated with other aspects of social cognition rather than the inference of mental 
states (i.e. mentalizing proper). For instance, the temporal poles are often activated during 
classical mentalizing tasks (Frith and Frith, 2003), but do not appear to be specifically 
related to mentalizing. More likely, they are important for the generation of a larger 
semantic context for the mentalized material by providing social ‘scripts’ – stereotypical 
sequences of events which are generated by experience (e.g. ‘going to a restaurant’) and 
support social categorization (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Among the SBN regions are also 
the fusiform face area (FFA), which is implicated in the orienting to and processing of faces 
(Schultz et al., 2003), and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which plays a fundamental 
role in the resolution of conflicting social information (Zaki et al., 2010) as well as the 
monitoring of incongruent self- and other-perspectives and inhibition of undesired mental 
states of others (Hartwright et al., 2012). The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) is 
involved whenever top-down modulation is needed to overcome automatic social-cognitive 
processes such as racial prejudices (Cunningham et al., 2004) or negative responses to unfair 
treatment (Kirk et al., 2011). Although they are numbered among the SBN regions, the ACC 
and the dlPFC exert more domain-general functions not exclusively related to social 
cognition. This is equally true for the amygdala, which plays a more general role in 
encoding behaviorally relevant aspects of sensory stimuli (Adolphs, 2010). However, it 
bears specific relevance in social cognition by encoding socially salient features, such as 
emotional facial expressions (Fitzgerald et al., 2006) and especially fearful faces which 
might signal threat (Adolphs et al., 1994; Morris et al., 1996). Finally, early reports 
indicated that the posterior region of the superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) is involved in the 
detection and analysis of all aspects of biological motion, such as movements of hand, 
mouth, eyes and body (Allison et al., 2000). A very recent study suggested that the pSTS is 
activated by virtually all classes of socially salient stimuli, such as faces, bodies, biological 
motion, goal-directed actions, emotions, pain, and observed interactions (Lahnakoski et al., 
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2012). Despite its seemingly universal importance in offline social cognition, one of the 
main functions of the STS is the processing of gaze direction (Nummenmaa and Calder, 
2009). This functional aspect is highly relevant for face-to-face interactions and is discussed 
in depth in the chapter on social gaze (» Chapter 3).  
 
2.2 Online Social Cognition 
Most readers will not dispute that the observation of actions and interactions contributes to 
our understanding of others. However, they will probably also agree that everyday social life 
focuses on the engagement in social interactions with others face-to-face and in real-time 
(i.e. online) rather than on the inference of the mental states of others from an observer’s 
perspective. An early description of a phenomenological difference between the passive 
observation of an interaction and the active participation – that is, the singularity of the 
relation between ‘me and you’ (i.e. a dyadic interaction) – can be found in the work of the 
religious philosopher Martin Buber. Although not exactly a social scientist, in his book I and 
Thou (written in 1919 under the German title “Ich und Du” and first translated to English in 
1937) he noted that every object or person can be regarded as an ‘It’ or a ‘Thou’ and that the 
fundamental qualities of a relation differ depending on whether it is an ‘I – It’ or an ‘I – 
Thou’ relation (Buber, 2004). In the first case, the other as ‘It’ is experienced as remote and 
consisting of a variety of different features that can be observed and pondered upon. In the 
latter case, the other as ‘Thou’ is experienced as a whole entity embedded in the same reality 
as ‘I’. This is perceived as the most existential type of relation between two individuals, i.e. 
one that is situated, embodied and enactive. In Buber’s own ornate words, “[t]he Thou meets 
me. But I step in direct relation with it. Hence the relation means choosing and being chosen 
(…). The primary word I – Thou can be spoken only with the whole being. Concentration 
and fusion into the whole being can never take place through my agency, nor can it ever take 
place without me. I become through my relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say Thou. All 
living is meeting” (Buber, 2004, p. 17). 
Over the past few years, a paradigm shift in the study of social cognition has begun 
to manifest itself, because growing numbers of researchers subscribe to the notion that “it is 
in engagement with other people rather than in thought that people normally and 
fundamentally know other people” (Reddy and Morris, 2004, p. 657). Philosophers, 
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psychologists and neuroscientists alike have advanced the idea that it is not sufficient to 
study single minds in ‘isolation paradigms’ (Becchio et al., 2010), but that studies on social 
cognition should focus on situations in which individuals participate in some form of online 
social interaction (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; De Jaegher et al., 2010; Froese and 
Fuchs, 2012; Hobson, 1991; Marsh et al., 2009; Reddy and Morris, 2004; Riley et al., 2011; 
Schilbach et al., in press).  
 
2.2.1 The Second-Person Approach to Other Minds 
In the most comprehensive research agenda for the study of online social cognition so far, 
Schilbach and colleagues put forward a ‘second-person approach’ to social neuroscience 
(Schilbach et al., in press). The term ‘second-person’ was coined to clearly demarcate the 
approach from other accounts presupposing a first- or a third-person perspective (» chapters 
2.1.1 and 2.1.2). It emphasizes the fact that online social cognition requires a person to be 
able to observe the effects of her behavior on the other and to be addressed reciprocally by 
the other’s reactions (i.e. from a second-person perspective as “you”). More specifically, two 
central components are named in the second-person approach of social interaction – 
emotional engagement and participation in interaction: First of all, emotional responses are 
argued to provide experiential access to the bodily and affective state of the interaction 
partner due to a tight coupling between the bodily expression of an affective state and the 
experience of this state referred to as emotional embodiment (Niedenthal, 2007). During 
social interaction this emotional embodiment can resonate across individuals. Interaction 
partners unconsciously imitate the emotional expressions of each other and consequently 
indicate experiencing the associated affective state (Rapson et al., 1994). Secondly, the 
participation in social interactions is considered a key to the understanding of other minds. 
In this framework, a social interaction is described as any relation between two (or more) 
agents that is characterized by a reciprocal exchange of socially salient information via 
verbal and non-verbal cue systems. There are virtually no limits to the complexity of social 
interactions. They can range from simple, sequential turn-taking games to non-linear and 
dynamic procedures such as, for example, political negotiations or a jam session by a group 
of musicians, who need to keep track of minute changes in rhythm and pitch in order not to 
end up in cacophony. This illustrates another aspect of online social interaction: It is a truly 
dynamic process in which the participating agents have to update their intentions and 
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motivations ‘on the fly’ during the interaction in order to maintain the interaction. A final 
feature of social interactions is that the interacting agents usually are either aware of a 
shared reality (Hardin and Higgins, 1996) and therefore of common resources as well as 
distinct action possibilities of the other (Sebanz et al., 2006), or strife to gain this awareness 
by establishing common ground by means of the interaction procedure (Clark, 1996). 
Beyond the establishment of common ground, it has been argued that some aspects of an 
understanding of the other reside in the interaction dynamics per se rather than on a mere 
inferential online interpretation of action-reaction feedback loops (De Jaegher et al., 2010). 
This means that not all social knowledge resides within the minds of individuals but that 
social cognition is an emergent property of the interaction, thereby assigning an epistemic 
value to the interaction process itself.  
 
2.2.2 Experimental Evidence for a Second-Person Grasp of Other Minds  
The hypothesis that we gain access to others’ minds via social interaction is intuitively 
intriguing. However, every hypothesis about cognition eventually must be supported by 
empirical evidence. There are two major implications of the second-person approach to 
social neuroscience which can be derived from the description of the approach in the 
previous chapter. The first major implication concerns the ‘least reducible unit’ of social 
knowledge. While cognitivist accounts of social cognition argue that social cognition can be 
reduced to representations in the minds of two individuals, the second-person approach 
advocates the view that social interaction cannot be reduced to the content of single minds 
but that knowledge resides in the interaction ‘between’ two agents (Schilbach et al., in 
press). Experimental data supporting this claim in its strictest interpretation would have to 
demonstrate that knowledge about the other can emerge from the interaction process per se 
and that the emergence of this knowledge can exclusively be explained by the dynamics of 
the interaction.  
Indeed, the epistemic value of interaction dynamics has been demonstrated for the 
first time using an innovative ‘perceptual crossing paradigm’ (Auvray et al., 2009). The 
central question of this experiment was whether a human interaction partner can be 
recognized based on intrinsic properties of shared perceptual activity in a minimalist tactile 
environment. To this end, two blindfolded participants interacted by moving their mouse 
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cursor in a one-dimensional space on a computer screen. In this space, they encountered a 
fixed and a continuously moving object, an object representing the other's cursor, and a 
‘shadow’ of this object. At each encounter participants received a tactile stimulation, and 
were instructed to click the mouse whenever they thought a particular stimulation is due to 
an encounter with the other. There was one crucial difference between the cursor and the 
shadow. Both objects moved exactly in the same way, but participants only received 
simultaneous tactile stimulation when their avatars encountered each other. Thus, only when 
they met, both were stimulated simultaneously. Results demonstrated a dissociation between 
task performance and awareness: A distinction between the avatar and the shadow was only 
detected in the absolute number of encounters, but not in the relative frequency of clicks. 
This suggests that participants were unable to recognize the other deliberately, but 
distinguished the avatar and the shadow unconsciously “as a consequence of the mutual 
search for one another which make the encounters between the participants far more 
frequent” (Auvray and Rohde, 2012, p. 2). Although the universality of these findings needs 
to be confirmed by research in other domains of social interaction, this simple paradigm has 
provided a first demonstration of meaning emerging from the interaction process itself. 
Importantly, however, the second-person approach does not stand or fall with interaction 
dynamics. Sufficient support for this approach would also be provided by demonstrations 
that the understanding of a person hinges on the observation of the effects our actions have 
on this person (Wolpert et al., 2003).  
The second implication concerns the neural mechanisms supporting online social 
interaction. It is unlikely that entirely separate brain systems subserve offline and online 
social cognition, as both modes are directed at understanding other persons. However, if 
offline and online interaction were fundamentally different operational modes, differences in 
the underlying neural systems should be observable. For example, it is possible that discrete 
temporal and anatomical couplings of regions originally associated with the MNS and the 
SBN – and therefore with offline processes – mediate online social cognition. While there 
are numerous studies investigating offline social cognition either from a first- or third-person 
perspective (» Chapter 2.1), and a growing number of empirical approaches to study minds 
in interaction (Schilbach et al., in press), studies directly comparing observation and 
interaction are still lacking. Unfortunately, it is therefore impossible at present to reach any 
conclusion about specific neural mechanisms supporting online social interaction. 
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2.2.2.1 Empirical Approaches to the Neural Mechanisms of Online Social Cognition 
This section introduces existing approaches to the study of online social cognition. Figure 2 
is an adaptation of a graph by Schilbach et al. (in press) which demarcates the experimental 
landscape of neuroscientific research on social interaction. The grey scale of the elements of 
Figure 2 indicates the depth of empirical coverage of the respective categories with darker 
shades of grey indicating lesser coverage.  
Category 1 comprises studies comparing direct social engagement and detachment 
by employing comparably static social stimuli. Among these are facial expressions, 
movements, or gestures which are either directed at the participant or at another person. 
Overall, this type of studies demonstrated across a range of stimulus categories that in 
comparison  to detachment, direct engagement recruits the SBN (e.g. Bristow et al., 2007; 
Conty and Grèzes, 2012; Kuzmanovic et al., 2009; Tylén et al., 2012) and the amygdala 
(Schilbach et al., 2006). Particularly the finding of differential amygdala activation suggests 
that there is increased emotional engagement when facing self- versus other directed actions. 
Category 2 is essentially an artificial category which has emerged as a by-product of the 
category system by Schilbach and colleagues (in press) and shall therefore not be discussed 
here.  
Category 3 comprises paradigms in which participants are able to observe the effects 
of their behavior on another person. Although such structured interactions are principally 
one-way interactions and have been disparaged as ‘pseudo-interactive’ (Konvalinka and 
Roepstorff, 2012) they capture one of the most crucial aspects of social interaction: They 
enable participants to experience feedback to their actions and thereby to adjust their 
behavior based on the reactions they are facing. Interactions of this category usually involve 
an initiator and a responder, such as it is the case in interactive eye-tracking paradigms. 
They either allow participants to interact with others via live video-streams (Redcay et al., 
2010), or with virtual agents in a gaze-contingent fashion (Wilms et al., 2010). The 
application of these paradigms will be discussed in the section on social gaze (» Chapter 3). 
Economic games – such as prisoner’s dilemma, ultimatum, or trust games – represent 
another class of structured social interactions which are characterized by highly formalized 
turn-taking procedures (Rilling and Sanfey, 2011).  
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Category 4 involves the same paradigms as category 3. The difference is that data 
are collected from both interaction partners while they engage in a structured social 
interaction. This can be achieved using so-called hyperscanning paradigms, in which the 
brain activity of two (or more) persons is measured simultaneously while they are engaged 
in social interaction (Babiloni et al., 2006 (EEG); Baess et al., 2012 (MEG); Montague et al., 
2002 (fMRI)). Despite the technical possibility of hyperscanning, the few existing studies so 
far have largely relied on game theoretic experiments (Fliessbach et al., 2007; King-Casas et 
al., 2005; Tomlin et al., 2006) and hence might fail to capture the dynamics of real social 
interaction as well as the ecological validity with respect to real-life social interactions 
(Konvalinka and Roepstorff, 2012). However, there are novel advances towards realistic, 
truly interactive eye-tracking paradigms involving two participants (» Chapter 3).  
Figure 2. Landscape of empirical research on social interaction. This diagram depicts different categories of 
experiments addressing the cognitive processes and neural mechanisms of online social interaction (adapted from 
Schilbach et al, in press). 
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Categories 5 and 6 can effectively be grouped together. In exceptional cases – for 
example when the connection of two MRI scanners for hyperscanning is impossible due to 
technical or financial restraints – it might make sense to create a truly interactive situation in 
which data of only one of the participants are collected. In most cases, however, the 
application of an interactive setup for realistic dyadic interactions will demand collecting the 
data of both participants, in particular because the analyses of individual data sets are 
interdependent. As the black box depicting category 6 (Figure 2) illustrates, there are barely 
any studies investigating unconstrained social interactions. Until present, there is only one 
dual EEG study investigating two interactors spontaneously imitating their hand movements 
without any further instructions (Dumas et al., 2010). Interestingly, these authors found that 
behavioral synchrony is associated with a coupling of oscillatory brain activity in the alpha-
mu rhythm. The source of this neuronal synchrony could be localized approximately to the 
TPJ. Furthermore, the alpha-mu rhythm has been related to activity in the MNS and has 
previously been described as an oscillatory marker of social coordination (Tognoli et al., 
2007). Although it has recently been made possible to combine dual eye-tracking and 
hyperscanning (Saito et al., 2010), there is not yet a study employing such a setup in an 
ecologically valid manner. A main problem here is the lack of experimental control and the 
choice of the variables entering data analysis. Whilst not offering fully unconstrained 
interactions, structured interaction paradigms have an advantage in this respect.  
In summary, a variety of approaches to the study of online social cognition have 
been proposed over the last years. While it is obvious that state-of-the-art approaches have 
surpassed categories 1 and 2, research on entirely unrestrained social interaction is still in its 
infancy and faces several financial, technical, and methodological problems. For instance, a 
major conceptual issue for social neuroscience concerns the question whether fMRI 
hyperscanning is altogether suited to capture the neural signature of interacting brains. One 
reason is the limited space inside the scanner bore and the susceptibility to movement 
artifacts. The main reason, however, is the low temporal resolution of the blood-oxygen 
level response (BOLD) underlying fMRI which might render a measurement of the neural 
processes supporting minute interactions of mutually coordinated agents impossible 
(Konvalinka and Roepstorff, 2012). Since the potentials of fully interactive paradigms 
cannot presently be exhausted, structured interaction paradigms falling into categories 3 and 
4 appear most auspicious at the moment. This is especially true because there are still many 
 
Ulrich Pfeiffer              From Participation to Motivation                              25 
open questions concerning the neural mechanisms related to the subjective experience of 
being engaged in social interaction in real-time. For this reason, the studies comprising this 
thesis rely on structured interactions. The novelty is that these interactions are 
operationalized in the domain of social gaze, which endows them with greater ecological 
validity than previous paradigms.   
 
2.2.3 The Rewarding Nature of Social Encounters 
The previous sections have focused on the participatory aspects of social interaction and 
ways to address them. Another essential feature of online interactions is emotional 
engagement (Schilbach et al., in press). Through a wide range of disciplines, it has been 
suggested that social interaction is intrinsically rewarding (e.g. Baumeister and Leary, 1995; 
Krach et al., 2010; Moll and Tomasello, 2007). Recently, Lebreton and collaborators (2009) 
linked personality traits with neuroanatomical measurements and demonstrated that social 
reward dependence positively correlates with grey matter increases in the orbitofrontal 
cortex and the basal ganglia, including the ventral striatum. As social reward dependence 
provides a measure of an individual’s propensity to engage in social interaction (Cloninger 
et al., 1993), these results suggest a direct link between the reward system and the 
motivation to participate in social interaction with others. 
 Indeed, activation of reward-related neurocircuitry was demonstrated in previous 
neuroimaging studies on social interaction. Rilling and colleagues scanned participants 
playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with another person or a computer (Rilling et al., 
2002). In each round, players could choose to defect or to cooperate, whereby cooperation 
represented the riskier choice in terms of monetary outcome. Mutual cooperation led to 
increased activity in the mOFC, ACC, and the VS when interacting with a human. The VS 
was not activated during mutual cooperation with a computer, thus suggesting that 
cooperation with a human but not a computer correlates with positively reinforcing activity 
in this area. Also the intentions to trust someone (King-Casas et al., 2005) as well as 
someone’s reputation for positive reciprocity during multi-round trust games are encoded in 
the VS (Phan et al., 2010). Another study compared neural activity when participants played 
a competitive video game against human or computer opponents (Kätsyri et al., 2012). 
Results indicated that winning led to greater activity in the striatum than losing. This activity 
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was further enhanced when participants thought they were interacting with a human 
opponent, again suggesting a specific role for reward-related processes during social 
interaction. Although these studies assess the neural mechanisms supporting online social 
interaction, there are two reasons why they do not answer the question concerning the 
reward value of social interaction per se. Firstly, most of them have relied on game-
theoretical approaches (Rilling and Sanfey, 2011). These approaches involve comparatively 
sophisticated interactions requiring the build-up of trust or reputation in turn-taking games 
and hence comprise high-level social concepts such as cooperation, trust, fairness, or 
altruism. Secondly, in other studies applying a human-computer distinction subjects were 
informed in advance whether they were going to interact with another person or a computer 
program (e.g. Decety et al., 2004; Gallagher et al., 2002; Kätsyri et al., 2012; Kircher et al., 
2009; Rilling et al., 2004; Sanfey et al., 2003). One advantage of the non-verbal Turing test 
presented in studies 3 and 4 is that the interactions are of a basic nature but nonetheless 
ecologically valid. Furthermore, participants are not pointed towards the nature of their 
interaction partner in advance, but develop a subjective experience of being in social 
interaction with another human through the interaction process itself.    
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3 Social Gaze: A Non-Verbal Cue System Suited for Studying 
Online Interaction 
 
In the present thesis, social gaze behavior has been selected as a means to operationalize 
online interactions for two major reasons: Firstly, gaze provides a salient non-verbal cue 
system commonly used in everyday social encounters and combines perception and action in 
single acts of looking. Secondly, gaze can be measured in combination with neural activity 
by using fMRI-compatible eye-tracking devices. The application of MRI has the advantage 
of providing access to medial and orbital cortical as well as subcortical regions, such as the 
amygdala and the basal ganglia. These are critically involved in affective and motivational 
aspects of social interaction and not easily accessible using EEG or MEG.  
Gaze serves a variety of social-cognitive functions beyond mere visual detection. It 
has been related to information seeking, signaling interpersonal attitudes, regulating the 
synchronicity of speech during dialogues, and plays a significant role in the regulation of 
interpersonal distance as well as the avoidance of undue intimacy (Argyle et al., 1973). 
Furthermore, the eye region provides social information related to a person’s identity, 
emotional state and focus of attention. Consequently, whenever we look at a face, the eyes 
are the primary and most consistent target of our visual attention (Haith et al., 1977; Walker-
Smith et al., 1977). Evolutionary biologists found the human eye to have a unique 
morphology (Kobayashi and Kohshima, 2001). Non-human primates generally have 
darkened eyes, which makes it difficult to distinguish the iris from the surrounding sclera. In 
contrast, the human eye is characterized by a largely exposed, depigmentated sclera 
surrounding a dark-colored iris. The development of these features facilitates the detection 
of the gaze direction of other individuals and has been paralleled by the development of 
brain mechanisms supporting social cognition, thereby suggesting that gaze is a crucial 
component of our social-cognitive skills (Emery, 2000). 
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3.1 The Core Processes of Social Gaze Behavior 
Emery (2000) has identified direct (or mutual) gaze, gaze aversion, gaze-following, joint 
attention, and shared attention as core processes constituting social gaze behavior (Figure 3). 
The discussion of these processes is necessary to comprehend how gaze behavior can be 
used to construct meaningful social interactions. Notably, gaze has an affective as well as a 
communicative dimension. The following sections will only briefly touch upon the affective 
aspects of gaze (cf. Itier and Batty, 2009) as this thesis focuses on gaze as a cue system 
supporting non-verbal social interaction. The core processes and their neural underpinnings 
will be discussed here.  
Figure 3. Core processes of social gaze. Green arrows indicate mutual awareness, blue arrows indicate unidirectional 
awareness (adapted from Emery, 2000). 
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3.1.1 Opening the Communicative Channel by Mutual Gaze 
Any gaze-based interaction starts with two individuals looking at each other, a situation 
referred to as mutual gaze (or direct gaze). In contrast to other species, direct gaze is not 
(necessarily) perceived as a threat in humans but serves as a natural attractor of attention 
already in newborns (Farroni et al., 2002). Numerous studies have found that direct gaze is a 
powerful modulator of cognition – a phenomenon referred to as the ‘eye-contact effect’ 
(Senju and Johnson, 2009). For example, it has been shown that faces displaying direct gaze 
are spotted faster among distractor items and memorized better than faces with averted gaze. 
Specific facial features and facial identity are detected earlier in faces expressing direct gaze. 
Direct gaze also exerts a positive influence on our judgment of other’s attractiveness (Mason 
et al., 2005) and increases the likeability of objects that are presented adjacent to faces 
expressing direct gaze (Strick et al., 2008). Most importantly, however, it has been described 
as an ostensive cue which signals that a behaviorally relevant act is going to follow (Csibra 
and Gergely, 2009). Direct gaze thus serves a particular behavioral function: It indicates 
communicative intent and thereby ‘opens the channel’ for any meaningful social interaction 
(Cary, 1978).  
A recent model by Senju and Johnson (2009) proposes that the eye contact effect is 
brought about by a subcortical ‘fast-lane’ via the amygdala and low-level visual areas 
including the superior colliculus and the pulvinar. Such a subcortical shortcut involving the 
amygdala has, for instance, also been demonstrated for the processing of fearful stimuli 
(LeDoux, 2000), which suggests that subcortical mechanisms generally facilitate the 
processing of behaviorally significant stimuli. In the case of direct gaze, this mechanism is 
supposed to modulate social brain areas involved in the detection of gaze direction (aSTS) 
and intentionality (mPFC, pSTS) depending on the present context and task demands (e.g. 
visual search, detection of facial identity etc.) which are administrated by the dlPFC.  
 
3.1.2 The Perception of Averted Gaze and Gaze-Following Behavior 
The perception of gaze aversion is a prominent cue signaling that another individual’s 
attention is not directed at us but at another aspect of the environment. Many studies using 
Posner-task-like gaze cueing paradigms have demonstrated that the detection of averted 
gaze results in a shift of visuo-spatial attention by means of reflexive gaze-following 
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behavior even when a gaze cue is counter-predictive of a target (cf. Shepherd, 2010). The 
development of gaze-following is also considered a critical hallmark of social-cognitive 
development, as it relates to an understanding of the field of view of another individual and 
the relevance this individual assigns to objects in that field. There are also affective 
differences between direct and averted gaze. While facing direct gaze has positive effects on 
likeability and attractiveness ratings, experiencing averted gaze can result in feelings of 
social exclusion and reduced self-esteem (Wirth et al., 2010). One study measured 
participants’ brain activity while they watched video sequences in which an animated 
character walked toward them and either expressed mutual or averted gaze when passing 
them (Pelphrey et al., 2004b). Mutual gaze led to greater activation of the pSTS than averted 
gaze, which suggests that this region encodes approach and avoidance associated with direct 
and averted gaze, which might play a role in the detection of communicative intent. 
Interestingly, an electroencephalographic (EEG) study showed that observing faces 
displaying direct and averted gaze was associated with patterns of EEG activation related to 
approach and avoidance systems, respectively (Hietanen et al., 2008). This has led to the 
general idea that “more gaze tends to elicit more positivity” (Wirth et al., 2010, p. 869) in 
object and person perception.  
The detection of gaze direction is supported by activation of the STS, which is 
commonly separated into an anterior and a posterior region. Neuroimaging studies in 
humans have consistently reported the pSTS to encode the perceived gaze direction of other 
individuals (cf. Nummenmaa and Calder, 2009).  However, in recent years it was shown that 
also the aSTS encodes particular gaze directions in a more fine-grained fashion than the 
pSTS (Carlin and Calder, in press). While the pSTS responds rather generally to the 
direction of attention and is not only activated by perceived gaze direction but also by head 
direction and body posture (Redcay, 2008), the aSTS contains neural populations encoding 
gaze direction independently of head direction and physical features of faces (Carlin et al., 
2011, 2012). Carlin and Calder (in press) suggest that there is a posterior-to-anterior 
specialization for gaze direction which is increasingly invariant to gaze-irrelevant features. 
Similar hierarchies with increasingly anterior specializations have been found for the coding 
of facial identity in cells of the macaque temporal cortex, suggesting that “hierarchical 
progressions toward view invariance may therefore be a general property of high-level face 
representations” (Carlin et al., 2011 p. 1820). Evidence that the pSTS is sensitive to the 
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social context in which a gaze shift occurs comes from an experiment in which participants 
watched brief video clips in which a visual stimulus appeared to the left or right side of a 
virtual agent looking at them. The agent then either shifted its gaze towards the stimulus or 
towards the blank side. Whenever the agent’s response was incongruent, activity in the right 
pSTS was increased. As a visual stimulus should evoke more interest than a blank space, the 
shift away from the stimulus violated participants’ expectations regarding the agent’s 
behavior. It was therefore concluded that the pSTS might be involved in detecting intentions 
expressed by gaze shifts (Pelphrey et al., 2003). In a similar study, the manipulation did not 
involve gaze shifts, but observed reach-to-grasp movements towards or away from a visual 
target (Pelphrey et al., 2004a). Activity in the pSTS was also increased for incongruent 
movements, thereby implicating a general role in analyzing the intentionality of actions.  
Given the contribution of the pSTS to multiple different aspects of gaze processing 
(approach-avoidance, general detection of social attention, encoding of intentions…) it is 
difficult to postulate a common function of this region. This is further aggravated by the 
involvement of the STS in speech perception, audio-visual integration, and the analysis of 
biological motion. It has thus been proposed that the function of the STS critically depends 
on network co-activations and that future studies should focus on connectivity analyses to 
detect commonalities and differences in STS activity between different tasks (Hein and 
Knight, 2008).    
 
3.1.3 Joining and Sharing Attention 
Following another individual’s gaze to a novel focus of visual attention creates a situation of 
joint attention (JA). In contrast to a situation in which two individuals coincidentally look at 
the same object, the follower is aware of sharing the gazer’s focus of attention in joint 
attention. According to the definition of Emery (2000), however, JA does not require the 
gazer to be aware of the gaze-follower’s reaction. A distinction has therefore been made 
between joint and shared attention (SA), with the latter requiring both individuals to be 
aware of focusing on the same object and on each other. Whereas the terms JA and SA are 
often used interchangeably in the literature (and usually subsumed under the label JA), the 
comparably modular and clear-cut definitions of core processes of social gaze of Emery 
(2000) shall be adopted here. They serve as the conceptual basis for an empirical 
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investigation of potential behavioral differences between JA and SA in study 2. For sake of 
simplicity, however, the term JA will be used in the following. 
While mutual gaze and gaze-following represent dyadic processes involving two 
individuals, JA represents a triadic interaction involving a ‘referential triangle’ of two 
individuals and some third entity (e.g. object, person, location etc.) in the environment 
(Carpenter et al., 1998). Considering that people look where they attend and where they 
intend to act, JA is hence considered fundamental to an understanding of other minds. An 
important distinction is made between responding to other people’s offerings of JA and 
initiating JA (Mundy and Newell, 2007). While responding to a bid for joint attention by 
following someone’s gaze can also be observed in non-human primates, the initiation of JA 
is believed to represent a uniquely human capacity. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that 
starting at the age of 9 months, children show an intrinsic motivation to actively share 
attention with parents and caretakers by directing their gaze to an object, and to reengage 
them in social interactions which have previously been interrupted (see Tomasello et al., 
2005 and references therein). JA thereby combines an intrinsic motivation to share with the 
establishment of perceptual common ground in a reciprocal fashion (Clark, 1996). This has 
been argued to create “a shared space of common psychological ground that enables 
everything from collaborative activities with shared goals to human-style cooperative 
communication” (Tomasello and Carpenter, 2007, p. 121). In sum, JA is the origin of any 
meaningful non-verbal social interaction and therein provides a tool to study engagement 
and participation in online social interaction. 
Neuroimaging literature on JA is still comparatively sparse. Due to the lack of 
interactive technologies, researchers were facing the problem that they could only address 
participant’s responses to bids of JA by using gaze-cueing paradigms. Materna et al. (2008) 
found that engaging in JA by following another individual’s gaze cue to an object in space 
recruited the pSTS, which is consistent with studies on the perception of gaze direction. 
More importantly, these authors demonstrated that this activation is specific for gaze cues, 
while symbolic cues recruit the IPS, which is more generally implicated in re-directing 
spatial attention. Another study reported activity in the mPFC while participants engaged in 
JA (Williams et al., 2005), thereby suggesting a link between JA and mentalizing. Although 
these results are interesting, the methods used did neither capture the reciprocal nature of JA, 
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nor did they allow for disentangling differences in the neural mechanisms subserving 
initiating and responding to JA. 
The development of the interactive setup in study 1 made it possible to use 
interactive eye-tracking in combination with MRI for a systematic study of responding to 
and initiating JA and NJA (Schilbach et al., 2010). Their results indicated that the mPFC is 
activated preferentially during the response to JA, whereas the successful initiation of JA 
specifically recruits the ventral striatum (VS) which is a central component of the reward 
system. This study provided first-time evidence for an intrinsic motivational mechanism to 
share attention and thereby, in a broader sense, initiate social interaction with others 
(Tomasello et al., 2005). In another study using live video feeds, Redcay and colleagues 
compared self- and other-initiated JA using a paradigm in which participants were instructed 
to play a game with the experimenter (Redcay et al., 2012). They had to locate an object on 
the screen following the gaze cue of the experimenter, or to help the experimenter to find the 
object by providing them with a gaze cue. A solo attention condition served as a control 
condition. The most reliable differential activation for JA was observed in the right pSTS. 
This is consistent with previous studies that have demonstrated the involvement of this 
region in other-initiated JA (Materna et al., 2008; Redcay et al., 2012). As it has been 
described above, the pSTS is crucially involved in decoding the direction of another 
person’s gaze direction as well as the intention behind a gaze shift (Nummenmaa and 
Calder, 2009). Both self- and other-initiated JA showed greater activation of the dorsal 
mPFC, which is consistent with the results of previous studies (Schilbach et al., 2010; 
Williams et al., 2005) and is likely to reflect a sharing of attention that is necessary for an 
inference of another individual’s mental states. During other-initiated JA, however, the 
ventral mPFC was activated to a greater extent as in self-initiated JA. This activation 
extended in the mOFC, which is considered part of the brain’s reward system. As the gaze 
cue of the experimenter was a cooperative cue in the framework of a collaborative game 
involving a joint intention (i.e. ‘finding the object together’), the authors argued that this 
activation might be related to the anticipation of rewards. However, a recent meta-analysis 
demonstrated that it is specifically involved in the subjective hedonic experience of reward 
(Peters and Büchel, 2010). This suggests that this activation is related to the experience of 
receiving a cooperative cue from another person rather than to reward anticipation. Self-
initiated JA recruited a fronto-parietal attention network (FPAN), which is explained by 
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greater attentional demands attributed to the voluntary initiation of JA in comparison to 
following someone’s gaze. In the study by Schilbach and colleagues (2010), this network 
was only recruited during NJA. Although this discrepancy cannot be clarified here entirely, 
it might be related to the explicit instruction to engage in NJA that participants received in 
the study by Schilbach and co-workers (2010), while the control condition in the study using 
live video feeds was a solo attention condition in which the experimenter disengaged from 
the interaction by closing her eyes.  
In sum, JA is associated with activation of the mPFC, pSTS, and networks more 
generally related to attentional processing. Especially the mPFC has been activated reliably 
during JA in most studies and thereby appears to represent a neural mechanism at the 
intersection between gaze behavior and an understanding of intentions in triadic relations. 
Considering the prominent role of the mPFC in offline mentalizing studies (» 2.1.2.1), these 
findings suggest that the mPFC broadly supports the understanding of others by enabling a 
‘meeting of minds’ (Amodio and Frith, 2006). In contrast, the reward-related activation of 
the VS during self-initiated JA has only been found in a single study so far (Schilbach et al., 
2010). Consequently, the exact nature of reward mechanisms during gaze-based interactions 
was a central issue of investigation in study 4 of this thesis. 
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4 Interacting with Virtual Agents 
 
Virtual reality techniques have found their way into numerous areas of neuroscientific 
research (Bohil et al., 2011). In social psychology and social-cognitive neuroscience, the use 
of virtual agents is promoted as they allow isolating a cue of interest, such as gaze reactions, 
while neutralizing confounding variables (Fox et al., 2009). Especially in neuroimaging 
studies, a reduction of the ‘band width’ of social interaction is essential in order to maintain 
experimental control. Recent research on so-called anthropomorphic virtual agents – which 
have realistic human features while still being easily recognized as artificial – has suggested 
that they provide an excellent tool to study online social interaction (cf. Vogeley and Bente, 
2010).  
In all studies comprising this thesis, participants engage in reciprocal interactions in 
which they are directly addressed by a virtual agent who reacts to their gaze behavior in a 
gaze-contingent fashion. At the outset of this thesis, this approach was an absolute novelty. 
In the meantime, two other groups have developed interactive eye-tracking setups to study 
real-time interaction. One setup involves the use of virtual characters similar to the one 
presented in study 1 (Grynszpan et al., 2011, 2012), while the other allows face-to-face 
interaction between a subject inside an MRI scanner and an experimenter via a live video-
feed (Redcay et al., 2010). Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. Obviously, 
the use of video-feeds allows the most realistic kind of gaze-based interaction. It has been 
shown that watching live faces but not pictures of faces increased left-frontal EEG 
asymmetries and arousal related to approach behavior (Pönkänen et al., 2008) which has 
been attributed to an enhancement of mentalizing and self-awareness induced by the 
interaction with a real face (Pönkänen et al., 2011). Accordingly, observational studies found 
that when participants watched movie clips of real humans versus animated humans 
performing actions, there was enhanced activity in areas of the SBN, such as the mPFC, 
TPJ, and STS (Han et al., 2005; Mar et al., 2007). Notably, it is possible that the advantage 
that has been attributed to using live faces might be partially due to the nature of the facial 
stimuli used in the studies cited above. For example, Han and colleagues (2005) used 
excerpts of TV cartoons which lack a variety of facial features whose presence might be 
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important for social-cognitive processes. Conversely, in another study, real scenes were 
interleaved with cartoon-rendered scenes of the same movie that were still extremely 
realistic (Mar et al., 2007), hence possibly triggering the ‘uncanny valley effect’, an 
unsettling experience that emerges when some entity appears extremely human without 
actually being human (Mori, 1970).  
The investigation of gaze behavior in interactions with live faces is prone to 
substantial noise because gaze direction is only one – albeit powerful – out of multiple facial 
cues conveying non-verbal information (Grant, 1969). Even slight changes in the muscles 
controlling the eye region or the labial angles can result in differences in the perception of a 
person (Ekman and Oster, 1979) and it has often been demonstrated that facial features and 
facial configuration have a general bias on our impression of others (Berry and McArthur, 
1986). Studies focusing on gaze-based social interaction hence require strict control of these 
features which is hardly possible when an experimenter or actor functions as the interaction 
partner. These problems can be circumvented by using carefully designed anthropomorphic 
virtual agents. The interaction with such agents results in comparable reactions and social 
behaviors as the interaction with real humans. For example, socially induced inhibition as 
well as facilitation of task performance could not only be observed in the presence of 
another person, but also in the presence of human-controlled avatars (Hoyt et al., 2003). 
Likewise, participants’ regulation of interpersonal distance and approach behavior is 
comparable in immersive virtual environments and real social encounters (Bailenson et al., 
2003). It was also demonstrated that participants displayed empathic concern for virtual 
agents in distressful situations, thereby demonstrating that encounters with virtual characters 
readily elicit prosocial behavior (Gillath et al., 2008). Finally, a study by Bente and 
collaborators revealed that the simulation of gaze behavior by virtual characters in face-to-
face interactions results in similar experiences of social presence and intimateness as real 
gaze behavior (Bente et al., 2007).  
To conclude, the use of live video feeds principally allows a holistic examination of 
the neural correlates of face-to-face interactions. However, with presently available 
neuroimaging methods it is difficult to correlate neural activity with specific components of 
complex social interactions. It is therefore beneficial to adopt a ‘divide-and-conquer’ 
strategy and decompose these interactions into meaningful constituents. Virtual agents 
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permit investigating the effects of gaze reactions while other facial features such as 
emotional expressions or attractiveness are kept constant. These features can then be 
modulated in a step-by-step fashion, for instance by pairing congruent gaze reactions with a 
smile, a frown, or an eye-blink. Taken together, the decision between real and virtually 
mediated interactions is presently a decision between a bottom-up and a top-down approach 
to the study of social interaction. 
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5 Research Agenda of this Thesis 
 
The aim of this thesis was to create an experimental paradigm which would allow to 
investigate the subjective experience and motivational basis of being engaged in online 
social interaction – i.e. face-to-face and in real-time – both on a behavioral and neural level. 
The construction of a realistic gaze-based interaction paradigm compatible with fMRI 
required several steps. The first step consisted of the development of an interactive eye-
tracking paradigm in which participants can initiate interactions with anthropomorphic 
virtual characters in a gaze-contingent fashion. The challenge of study 1 was to design a 
paradigm in such a way that it could be used with on any hardware with a variety of eye-
trackers to allow for behavioral testing as well as application in an MRI scanner. Before a 
gaze based interaction paradigm can be crafted, it is necessary to explore the dynamic and 
temporal aspects of social gaze behavior on the basis of single gaze trials. Study 2 aimed at 
uncovering the latencies of another individual’s gaze-following reactions that were 
experienced as contingent upon participant’s own gaze shifts. These ‘natural’ latencies were 
then used in another experiment addressing differences in the dynamics of gaze shifts in the 
conceptually distinct processes of JA and SA. It was hypothesized that the initiation of JA 
would require less gaze shifts between the virtual agent and an object on the screen than the 
initiation of SA. Using the information obtained in study 2, the actual interaction paradigm, 
which represents the core of this thesis was developed in study 3. The objective was to 
design a task that would allow differentiating participants’ subjective experience of 
interactions as social or as non-social. To this end, a non-verbal Turing test was generated in 
which participants had to judge whether a virtual agent had been controlled by a human 
conspecific or a computer algorithm based on the gaze reactions of this agent during brief 
interaction sequences. The interaction partner was introduced either as naïve to the 
participants’ task, as explicitly cooperative, or as openly competitive. This allowed assessing 
the patterns of gaze reactions participants judged as indicative of real human interaction in 
different types of interaction contexts. Finally, study 4 was a within-subject version of the 
non-verbal Turing test adapted for fMRI which targeted the intrinsic motivational 
foundation and rewarding nature of social interaction.  
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5.1 Own Experimental Studies 
 
5.1.1 Study 1: It’s in your eyes – using gaze-contingent stimuli to create truly 
interactive paradigms for social cognitive and affective neuroscience. (Wilms M, 
Schilbach L, Pfeiffer UJ, Bente G, Fink GR, Vogeley K, 2010. Social Cognitive and 
Affective Neuroscience, 5(1), pp. 98 – 107.) 
In this study we sought to develop an interactive eye-tracking setup, which allows 
participants to interact with an anthropomorphic virtual agent on a computer screen via their 
eye-movements. An interactive paradigm means that that users cannot only react to the 
agent, but are also able to observe the agent moving its eyes in a gaze-contingent fashion, 
that is, in response to their own gaze behavior. Although gaze-contingent eye-tracking had 
been used in human-computer interaction research before the beginning of this thesis 
(Duchowski et al., 2004), no methods allowing reciprocal, non-verbal interaction in the 
context of social neuroscience existed at that time. The challenge of our approach was to 
create an MRI-compatible eye-tracking setup which extracts the gaze input of a user to 
control visual stimulation in real-time according to preset task definitions.      
 The algorithm controlling the interactive paradigm was originally implemented in 
Presentation
TM
 (Neurobehavioral Systems, www.neurobs.com), a software package 
dedicated to visual stimulus presentation in psychological experiments. However, the 
algorithm is universally applicable and can therefore be used across a variety of 
programming languages and eye-tracking systems. Figure 4 (adapted from Pfeiffer and 
Weidner, 2013; Wilms et al., 2010) depicts the algorithm in a flowchart. Input and output 
are depicted by green flowchart elements. The algorithm enables both overt and covert 
feedback, the former being symbolized by blue and the latter by red elements. The blue parts 
of the flowchart depict components relating to the detection of gaze coordinates and overt 
feedback. Raw gaze coordinates are fed into a continuously moving sliding window with a 
preset number of gaze positions. A moving average is calculated from this sliding window to 
ensure smooth movements of a gaze cursor in cases of overt feedback. Standard deviations 
of gaze coordinates are monitored in order to detect coherent gaze periods. After a preset 
number of moving averages, a gaze period is accepted as a fixation. When covert feedback 
is used, it is validated whether a fixation is within a region of interest (ROI). This is depicted 
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Figure 4. Interactive eye-tracking algorithm. Flowchart depicting the elements of the interactive eye-tracking 
paradigm established in study 1. Green elements denote in- and output, blue elements are important for both overt 
and covert feedback, and red elements relate to covert feedback (adapted from Pfeiffer and Weidner, 2013; Wilms et 
al, 2010). 
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by the red elements of the flowchart. Depending on the ROI fixated by a user, the visual 
stimulation on a screen can then be changed dynamically, for instance by making a virtual 
agent follow the user’s gaze to engage in JA. Since the delay caused by the algorithm is in 
the range of few milliseconds (ms), gaze-based interactions can be simulated in real-time. 
Taken together, interactive eye-tracking constitutes a significant enrichment of the 
toolbox of social neuroscience by allowing an assessment of online social cognition and 
enabling participants to observe an agent reacting to their own gaze shifts. This closes the 
‘perception-action loop’ between two interacting individuals and allows investigations of 
initiating joint and shared attention as compared to merely responding to another person’s 
gaze cues. The use of virtual agents provides the possibility to control for factors such as 
attractiveness and likeability of an interaction partner and permits focusing on gaze behavior 
in an ecologically valid fashion (e.g. Bailenson et al., 2005; Bente et al., 2007; Vogeley and 
Bente, 2010).    
 
5.1.2 Study 2: Eyes on the mind: investigating the influence of gaze dynamics on the 
perception of others in real-rime social interaction. (Pfeiffer UJ, Schilbach L, 
Jording M, Timmermans B, Bente G, Vogeley K, 2012.  Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 
p. 537.) 
While previous studies have concentrated on responses to other persons’ gaze behavior, the 
development of an interactive eye-tracking paradigm (study 1) made it possible to examine 
different aspects of self-initiated gaze behavior. Similar to other domains of non-verbal 
behavior (e.g. facial expressions, gestures…), gaze behavior has certain specific temporal 
and dynamic features. For example, when someone follows our gaze after a delay of one 
second it is likely to be a reaction to our gaze shift. In contrast, when there is a delay of ten 
seconds, we hardly experience the other’s gaze as contingent upon our own. More precisely, 
two questions were addressed in this study: (1) How does the perception of JA depend on 
the congruency (i.e. following vs. non-following) and latency (i.e. temporal delay) of 
another individual’s gaze reaction? (2) Is there a difference between gaze dynamics in JA 
and SA?  
In each experiment of this study, participants interacted with a virtual agent in an 
adaption of the interactive eye-tracking setup designed in study 1 and believed that the eye 
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movements of a confederate were visualized by the agent. In experiment 1a, they were asked 
to fixate one of two objects on the screen. The agent would then either follow their gaze or 
look to the other object. The latency of the agent’s gaze reaction was varied from 0 to 4000 
ms in steps of 400 ms. Subsequently, they were asked to rate how contingent they 
experienced this reaction on their gaze shift on a 4-item scale. Overall, participants rated 
congruent reactions as more contingent on their own gaze with ratings decreasing for 
latencies greater than 800 ms. Furthermore, when reactions had a latency of 0 ms, they were 
experienced as coincidence and hence rated as rather non-contingent. Experiment 1b 
repeated experiment 1a without the incongruent condition to increase participants’ 
sensitivity to the timing of gaze reactions by decreasing the putative other’s options to act. 
Starting at a latency of 400 ms, there was a highly significant linear decrease in relatedness 
ratings that was much more pronounced than in experiment 1a. Furthermore, an analysis 
directly comparing the congruent trials of experiments 1a and 1b demonstrated that the 
experience of contingency was earlier in experiment 1b than in experiment 1a (i.e. 400 vs. 
800 ms). This suggests that the action possibilities of an interaction partner are implicitly 
taken into account when evaluating the contingency between our own and another person’s 
gaze behavior. The findings of this study demonstrate that, depending on an interaction 
partner’s options to act, gaze reactions with latencies between 400 and 800 ms are perceived 
as most contingent (i.e. most natural) upon our own gaze shifts. Moreover, given that 
latency hardly has an effect on contingency judgments when the other has another option to 
act (experiment 1a), our sense of agency is stronger in this situation although the causal link 
between our gaze shift is weaker than in experiment 1b. 
In experiment 2, these ‘natural’ latencies between 400 and 800 ms were used to 
construct a paradigm in which participants’ were either instructed to engage in JA or SA. In 
the JA group, they were instructed to respond as soon as they themselves were aware that 
both they and the other directed their attention to the same object. In the SA condition, they 
received the instruction to respond once they were convinced that both of them were aware 
of each other directing their attention to the same object. SA required more oscillatory gaze 
shifts between the agent and the object than JA. There was also substantially more inter-
individual variance in the number of gaze shifts in SA. These findings show for the first time 
that JA and SA differ regarding the underlying gaze dynamics and can thus indeed be 
regarded as different processes (Emery, 2000). The great variance in the number of gaze 
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shifts in the SA group furthermore suggests that gaze dynamics might be an embodied 
correlate of mentalizing processes involved, which have previously also been reported to be 
subject to great inter-individual variance. 
In sum, study 2 sheds light on important dynamic features of self-initiated social 
gaze behavior that could not be observed previously due to a lack of appropriate method. 
The findings also aid a clear terminological distinction of core processes of social gaze. In 
particular, the hitherto theoretical distinction between JA and SA has been empirically 
supported. Finally, the results are of great significance for a realistic design of prospective 
studies on gaze-based interactions.  
 
5.1.3 Study 3: A non-verbal Turing test: Differentiating mind from machine in gaze-
based social interaction. (Pfeiffer UJ, Timmermans B, Bente G, Vogeley K, 
Schilbach L, 2011. PLoS One, 6(11), e27591.) 
Social interactions come in various forms and often present themselves as very complex. To 
study online social interaction under standardized experimental conditions, it is therefore 
indispensable to develop paradigms in which communicative bandwidth is limited while 
ecological validity is high. Furthermore, prior to addressing high-level interactions, it is 
necessary to reveal how the subjective experience of being engaged in social interaction in 
real-time shapes the behavior of an individual. This requires a paradigm in which 
participants subjectively experience an interaction as social or non-social depending on the 
dynamics of the interaction. Several decades ago, Alan Turing has developed such a 
paradigm, the so-called ‘Turing test’ (Turing, 1950). In this test, a participant engages in 
written communication with another human being or a computer program via a computer 
screen. The task of the participant is to deduce the nature of his present interaction partner 
solely from the conversation. Although Turing was interested in the question whether and 
which machines can be ascribed human-like intelligence, his famous test provides an 
excellent scaffold for separating situations of social from non-social interaction without 
informing participants a priori about the nature of their interaction partner. We thus created 
an experimental procedure termed the ‘non-verbal Turing test’, in which participants had to 
judge whether they were interacting with a human conspecific or a computer in brief, gaze-
based interactions.     
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Each interaction consisted of a series of six gaze trials in each of which participants 
had to establish mutual gaze with a virtual agent before shifting their gaze to one of two 
objects on the screen. Consequently, the agent either followed their gaze or averted its gaze 
to the other object on the screen, thereby engaging in JA or NJA, respectively. Participants 
were instructed that in each interaction block the agent could be controlled by another 
human participant or a computer. Unbeknownst to them, however, the alleged interaction 
partner was a confederate and the agent was always controlled by a computer algorithm to 
allow for a systematic variation of JA and NJA ranging from zero to six out of six possible 
instances of JA. After each block, they had to engage in a ‘humanness ascription task’ by 
indicating whether the agent had been controlled by the other participant or the computer, or, 
in other words, whether they had experienced this interaction as social or non-social. In a 
series of three experiments using a between-subject design, the confederate was introduced  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Humanness ascription in the non-verbal Turing test. These graphs depict the proportion of human ratings 
when the interaction partner was introduced as A) naïve, B) cooperative, and C) competitive (adapted from Pfeiffer 
et al, 2011). 
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as naïve to the participant’s task, explicitly cooperative, or explicitly competitive. Results 
indicate that the ascription of humanness increases with higher degrees of gaze-following 
when participants interact with a putatively naïve partner (Figure 5A). In contrast, 
humanness was also ascribed in cases of high degrees of gaze aversion when the confederate 
had been introduced as cooperative, thereby indicating an expectation of contingent rather 
than merely congruent reactions (Figure 5B). In competitive interaction, neither congruency 
nor contingency of the agent’s reactions played a role in humanness ascription (Figure 5C). 
In addition, the naïve and cooperative experiments were repeated using a concurrent 
cognitive load task to reveal the degree of automaticity of the different patterns of 
humanness ascription. The cognitive load tasks revealed that high-levels of JA are 
automatically considered as indicative of a human interaction partner, whereas the ascription 
of humanness in the cooperative condition is lacking such an automatic component, thereby 
indicating a comparably strategic integration of the other’s reactions. 
To begin with, participants readily believed that they were engaging in real social 
interactions implemented in a virtual environment. These results hence demonstrate that 
gaze behavior displayed by virtual agents can be applied to construct ecologically valid 
social interactions. Furthermore, the findings on humanness ascription show that humans 
have a default expectation of reciprocity in interaction. An interactor’s presumed disposition 
to cooperate appears to drastically alter the evaluation of this interactor’s reactions. Taken 
together, the non-verbal Turing test offers an appropriate tool to study the neural 
mechanisms associated with the experience of engagement in interaction (study 4). 
 
5.1.4 Study 4: Why we interact: On the functional role of the ventral striatum during 
real-time social interactions. (Pfeiffer UJ, Schilbach L, Timmermans B, 
Kuzmanovic B, Georgescu AL, Bente G, Vogeley K., Submitted) 
An intrinsic motivation for social interaction has often been proposed and is thought to be 
unique to the human species (Tomasello, 2009). Indeed, various neuroeconomic studies have 
found reward-related activity during social interactions. However, the application of 
economic games in the study of social interaction usually entails the investigation of specific 
high-level social concepts such as trust, fairness, or cooperation. In contrast, the claim that 
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being in interaction with others is per se rewarding has never been put to the test, which 
most likely is due to the absence of appropriate methods. 
We sought to explicitly assess whether experiencing engagement in social interaction 
recruits the reward system of the brain. In order to allow participants to engage in social 
interaction face-to-face and in real-time while they were in an MRI scanner, we used a 
within-subject adaption of the non-verbal Turing test introduced in study 3. In this version, 
each interaction comprised five trials in which the virtual agent would either engage in joint 
or non-joint attention. The experiment consisted of two phases in which the human 
interaction partner was either introduced as naïve to participants’ task or as explicitly 
cooperative. This permitted an exploration of the neural integration of another individual’s 
gaze reactions during naïve and cooperative interaction. More importantly, however, this 
enabled investigating whether social interaction per se is sufficient to recruit reward-related 
neurocircuitry, or whether the introduction of a cooperative context is necessary. A major 
advantage of this setup the fact that the experience of engagement in social interaction is not 
defined a priori as an independent variable as in other studies employing human-computer 
distinctions, but emerges through the interaction dynamics.  
Results show that the subjective experience of human interaction is correlated with 
activation of the ventral striatum (VS) and mOFC (Figure 6A), while experiencing non-
social interaction is associated with increased neural activity in a fronto-parietal network 
related to attentional processing (Figure 6B). Behavioral data revealed that the time course 
of the integration of information during social interaction differs between naïve and 
cooperative interaction. During naïve interaction, already the first two trials (i.e. whether 
they are JA or NJA trials) exerted significant influence on the humanness judgment. On the 
contrary, during cooperation the influence of trial type increased towards the end of an 
interaction block. Based on these behavioral findings, additional fMRI analyses 
demonstrated that experiencing the interaction with a naïve and a cooperative interaction 
partner differentially modulates striatal activity. During naïve interaction, the striatum 
signals an early and putatively automatic preference subserving mechanisms of impression 
formation. During cooperation, it encodes the accumulation of value – i.e. the buildup of 
evidence that the interaction partner is actually human. Analyses based on the independent 
variable (i.e. the manipulation of the agent’s gaze behavior) show that in the naïve condition 
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single events of joint attention recruit the social brain network irrespective of the condition 
without any integration of gaze reactions over the time course of an interaction block. In 
contrast, single events are stripped of their social salience during cooperation. The 
cooperative instruction appears to introduce an overarching mindset in which only 
contingency matters: Positive contingency is predominantly encoded by the dorsal striatum 
whereas negative contingency recruits the FPAN. The interplay of these two systems 
suggests a distribution of cognitive resources which might be required to ensure that joint 
attention – a social cue which is naturally meaningful and rewarding – is only associated 
with salience when the overall congruency of reactions is high and thereby indicative of a 
cooperative interaction partner.  
These results provide first-time evidence that the subjective experience of social 
interaction is sufficient to recruit the reward system even without the presence of an 
explicitly cooperative interactor and, therefore, provide long sought confirmation of a neural 
motivation for social interaction. Moreover, the context of an interaction – that is, whether 
we interact with a naïve or a cooperative interaction partner – does not only influence our 
behavioral evaluation of her reactions to our own actions, but also has a great impact on the 
neural integration of these reactions. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. A) Neural correlates of social and non-social interaction. Greater activation of VS and mOFC during the 
experience of social interaction. B) Greater activation across the FPAN (including IPS, PC, MFG, IFG) during the 
experience of non-social interaction. 
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6 General Discussion 
 
The studies in the present thesis attempted to contribute to an understanding of the cognitive 
mechanisms and neural processes contributing to online social interaction. The development 
of an interactive eye-tracking paradigm (study 1) enabled us to study temporal and dynamic 
features of self-initiated processes of social gaze, such as gaze-following and joint attention, 
thereby opening a window to an understanding of gaze dynamics in triadic social 
interactions (study 2). Moreover, obtaining these data on a single-trial level made it possible 
to use sequences of gaze trials to construct basic and realistic interactions serving as the 
building blocks of the ‘non-verbal Turing test’ (study 3). Although study 3 represented a 
somewhat explorative endeavor into understanding the mind in interaction, results 
demonstrated that the signals we evaluate as indicative of real human interaction crucially 
rely on the context of the interaction, i.e. whether someone is explicitly cooperating with us 
or not. Finally, in study 4 an fMRI adaptation of this paradigm demonstrated that also the 
neural evaluation of these signals differs depending on whether we interact with a 
cooperator or not. Most intriguingly, however, results showed that explicit cooperation is not 
necessary to recruit the reward system during online social interaction but rather that the 
mere subjective experience of being in interaction is intrinsically rewarded as demonstrated 
by the activation of the ventral striatum and the mOFC. Importantly, social interaction was 
mediated by virtual agents instead of live faces. These results challenge the previous 
findings indicating that live faces are required to trigger mentalizing processes (Pönkänen et 
al., 2008; Wheatley et al., 2011), and thus strongly encourage the application of 
anthropomorphic virtual agents in the study of social interaction.  
 
6.1 Motivational Aspects of Social Interaction 
First speculations for the involvement of reward-related processes are supported by the 
findings of study 3. This study focused on the expectations regarding the behavior of an 
alleged human interactor depending on whether this interactor was perceived as naïve, 
cooperative, or competitive. The main finding was that we are naturally predisposed to 
congruent gaze reactions (i.e. JA) as an indicator of an agent’s humanness, while we 
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discount this expectation of mere congruency and accept generally contingent behavior (i.e. 
maximal JA or maximal NJA) as a cue to humanness in cases of explicit cooperation. This 
demonstrates that we are not blind to the actual contingency of gaze behavior but need an 
obvious reason to accept negatively contingent behavior as indicative of being in interaction 
with another human. This is likely to be related to the fact that gaze aversion is generally 
associated with negative emotional valence (e.g. Hietanen et al., 2008; Wirth et al., 2010). In 
comparison, JA is experienced as pleasant and recruits the VS as a function of the 
experienced pleasantness. This has been argued to represent an intrinsic neural motivation to 
initiate social interaction with another person (Schilbach et al., 2010). However, the study by 
Schilbach et al. (2010) does not provide unequivocal evidence for this claim. Participants in 
this study were informed that the other was explicitly instructed to either follow their gaze or 
avert its gaze in a given interaction block. In addition, they were informed about the other’s 
instruction prior to each interaction block. The observed striatal activation might therefore 
be related to the feeling of being in control or to the confirmation of the expectation of 
another person’s gaze-following behavior rather than to the experience of JA in itself 
(Delgado, 2007). This is supported by two studies which used a live face-to-face interaction 
setup to disentangle the neural correlates of initiating and responding to JA and failed to 
report differential activation of the VS for self-initiated JA (Redcay et al., 2010, 2012). 
These inconsistencies warranted a more direct investigation of the question whether the 
experience of online social interaction recruits the reward system. Indeed, previous 
neuroimaging studies suggested the recruitment of the reward system during social 
interactions. However, these studies comprised high-level neuroeconomic social interactions 
and operationalized human-computer distinctions explicitly as an independent variable (» 
Chapter 2.2.3). In contrast, the design of the Turing test required participants to determine 
the nature of their interaction partner in basic social interactions via the dynamics of the 
interaction process itself. The within-subject design of study 4 provided the additional asset 
of allowing a comparison of neural activity during naïve and cooperative social interaction. 
This allowed answering the question whether explicit cooperation is necessary to turn social 
interaction into a rewarding experience. As study 4 demonstrated, this is not case, which 
clearly demonstrates that the mere experience of active engagement in interaction with 
another person is intrinsically rewarding. 
The findings of studies 3 and 4 are consistent with proposals of an internal drive to 
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engage in interaction from early childhood on. Developmental studies have shown that 
behavioral contingencies inherent to social interactions between few-month old infants and 
their caregivers are experienced as joyful and pleasant (e.g. Rochat, 2001). Similarly, in the 
double television experiments by Murray and Trevarthen, babies interacted with their 
mothers via a television screen in real-time or saw recordings of their mothers’ previous 
interaction behavior, which disrupted the behavioral contingency and caused severe 
emotional distress (Murray and Trevarthen, 1985). This has lend support to Trevarthen’s 
concept of ‘primary intersubjectivity’ which suggests that from the very beginning of life 
there is a sharing of experience by elementary reciprocal interactions which are described as 
enjoyable both for infant and adult (Trevarthen, 1979). Such early interactions – so-called 
protoconversations – are devoid of any references to the outside world and therefore are not 
‘about’ anything.  Tomasello and colleagues noted that they require not only the capacity, 
but also the motivation to share emotions in the form of such simple interactions (Tomasello 
et al., 2005). At later stages of development, this motivation continually expands to sharing 
perceptions, goals, and activities, as measured by children’s active pursuit of an engagement 
with others in order to share. Although Tomasello never claims explicitly that social 
interaction is rewarded by the brain, this is an implicit consequence of his postulate of an 
innate ‘motivation to share’ (Tomasello et al., 2005; Tomasello and Carpenter, 2007; 
Tomasello, 2009). As a final notion, the ‘social brain hypothesis’ shall be mentioned here, 
which argues that the complexity and extraordinary size of the human brain has emerged due 
to the evolutionary pressures created by living in groups (Dunbar, 1998). Specifically, he has 
argued that the limiting factor of group size is the information-processing capacity of the 
brain. Obviously, the question of whether intelligence enabled social cognition or whether 
social cognition enabled intelligence is a “chicken-and-egg question” (Adolphs, 2009, p. 
699) which cannot be answered here. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that an intrinsic 
motivation to engage in social interaction with conspecifics might have co-evolved as a 
selection advantage. Taken together, however, it must be noted that despite providing first-
time evidence for the rewarding value of social encounters, the data of studies 3 and 4 can 
only serve as starting point for research on the motivational drive to interact. Further 
research is needed to investigate whether this is a central aspect of social interactions and 
which discrete factors of social interaction modulate the reward system.  
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6.2 Investigating Social Motivation in Autism 
Future research might help to understand impairments of social cognition in clinical 
populations. While it has been argued throughout this thesis that social interaction is 
rewarding, this appears not to be true in autism spectrum disorders (ASD). ASD is 
characterized by repetitive, stereotyped behaviors, deficits in communication, and a severe 
impairment of social interaction (Baron-Cohen and Belmonte, 2005). Moreover, this 
impairment does not only seem to include the process of interaction but also the motivation 
to interact – that is, autistic persons do not seem to want to interact with others (Kohls et al., 
2012). This ‘social anhedonia’ has been demonstrated across a wide range of social 
phenomena. For example, children with ASD prefer non-social to social stimuli and are less 
likely to help others spontaneously or to engage in shared collaborative activities. 
Furthermore, persons with ASD often report not having friends without feeling lonely, avoid 
eye contact, and do not initiate joint attention with others. These observations have recently 
led to the proposal of a ‘social motivation theory of autism’ which suggests deficits in the 
neural mechanisms supporting social rewards (Chevallier et al., 2012). Reward processing is 
usually divided into two components – an anticipatory phase of ‘wanting’ and a phase of 
reward ‘liking’. One of the main claims of the social motivation hypothesis is that rather the 
‘wanting’ than the ‘liking’ component is disrupted in ASD. At the moment, neuroimaging 
studies on the processing of social rewards are sparse. Interestingly, however, ‘wanting’ is 
mainly associated with activity of the VS (Peters and Büchel, 2010), which has been shown 
to be activated during the experience of social interaction in study 4. It is thus conceivable 
that the non-verbal Turing test provides a suitable tool to scrutinize the neural mechanisms 
underlying the deficits in social motivation observed in ASD. Understanding the differences 
in reward-related activity during social encounters might be crucial for an understanding of 
both the ‘healthy’ and the autistic brain. Lastly, uncovering social motivational deficits of 
ASD is of great importance for the development of suitable therapy programs.  
 
6.3 From One Mind to Two Minds 
A further expansion of the present studies would consist of the implementation of dual eye-
tracking setups which involve two individuals engaging in gaze-based interactions (Carletta 
et al., 2010). Very recent work by our group resulted in the development of such a system 
 
Ulrich Pfeiffer              From Participation to Motivation                              52 
which enables two individuals to engage in gaze-based interaction with each other while 
their gaze behavior is visualized by virtual agents. For a quantification of gaze parameters 
beyond gaze direction, this platform allows very fine-grained behavioral measurements and 
allows describing interactive gaze behavior in terms of direction, scan path length and area, 
number of saccades and fixations, fixation duration, and saccade velocity. In comparison to 
the interactive paradigm presented in this thesis and live video-streams, this platform has the 
major advantage that true real-time interactions between two individuals can be combined 
with the benefits of virtual reality methods (Barisic et al., in press). The avatars used to 
display participants’ gaze behavior can be controlled for facial appearance and expressions 
whilst the microstructure of interactive gaze behavior is maintained. Furthermore, the 
environment surrounding the avatars can be modulated in a gaze-contingent fashion, thereby 
enabling a plethora of real-life as well as game-like social interactions in a highly realistic 
but controlled fashion. Very recently, live video-streams have been used in hyperscanning 
experiments on social gaze (Saito et al., 2010; Tanabe et al., 2012). Although these studies 
provided a proof-of-principle for the applicability of this method rather than novel insights 
into interactive gaze behavior, the possibility of combining the dual eye-tracking setup with 
hyperscanning has enormous potential for understanding the neural correlates of gaze-based 
interaction online. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
The work reported in this thesis is altogether of an explorative nature. Not surprisingly, this 
opens numerous new questions to be addressed in future studies. Two major challenges can 
be identified at the present stage. Firstly, in the introduction of the second-person approach 
to other minds (» Chapter 2.2.1.) it has been noted that offline and online social cognition 
should differ from one another with respect to the underlying cognitive processes and neural 
mechanisms. Although the studies comprising this thesis offer valuable information about 
online mechanisms, they do not allow a direct comparison of being in interaction and 
observing interaction. Furthermore, such a comparison using the same kind of paradigm is 
of paramount importance for the viability of a second-person approach to social cognition 
(Przyrembel et al., 2012). A potential starting point for addressing this question might 
therefore be to design an observational version of the non-verbal Turing test in which two 
individuals engage in the task while being observed by another participant. The observer 
would then be asked to judge whether the participant who is initiating the gaze trials rates a 
given interaction sequence as social or non-social. The comparison of humanness ratings in 
the offline and the online version might provide a first measure of whether our experience of 
an interaction is changed by our active participation in this interaction. Secondly, the 
discovery that the subjective experience of social interaction is sufficient to recruit the 
reward system raises questions about the function of reward processes during cooperative 
activities. Are we born to cooperate, as suggested by Tomasello (2009), or are we born to 
interact, as the data of study 4 suggest? It might be entirely possible that we cooperate due to 
a much more basal motive – namely to sustain social interactions. As cooperation usually 
entails the engagement in social interactions, future research should focus on investigating 
commonalities as well as differences in the activation of the reward system during 
unconstrained and cooperative interactions.  
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Tools of the Trade
It’s in your eyesusing gaze-contingent stimuli
to create truly interactive paradigms for social
cognitive and affective neuroscience
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The field of social neuroscience has made remarkable progress in elucidating the neural mechanisms of social cognition. More
recently, the need for new experimental approaches has been highlighted that allow studying social encounters in a truly
interactive manner by establishing ’online’ reciprocity in social interaction. In this article, we present a newly developed adap-
tation of a method which uses eyetracking data obtained from participants in real time to control visual stimulation during
functional magnetic resonance imaging, thus, providing an innovative tool to generate gaze-contingent stimuli in spite of the
constraints of this experimental setting. We review results of two paradigms employing this technique and demonstrate how gaze
data can be used to animate a virtual character whose behavior becomes ’responsive’ to being looked at allowing the participant
to engage in ’online’ interaction with this virtual other in real-time. Possible applications of this setup are discussed highlighting
the potential of this development as a new ’tool of the trade’ in social cognitive and affective neuroscience.
Keywords: magnetic resonance imaging-compatible interactive eyetracking; truly interactive paradigms; gaze feedback; social cognition
INTRODUCTION
Social neuroscience has helped to shed light upon the neural
mechanisms underlying our ability to understand other
minds under the headings of ‘theory of mind’ or ‘menta-
lizing’, commonly understood as the ability to represent
other people’s mental states (Frith and Frith, 2003, 2008).
An increasing number of functional neuroimaging studies
suggests that two large-scale neural networks are involved,
namely the so-called mirror neuron system, comprising
essentially the parietal and premotor cortices and the
so-called ‘social brain’, comprising essentially the medial pre-
frontal, the temporopolar, the temporoparietal cortices and
the amygdala (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007; Lieberman, 2007).
Most of these studies, however, rely on paradigms in
which participants are asked to merely observe others
(‘offline’ mentalizing; Schilbach et al., 2006), while mentaliz-
ing during ‘online’ social interaction has only been studied
by a minority of studies (e.g. Montague et al., 2002;
Eisenberger et al., 2003), often making use of game theory
paradigms from economics (e.g. Sanfey, 2007).
Consequently, the need to develop ‘interactive mind’ para-
digms that could provide a platform to systematically study
the neural mechanisms of social interaction in an ecologi-
cally valid manner has been pointed out recently (Singer,
2006). ‘Online’ interaction crucially involves ‘closing the
loop’ between interaction partners and establishing recipro-
cal relations where actions feed directly into the communi-
cation loop and elicit reactions which, in turn, may
subsequently lead to reactions of the initiator and so forth.
This has been referred to as adopting a ‘second-person-per-
spective’ (2PP; Reddy, 2003) which can be taken to suggest
that awareness of mental states results from being psycho-
logically engaged with someone and being an active partic-
ipant of reciprocal interaction thereby establishing a
subject-subject (‘Me–You’) rather than a subject–object
(‘Me–She/He’) relationship. Paradigms that permit the sys-
tematic investigation of the reciprocity of interactions as well
as the involvement of implicit and explicit processes will
substantially enrich our knowledge of the neurobiology of
social cognition (Frith and Frith, 2008).
The challenge for social neuroscience here will be twofold:
a suitable experimental platform should allow real-time,
‘online’ interactions between participants and the social
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stimuli while also providing means for experimental control
over changes of the social stimuli. Here, we suggest that
measurements of participants’ gaze behavior inside the MR
environment could be used to influence a virtual character’s
gaze behavior making it ‘responsive’ to the participant’s gaze
allowing to engage in ‘online’ interaction with the virtual
other in real-time.
From a theoretical standpoint, gaze is known to be an
important social cue in dyadic interaction indicating interest
or disinterest, regulating intimacy levels, seeking feedback
and expressing emotions (e.g. Argyle and Cook, 1976;
Emery, 2000). In addition, gaze can also influence object
perception (Becchio, et al., 2008) by means of establishing
triadic relations between two observers and an object onto
which the interactors can look ‘together’ and thereby estab-
lish ‘joint attention’ (Moore and Dunham, 1995). From a
methodological standpoint, gaze behavior represents one of
the few ways in which participants can interact with stimuli
naturally in spite of the movement constraints when lying
inside an MR scanner. Gaze is a socially most salient non-
verbal behavior, which can be reliably measured even within
an functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) setting
and can, therefore, be used as input for interactive paradigms
in neuroimaging studies.
This leads to the further question of how gaze input can be
used to automatically control contingent behavior of a social
stimulus to create the illusion of real-time interaction in
such a setting. Pre-programmed and strictly controlled
visual presentation of nonverbal behaviors in general and
of gaze cues in particular, can be established by using anthro-
pomorphic virtual characters. Such computer-generated
characters have been suggested as a valuable tool for social
neuroscience (e.g. Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005) as they
convey social information to human observers (e.g. Bente
et al., 2001; Bente et al., 2002, 2008a; Bailenson et al.,
2003) and cause reactions strikingly similar to those in real
human interactions (e.g. Slater et al., 2006). An increasing
number of behavioral as well as fMRI studies has now used
such stimuli to study different aspects of social cognition
including gaze perception (e.g. Pelphrey et al., 2005; Spiers
et al., 2006; Schilbach et al., 2006; Bente et al., 2007, 2008b;
Park et al., 2009; Kuzmanovic et al., 2009).
To establish a paradigm that actively engages participants
in the 2PP as opposed to being a ‘detached’ observer of social
stimuli (from a ‘third-person-perspective’; 3PP), we present
a new technique that makes use of eyetracking data obtained
from participants inside an MR scanner to control a virtual
character’s gaze behavior in real-time making it ‘responsive’
to the human observer’s gaze (Schilbach et al., in press).
In this setup the eye movements of the participant become
a means to ‘probe’ the behavior of the virtual other similar to
real-life situations. Importantly, this also seems compatible
with an ‘enactive’ account of social cognition which under-
stands social cognition as bodily experiences resulting from
an organism’s adaptive actions upon salient and self-relevant
aspects of the environment (e.g. Klin et al., 2003) that feed
back into the social interaction process.
Consequently, our setup promises to allow the exploration
of the neural basis of processes of interpersonal alignment
and the reciprocity inherent to social interaction, i.e.
whether and how social cues are detected as contingent
upon one’s own behavior and how interaction partners ini-
tiate and respond to each other’s actions (Schilbach et al., in
press). Both aspects seem highly relevant to make substantial
progress in the field of social cognitive neuroscience and may
lead to a reconsideration of the current emphasis on simila-
rities between self- and other-related processing.
To implement these different eyetracking setups were
tested in the fMRI setting to produce gaze-contingent stim-
uli. We review results of these different approaches which
use eyetracking measurements overtly or covertly to drive
MR-compatible experimental paradigms and underline the
usability of this technique. Furthermore, we give examples
for the applications of these interactive, eyetracking-based
paradigms. Given the importance of gaze behavior during
real-life social interaction, this approach, we suggest, pro-
vides a much needed, new ‘tool of the trade’ for the study
of real-time ‘online’ interaction in social neuroscience.
METHODS
Interactive eyetracking setups
‘Interactive eyetracking’ relies on an MR-compatible eye-
tracking system that allows real-time data transmission to
a visual stimulation controller. The controller receives the
ongoing gaze data and adapts the visual stimulation accord-
ing to preset task conditions and the volunteer’s current gaze
position on screen.
For stimulus delivery, different presentation devices were
tested employing either a TFT screen or two different goggle
systems. First, a custom-built, shielded TFT screen was used
for the stimulus presentation at the rear end of the scanner
(148 88 horizontal vertical viewing angle, screen distance
from volunteer’s eyes: 245 cm). Volunteers watched the stim-
uli via a mirror mounted on the head coil. Volunteers’ eye
movements were monitored by means of an infrared camera
(Resonance Technology, CA, USA). The camera and
infra-red light source were mounted on the head coil using
a custom-built gooseneck that allowed easy access to the
volunteer’s eyes without interfering with the visual stimula-
tion (setup A). Second, stimuli were presented using
MR-compatible goggles. Volunteers’ eye movements were
monitored by means of an infrared camera that was built
into the goggles. In a 3T MR environment we used a
VisuaStimTM system (308 22.58 horizontal vertical view-
ing angle; Resonance Technology, CA, USA; setup B1)
whereas in a 1.5 T environment we tested a Silent
VisionTM (25.58 188 horizontal vertical viewing angle;
AvoTec, FL, USA; setup B2). The raw analog video signals
of all setups were digitized at a frame rate of 60Hz on
a dedicated PC running a gaze extraction software
It’s in your eyes SCAN (2010) 99
 at D
eutsche Zentralbibliothek fuer M
edizin / M
edizinische Abt.-Bibl. der Unive on M
ay 14, 2010
sca
n
.o
xfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
(iViewXTM, SMI, Germany, and ClearviewTM, Tobii
Technology AB, Sweden, respectively) which produced
real-time gaze position output. Careful eyetracking calibra-
tion was performed prior to each training or data acquisition
session in order to yield valid gaze positions in a
stimulus-related coordinate system. Via a fast network con-
nection, gaze position updates were transferred and, thus,
made available to another PC running the software which
controlled the stimulation paradigm (PresentationTM,
http://www.neurobs.com).
Interactive eyetracking with overt feedback
This version was established so that study participants could
engage in cognitive tasks using their eye movements only
while receiving visual feedback. To this end we coupled the
volunteer’s current gaze position to the location of a
cursor-like object on the screen (hereafter: gaze cursor).
Using their eyes, the volunteers could, thus, voluntarily
move the gaze cursor according to the demands of the
tasks. For the automatic detection of gaze fixations on
screen targets in real-time the following computer-based
algorithm was devised: Using PresentationTM software,
gaze positions were transformed into stimulus screen coor-
dinates (pixels). A continuously proceeding ‘sliding window’
average of the preceding 60 gaze positions was calculated
throughout the whole stimulus presentation (Figure 1). In
effect, the gaze cursor marked the volunteers’ average gaze
position within the preceding 1 s time window providing the
observer with a smooth gaze-contingent visual stimulus to
which the volunteers quickly adapted despite a brief tempo-
ral lag. In particular, this procedure lessened blinking arti-
facts, averaged out fixational eye movements (2–120 arcmin;
Martinez-Conde et al., 2004), and attenuated the impact of
erroneous gaze estimates caused by intermittent residual
imaging artifacts in the eye video signal. Each ‘sliding
window’ average was tested for being part of a coherent fix-
ation period or not and was accepted by the algorithm as
part of an ongoing fixation, if the standard deviation of the
sliding window gaze elements was below a pre-specified
threshold, in which case a counter was incremented. If the
standard deviation criterion was not fulfilled, the counter
was reset to zero. This procedure was repeated until a fixa-
tion period of a pre-specified length, i.e. a pre-specified
number of consecutive sliding window averages, was
detected. This procedure reliably recognized effective fixa-
tions from gaze behavior without prior knowledge of fixa-
tion coordinates. Fixations were subsequently tested for
being within one of a set of predefined region-of-interests
(ROIs) on the stimulus screen. If this was not the case, the
algorithm searched for another fixation. This cycle was
repeated until either a fixation was found that was within
one of the predefined ROIs or the maximum duration of the
current task was reached. Time stamps as well as coordinates
of detected fixations were stored in a text file for offline data
analysis.
Interactive eyetracking with covert feedback
As during interactive eyetracking with overt feedback, here,
participants engage in and ‘drive’ an experimental paradigm
by looking at different locations on the screen. In this version
of the setup, however, they do not receive visual feedback in
form of a gaze cursor.
In conjunction with a virtual character whose gaze behav-
ior could be made contingent upon fixations detected in
ROIs this was done to generate an ecologically valid setting
in which the gaze behavior of the virtual other could change
in response to the human observer’s gaze position on the
Fig. 1 Flow diagram of gaze data processing. Raw gaze data is stored in a sliding
window vector whose average value is shown as a gaze cursor in overt gaze feedback
paradigms. A counter (c) increments for each consecutive updated sliding window
data vector whose standard deviation is below a prespecified threshold (smax). The
gaze status is identified as ‘fixation’ if a prespecified number (cmax) of consecutive
sliding windows is reached. The average gaze position is thereafter tested for being
within one of a given set of ROIs. The described procedure is typically run until a
fixation was found within one of the given ROIs triggering a step forward in the
experimental paradigm, e.g. the presentation of a new visual stimulus or the change
of the gaze direction of a virtual character.
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stimulus screen. In this setup the temporal delay between a
relevant fixation and the reaction of the virtual character
needed to be small to successfully induce a fluent experience
of reciprocal exchange between the participant and the vir-
tual character. Not providing continuous visual feedback via
a gaze cursor precluded the possibility of participants being
distracted by the gaze cursor but also to adapt to possible
measurement errors, even if minimal in size. For example,
participants’ head movements or variations in eye illumina-
tion could invalidate the initial eye tracking calibration and
lead to displaced gaze coordinates. This type of technical
problem could be met by defining larger ROIs that were
less sensitive to distortions in gaze estimations. Despite min-
imal offset errors in the gaze coordinates, thus, meaningful
reactions of the virtual character were still possible.
The tasks inside the MR environment
To make use of the overt interactive eyetracking mode we
implemented two tasks resembling clinical bedside tests for
visuo-spatial neglect. In a line bisection task participants had
to bisect a horizontal line by fixating it centrally thereby
moving a gaze cursor (a vertical line) on the screen into
the desired position (Figure 2). In a target cancellation
task volunteers had to search for and single out randomly
distributed targets among distractors by fixating them one by
one thereby moving a gaze cursor (a circle) over each of the
detected targets (see online supplementary data for video of
task performance). Participants were informed about the
paradigm prior to entering the scanner room. Both overt
interactive eyetracking tasks were tested with visual stimula-
tion delivered via the TFT screen (setup A) and via goggles
(setups B1 and B2). After careful calibration of the eyetrack-
ing, volunteers were allowed to get adjusted to the procedure
and then went on to perform the task while lying inside the
scanner. During this period we ran ‘dummy’ EPI sequences
with MRI parameters identical to those in standard imaging
experiments. We thereby introduced EPI artifacts in the eye-
tracking data to test that the devised algorithm would be able
to successfully cope with the added noise.
In order to test the covert interactive eyetracking mode we
made use of a task in which test subjects were asked to
respond to or probe the gaze behavior shown by an anthro-
pomorphic virtual character on screen (Figure 3; Schilbach
et al., in press). Before participation test subjects were
instructed that the gaze behavior shown by the virtual char-
acter on screen was actually controlled by a real person who
was also participating in the experiment outside the scanner.
Likewise, their own gaze behavior was said to be visualized
Fig. 2 Overt gaze feedback tasks. (A) While being scanned using ‘dummy’ fMRI scans, a subject was instructed to bisect a horizontal line with a vertical line which is locked to
her gaze. In effect, the subject performed the task by fixating the perceived line center. The screen positions of the horizontal lines were randomized. (B) Example of the spatial
precision of one subject performing the bisection task. Each of the blue symbols represents one bisection position relative to the true line center. The red cross denotes the
average and standard deviation of the spatial bisection error. (C) This histogram shows the frequency distribution of the number of line bisections that subjects were able to
perform within one task/block length (21.9 s). On average over 18 subjects, each performing the tasks 15 times, 7.7 line bisections were successfully performed within one block
length revealing a rather fluent task performance. (D) In a second task, the subject was asked to cancel targets (‘O’) among distractors by centering the black circle over each
target until marked as cancelled. Since the circle’s position was locked to the subject’s gaze she only had to find and fixate the targets one by one. (E) The spatial precision of the
same subject as in (B) performing the cancellation task. (F) On average over 18 subjects, 6.6 cancellations were successfully performed within one block.
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Fig. 3 Covert gaze feedback task. (A) Screenshot (as seen by participants) depicting anthropomorphic virtual character and three objects. (B) Illustration of gaze samples
obtained for one exemplary participant during the experiment.
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for the other participant outside the MR scanner, so that
both participants could engage in gaze-based ‘online’ inter-
action. During functional neuroimaging participants were
instructed to direct the gaze of the other person towards
one of three objects by looking at it. Alternatively, they
were asked to respond to gaze shifts of the virtual character
by either following or not following them to then look at an
object. The gaze behavior of the other was made contingent
to the participant’s gaze and systematically varied in a 2 2
factorial design (joint attention vs non-joint attention;
self-initiation vs other-initiation; see online supplementary
data for video of task performance). The neural correlates of
task performance were investigated employing fMRI in 21
participants.
In this task, stimuli were presented to the participants
lying inside the MR scanner using setup A. Due to the
screen’s distance from the volunteers’ eyes and the corre-
sponding narrow field of view; changes of the virtual char-
acter’s gaze behavior were easily observable while focusing
on one of the three objects. Functional MRI (fMRI) data was
acquired on a Siemens Trio 3T whole-body scanner
(Erlangen, Germany) using blood-oxygen-level-dependent
(BOLD) contrast (Gradient-echo EPI pulse sequence,
TR¼ 2.304 s, slice thickness 3mm, 38 axial slices, in-plane
resolution 3 3mm). Additional high-resolution anatomi-
cal images (voxel size 1 1 1mm3) were acquired using a
standard T1-weighted 3D MP-RAGE sequence. The neuroi-
maging data was preprocessed and analyzed using a general
linear model (GLM) as implemented in SPM5 (for further
details see: Schilbach et al., in press).
RESULTS
Interactive eyetracking under the constraints of fMRI was
successfully installed in all setups. The quality depended on
the length of the sliding window which in turn depended on
the raw gaze data variance, the main source of which were
residual imaging artifacts. Fixational eye movements were
the other important source of raw gaze data jitter. The
amplitude of such eye movements are in the range of
2–120 arcmin (Martinez-Conde et al., 2004) and their size
in screen pixel coordinates scales with the eye’s distance to
the screen display. This rendered the fixational eye move-
ments’ impact particularly disadvantageous in setup A where
a screen distance of 245 cm translated the range of
2–120 arcmin to 2–120 pixels on the screen (given a
800 600 pixels resolution). On the other hand, setup A
did also include important advantages regarding the hand-
ling of the eyetracking camera compared to setups using
goggles. The distance as well as the angle with which the
camera was positioned in relation to the test subject’s eyes
region could be adjusted more easily when the eyetracking
camera was mounted to the head coil as in the TFT-based
setup. However, goggle systems that allowed a precise eye-
tracking with their built-in camera did hardly need any
camera adjustments (e.g. setup B2). After the feasibility of
all setups was secured we chose to use our 3 T MRI system
and opted for the TFT-based visual stimulation setup for
data acquisition. We nevertheless stress, that the other
setups allowed running the paradigms as well.
Interactive eyetracking with overt feedback
(line bisection and target cancellation)
During the task in which overt feedback was given, partici-
pants were able to use the gaze cursor which they could
move across the screen in concordance with their eye move-
ments to execute the task. For the bisection task this
amounted to subjects completing an average of 7.7 line bisec-
tions in blocks of 21.9 s (n¼ 18 subjects), whereas during the
cancellation task subjects were able to cancel an average of
6.6 targets within the same time (Figure 2). Subjects needed
an average of 2.8 s to judge the center of a given line and
position the gaze cursor in the respective position. An aver-
age additional 0.5 s was needed to search, find, and position
the gaze cursor in cancellation tasks (average time between
cancellations: 3.3 s). The time subjects needed to choose tar-
gets generally depended on the length of the sliding window.
If the sliding window length was too small, increased residual
gaze cursor jittering made it hard for volunteers to ‘focus’ a
target, whereas too long a sliding window increased the tem-
poral lag of the gaze cursor, which reduced the intuitive
usability of the gaze feedback. Apart from this, the spatial
precision of target choices was increased when the eye track-
ing calibration was optimal and subjects were well adjusted
to the temporal lag of the gaze cursor (Figure 2).
Interactive eyetracking with covert feedback
(joint attention)
Having been able to use overt gaze feedback successfully to
drive an experiment, we went on to perform the joint atten-
tion task which included running regular fMRI measure-
ments. During this task subjects were not given visual
feedback in the form of a gaze cursor because we wanted
to create a naturalistic as possible setup which allowed for an
immersive experience during which participants could inter-
act with the virtual other similarly to how one might interact
with another person by means of gaze behavior in real life. In
spite of the absence of continuous visual feedback partici-
pants were able to fulfill the task in which they had been
asked to engage: they were able to establish ‘eye-contact’ with
the virtual character and to respond to the virtual character
either by following or not following its gaze to either fixate
one of three visible objects ‘together with’ the virtual
character (other-initiated joint attention: OTHER_JA) or
not (other-initiated nonjoint attention: OTHER_NOJA;
Figure 3A). Conversely, they were also able to establish
‘eye-contact’ and subsequently direct the virtual character’s
gaze towards one of the three objects (self-initiated joint
attention: SELF_JA). In an equal number of occasions sub-
jects were unable to do so as the character would ‘react’ by
fixating an object other than the one chosen by the
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participant (self-initiated nonjoint attention: SELF-NOJA).
On average, this procedure amounted to approximately four
object fixations per ‘interaction segment’ (i.e. a block of 18 s
duration) for all conditions (SELF_JA: 4.10 (n¼ 21,
s.d.¼ 0.68), SELF_NOJA: 4.06 (n¼ 21, s.d.¼ 0.79),
OTHER_JA: 3.96 (n¼ 21, s.d.¼ 0.88), OTHER_NOJA:
4.03 (n¼ 21, s.d.¼ 0.88); see Figure 3B for exemplary gaze
data; for more details see Schilbach et al., in press). FMRI
results demonstrated, firstly, that interpersonal gaze coordi-
nation and ‘joint attention’ (main effect of JA) resulted in a
differential increase of neural activity in the medial prefron-
tal cortex (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) as
well as the anterior temporal poles bilaterally. While this
activation pattern bears some resemblance with the ‘default
mode of brain function’ (Raichle et al., 2001; Schilbach et al.,
2008), activations in ventral and dorsal MPFCat voxel-level
correction for multiple comparisonshave been related to
outcome monitoring and the understanding of communica-
tive intent (Amodio and Frith, 2006) as well as representa-
tions of triadic relations (Saxe, 2006). Conversely, looking at
an object different from the one attended by the virtual
characterregardless of whether or not this was self-initiated
(main effect of NOJA)recruited a bilateral fronto-
parietal network known to be involved in attention and
eye-movement control (Schilbach et al., in press; Figure 4).
DISCUSSION
Here, we have presented a method by which eyetracking data
obtained from study participants lying inside an MR scanner
can be processed in real-time in order to directly influence
visual stimulus material in spite of the electromagnetic noise
associated with fMRI measurements. This can be realized by
using a form of overt gaze feedback, i.e. a gaze cursor which
subjects can control with their eye movements to carry out a
task. Alternatively, this can be done by means of covert gaze
feedback where gaze data is used to systematically manipu-
late and drive the visual stimulation unbeknownst to the
participant. In combination with the presentation of anthro-
pomorphic virtual characters whose behavior can be made
responsive to the participants’ fixations, the latter technique
can be used to allow participants to engage in reciprocal
‘online’ interaction with a virtual other similar to instances
of interpersonal gaze coordination in real-life social
Fig. 4 Neural correlates of joint attention task. (A) Differential increase of neural activity in MPFC, PCC as well as ventral striatum and anterior temporal poles (latter not
illustrated here) for main effect of joint attention. (B) Differential increase of neural activity in medial and lateral parietal as well as frontal cortex bilaterally for main effect of
nonjoint attention (taken from: Schilbach et al., in press).
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encounters. Even though similar approaches of using
gaze-contingent stimuli have been used in other areas of
research (e.g. Duchowski et al., 2004), the development of
an MR-compatible version of the technique as presented
here is of crucial importance for social cognitive and affec-
tive neuroscience as it allows to experimentally target the
neural underpinnings of processes during ‘online’ interac-
tion which have so far been largely inaccessible due to the
technical constraints of the MR environment.
Different possible paradigms come to mind which could
benefit from making use of the here described method.
Given the scope of this article, we will limit our description
to interactive paradigms in which gaze behavior is exchanged
between a human observer and a virtual character. We
will focus here on dyadic interaction between two interactors
(‘Me–You’), but also on triadic interaction where two
interactors relate to an object in the environment
(‘Me–You–This’; Saxe, 2006).
Within dyadic interaction gaze is known to have impor-
tant regulatory functions impacting on a wide range of cog-
nitive, affective and motivational processes (Argyle and
Cook, 1976; Emery, 2000). Furthermore, gaze is known to
influence our social perception and evaluation of others (e.g.
Macrae et al., 2002; Mason et al., 2005) as it conveys the
direction of an agent’s attention and has been suggested to
be closely related to mentalizing, i.e. our ability to under-
stand other people’s mental states (Nummenmaa and
Calder, 2009). Importantly, gaze is also known to ‘connect’
human beings in everyday life situations by means of a ‘com-
munication loop’ in which interactors impact reciprocally on
each others’ behavior (e.g. Frith, 2007, p. 175). This proce-
dural dimension of ‘social gaze’ in ‘online’ interaction has
only recently begun to be systematically investigated (e.g.
Senju and Csibra, 2008) and promises to allow radically
new insights into the temporal dynamics of implicit inter-
personal ‘alignment’.
As many previous studies concerning the social effects of
gaze on person perception have used static, non-interactive
stimuli, it may be important to revisit these paradigms by
making use of this new technique to validate whether the
findings actually result from social communicative processes
or not. Here, it is important to note, however, that our setup
in its current version does not allow to investigate real social
interaction (as in the setup used by Montague et al., 2002),
but uses anthropomorphic virtual characters in conjunction
with a cover story to generate the impression of interacting
with a ‘mindful’ agent. While this can be seen as a limitation
of our setup, it is important to note that using gaze feed-
back has the important benefit of enabling the systematic
study of a major component of real interpersonal interaction
as it provides a naturalistic way to engage participants.
Furthermore, future research could explicitly address
how variations of the temporal and stochastic characteristics
of a virtual character’s gaze behavior made contingent
upon the human observer’s gaze impact on a human
observer’s perception of the nature of the agent (‘social’
Turing test).
Apart from aspects related to dyadic interaction, gaze is
also known to contribute to the establishment of triadic
relations between two interactors who can look at an
object together and engage in (gaze-based) joint attention
(Moore and Dunham, 1995). Apart from the convergence
of gaze directions, this, importantly, also requires mutual
awareness of being intentionally directed towards the same
aspect of the world which may result directly from the pro-
cess of interaction. Therefore, joint attention can be con-
strued as an interactively constituted phenomenon whose
different facets can only be explored by making use of an
interactive paradigm (e.g. Schilbach et al., in press).
Interestingly, it has been suggested that being actively
engaged in triadic interaction may have an impact both on
the perception of the other person (e.g. his/her trustworthi-
ness and attractiveness) as well as on the perception of an
object (e.g. its value) that may be jointly attended (Heider,
1958).
To the best of our knowledge, there are no neuroimaging
studies which have targeted the neural correlates of the per-
ception of jointly attended objects. Such investigations might
be extremely informative, however, by allowing the empirical
investigation of the neural correlates of different formats or
varying degrees of shared intentionality and could help to
investigate the complex relationship of implicit and explicit
processes involved in social cognition (Frith and Frith,
2008). Further applications of the method could include
investigations of how interactive gaze cues shown by a virtual
character impact on object-related decision-making or
memory performance. Finally, gaze-based triadic interaction
could also help to disentangle differences between ‘online’
and ‘offline’ social cognition, i.e. social cognition from a
second- or third-person-perspective, by realizing interac-
tions between two virtual agents and a human observer
while introducing systematic differences in social responsive-
ness of the agents making them more or less likely to actually
engage with the participant (Eisenberger et al., 2003).
Apart from investigations of dyadic and triadic interaction
in healthy adults, we also see great potential in using the
above described method to investigate social cognition in
development and diagnostic groups. In spite of the impor-
tance of joint attention in ontogeny the neural correlates of
this significant phenomenon are only incompletely under-
stood. Given that our paradigm does not rely upon verbal
information and higher-order reasoning about others’
mental states, but relies upon naturally occurring social
behavior, it might prove to be particularly helpful for the
study of the neurofunctional substrates of the development
of social cognitive and perceptual abilities during ontogeny.
Specific alterations of social cognition are known to be
characteristic of psychiatric disorders such as autism and
schizophrenia. In the former case, a dissociation between
implicit and explicit processes underlying social cognition
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has recently been emphasized (Senju et al., 2009). Also, it has
been suggested that autistic individuals might be more sen-
sitive to perfect, non-social as compared to imperfect, social
contingencies in the environment (Gergely, 2001; Klin et al.,
2009). We suggest that the investigation of the neural mech-
anisms underlying these clinically relevant differences in
high-functioning autism will benefit substantially from the
method described here (see also Boraston and Blakemore,
2007).
CONCLUSIONS
Taken together, we have shown that the interactive
eyetracking method here presented allows to generate gaze-
contingent stimuli during fMRI in spite of the electromag-
netic noise introduced by such measurements. Used in con-
junction with anthropomorphic virtual characters whose
behavior can be made ‘responsive’ to the participant’s current
gaze position, this method has the potential to substantially
increase our knowledge of the neural mechanisms underlying
social cognition by making psychological processes accessible
for empirical investigation that are involved in the interper-
sonal coordination of gaze behavior, both in dyadic and tria-
dic interaction. Making use of this new ‘tool of the trade’, we
suggest, could open up an entire new avenue of research in
social cognitive and affective neuroscience.
SUPPLEMENTARY DATA
Supplementary data are available at SCAN online.
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Social gaze provides a window into the interests and intentions of others and allows us to
actively point out our own. It enables us to engage in triadic interactions involving human
actors and physical objects and to build an indispensable basis for coordinated action and
collaborative efforts.The object-related aspect of gaze in combination with the fact that any
motor act of looking encompasses both input and output of the minds involved makes this
non-verbal cue system particularly interesting for research in embodied social cognition.
Social gaze comprises several core components, such as gaze-following or gaze aversion.
Gaze-following can result in situations of either “joint attention” or “shared attention.”The
former describes situations in which the gaze-follower is aware of sharing a joint visual
focus with the gazer. The latter refers to a situation in which gazer and gaze-follower focus
on the same object and both are aware of their reciprocal awareness of this joint focus.
Here, a novel interactive eye-tracking paradigm suited for studying triadic interactions was
used to explore two aspects of social gaze. Experiments 1a and 1b assessed how the
latency of another person’s gaze reactions (i.e., gaze-following or gaze version) affected
participants’ sense of agency, which was measured by their experience of relatedness
of these reactions. Results demonstrate that both timing and congruency of a gaze reac-
tion as well as the other’s action options influence the sense of agency. Experiment 2
explored differences in gaze dynamics when participants were asked to establish either
joint or shared attention. Findings indicate that establishing shared attention takes longer
and requires a larger number of gaze shifts as compared to joint attention, which more
closely seems to resemble simple visual detection. Taken together, novel insights into the
sense of agency and the awareness of others in gaze-based interaction are provided.
Keywords: gaze-following, joint attention, shared attention, social interaction, agency, mentalizing, eye-tracking
INTRODUCTION
The visual system is a major source of information about the envi-
ronment. In face-to-face social encounters it is not only a source
of information but also a crucial means of non-verbal communi-
cation. Imagine the following everyday situation: you are sitting
at the bar of a pub gazing contemplatively at your empty glass.
Suddenly the bartender walks by and observes that your eyes are
directed at the empty glass. As soon as you direct your gaze at him
and back to the glass he will – without words – understand that
you need another drink. Such instances of “social gaze” demon-
strate how meaning can be conveyed by simple acts of looking. A
considerable amount of research has been devoted to the develop-
ment and function of social gaze (Argyle and Cook, 1976; Mundy
and Newell, 2007; Shepherd, 2010). Gaze represents a non-verbal
cue system which reflects perception and action simultaneously,
or in which, as Gibson and Pick, 1963, p. 368) have noted, “any
act of looking can be treated as a source of stimulation as well as
a type of response.” Its salience in social encounters makes gaze
a perfect tool to study “online” social interaction, i.e., face-to-face
interaction between two persons in real-time (Schilbach et al.,
2011).
Mainly due to methodological constraints, the study of online
interaction has largely been neglected by researchers in social cog-
nition (Schilbach et al., in press). In recent years, however, there
have been exciting advances to create tools for the investigation
of non-verbal and especially gaze-based social interaction (Red-
cay et al., 2010; Wilms et al., 2010; Staudte and Crocker, 2011;
Bayliss et al., 2012). For example, Redcay et al. (2010) estab-
lished a setup in which participants inside an MRI scanner could
either interact face-to-face with an experimenter via a live video
feed or watch a recording of the experimenter’s behavior dur-
ing previous interactions, thereby enabling the investigation of
the processing of dynamic features of social interaction. Staudte
and Crocker (2011) designed a series of experiments in which
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participants interacted with an artificial agent (i.e., a robot) in
order to study the dynamic coupling between gaze and language
in verbal human-robot interaction. Recently, Wilms et al. (2010)
introduced an interactive eye-tracking setup which allows par-
ticipants to interact with an anthropomorphic virtual character
in a gaze-contingent manner. A similar program has been cre-
ated recently by another group to study face-to-face interaction in
social contexts (Grynszpan et al., 2012).
The advent of virtual reality techniques for research in neu-
roscience and psychology (Tarr and Warren, 2002; Bohil et al.,
2011) has raised the general question why we need these dis-
plays to study human cognition. Bohil et al. (2011, p. 752) have
noted that “an enduring tension exists between ecological validity
and experimental control” in psychological research. They suggest
that virtual reality techniques provide a way out of this dilemma
because they provide naturalistic, real-world-like displays whilst
offering full control over a selected set of experimental variables.
Indeed, studies addressing the validity of using virtual charac-
ters have demonstrated that the interaction with virtual agents
elicits social behaviors which are similar to real interaction (von
der Pütten et al., 2010) and that uncontrolled aspects of another
person’s outer appearance and non-verbal behavior can be fil-
tered out while participants’ overall impression of an interaction
remains intact (Vogeley and Bente, 2010). In addition, avatar- and
video-mediated communication have shown to create compara-
ble levels of experienced social presence and intimateness (Bente
et al., 2008).
Before such paradigms can be used to study gaze in more com-
plex social scenarios, basic parameters of different processes of
social gaze need to be identified. Several of these processes have
been defined by Emery (2000): direct (or mutual) gaze – a situ-
ation where two individuals direct their gaze at each other – is
described as the most basic process of social gaze. If one individ-
ual detects that the other averts its gaze this can serve as a cue for
a gaze-following reaction to the other’s novel focus of visual atten-
tion. This results in a situation of joint attention (JA), in which the
gaze-follower is aware that he and the gazer have the same focus
of attention – for instance, an object in the environment. In other
words, in JA another person’s gaze is hence used as a cue to this per-
son’s visual attention. This has been argued to represent a crucial
prerequisite for the gaze-follower to infer the gazer’s mental states
(e.g., thoughts, intentions, feelings. . .) regarding an object of joint
focus (Gopnik et al., 1994), an ability commonly referred to as
mentalizing (Frith and Frith, 2006). Notably, JA does not require
the gazer to be aware of the gaze-follower’s reaction. In contrast,
shared attention (SA) requires that both individuals are aware of
focusing on the same object and of each other’s reciprocal aware-
ness of this joint attentional focus (Emery, 2000). Moreover, SA
has been argued (Moll and Tomasello, 2007) to involve the gazer’s
intention to direct the other’s gaze to a certain object in order to
achieve a shared goal or share an experience, thereby providing a
behaviorally accessible measure of shared intentionality. Notably,
different but often overlapping descriptions of JA or SA exist in the
literature (e.g., Clark, 1996; Povinelli and Eddy, 1996; Tomasello
et al., 2005; Frischen et al., 2007; Mundy and Newell, 2007). The
study presented in this article is largely guided by the compara-
bly mechanistic account of Emery (2000), which provides a clear
conceptual distinction between JA and SA that is suited to provide
empirical access to these processes.
Joint and shared attention constitute so-called triadic social
interactions. In contrast to dyadic interactionswhich develop early
in infancy and involve processes such as mutual gaze or reciprocal
emotional displays (Stern, 1974), triadic interactions are charac-
terized by involving “the referential triangle of child, adult, and
some third event or entity to which the participants share atten-
tion” (Carpenter et al., 1998, p. 1). The establishment of reference
to a certain aspect of the environment in a triadic interaction thus
creates a formof perceptual common ground (Clark, 1996). This is
a prerequisite for understanding each other’s goals and intentions
regarding the object of joint focus. So far, however, the temporal
and spatial dynamics of gaze in triadic interactions have not been
studied systematically using interactive (i.e., gaze-contingent) par-
adigms (for discussion, see Becchio et al., 2010; Schilbach et al., in
press). Although pictures of objects have been used in gaze cueing
studies (Bayliss et al., 2006, 2007; van der Weiden et al., 2010),
interactive eye-tracking studies so far have been limited to simple
geometric shapes as stimuli (Schilbach et al., 2010; Wilms et al.,
2010; Pfeiffer et al., 2011).
Using pictures of real-world objects, the current study employs
a more ecologically valid interactive eye-tracking setup to address
the following questions: (1)Howdoes the perception of JAdepend on
the congruency (i.e., gaze-following and gaze aversion) and latency of
another person’s gaze reactions? In experiments 1a and 1b, the effect
of the congruency of gaze reactions – gaze-following and gaze
aversion – as well as the latency with which these reactions follow
participants’ gaze shifts was manipulated. To this end, participants
interacted with a virtual character in brief triadic interactions in
which the character would either engage in joint or in non-joint
attention (NJA) with different latencies. After each reaction, par-
ticipants had to indicate how related they experienced this reaction
to their own behavior. We argue that this can be taken as a mea-
sure to which degree participants experienced agency, i.e., that the
other’s reaction is a consequence of their own action. In its preva-
lent definition, the sense of agency is described as an all-or-none
phenomenon relating to the awareness that we are the initiators
of our own actions (de Vignemont and Fourneret, 2004; Synofzik
et al., 2008). However, the sense of agency also encompasses an
awareness of the consequences (e.g., another person’s gaze shifts)
inextricably linked to our actions (Bandura, 1989; Pacherie, 2012).
As put forward by Pacherie (2012), in social interactions agency
experience is not only influenced by high-level cognitive factors
and sensorimotor cues, but also by perceptual consequences of
one’s own actions, including the reactions of another person.
Specifically, we hypothesize that participants experience gaze-
following (which results in JA) as more strongly related to their
own gaze behavior as compared to gaze aversion (which results in
disparate attention). It is also predicted that the latency of gaze
reactions modulates this experience: very short latencies, which
might create an experience of coincidental looking, as well as
very long latencies, whichmight disrupt the temporal contingency
between actions, were supposed to decrease participants’ sense of
agency. (2) Does gaze behavior differ in situations of JA and SA?
Although the concepts of JA and SA are theoretically distinct, it
has never been tested experimentally whether they correspond to
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differences in the dynamics of gaze behavior. In Experiment 2,
participants engaged in a series of triadic interactions in which
they were asked to indicate whenever they experienced JA or SA.
We hypothesized that SA requires an increased number of gaze
shifts and takes longer to establish as compared to JA.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
In this section, three different experiments will be described. These
experiments largely rely on the same materials and methods. For
the sake of brevity, those materials and methods that are common
to all experiments will be indicated before the procedure of each
experiment will be described separately.
PARTICIPANTS
In sum, 95 healthy female and male persons aged 19–42 years
(M = 25.86, SD= 6.23), with no record of neurologic or psychi-
atric illnesses volunteered for the study. The numbers for each
individual experiment are given in the description of that partic-
ular experiment below. All participants were naïve to the scientific
purpose of the study and were compensated for their participa-
tion (10 Euro/h). Prior to the experiment, participants were asked
to sign a written consent form in which they approved that par-
ticipation is voluntary and that data are used in an anonymized
fashion for statistical analysis and scientific publication. The study
followed theWMADeclaration of Helsinki (Ethical Principles for
Medical Research Involving Human Subjects) and was presented
to and approved by the ethics committee of the Medical Faculty
of the University Hospital Cologne, Germany.
SETUP AND MATERIALS
We made use of an interactive eye-tracking program recently
developed (Wilms et al., 2010). This method allows participants to
interact with an anthropomorphic virtual character by means of
their eye-movements. Using a high resolution eye-tracking device
(Tobii™T1750 Eye-Tracker, Tobii Technology AB, Sweden) with
a digitization rate of 50Hz and an accuracy of 0.5˚, participants’
eye-movements could be detected exactly. Stimuli were presented
on the 17′′ TFT screen of the eye-tracker with screen resolution
set to 1024 by 768 pixels. Both the participant and the confed-
erate were seated at a distance of 80 cm from their respective
eye-tracker as depicted in Figure 1A. The viewing angle sub-
tended 32˚× 24˚. A PC with a dual-core processor and a GeForce
2MX graphics board controlled the eye-tracker as well as stimulus
presentation at a frame rate of 100Hz. Integrated gaze extrac-
tion software (Clearview™, Tobii Technology AB, Sweden) made
data available for real-time computation of stimulus presenta-
tion to the software package Presentation (Presentation™)1 which
was used to control stimulus presentation in a gaze-contingent
manner (for details on the algorithm see Wilms et al., 2010). All
data were analyzed using PASW Statistics 20 (SPSS Inc., Chicago,
IL, USA)2.
STIMULI
Onemale and one female anthropomorphic virtual character were
used in this study (Schilbach et al., 2010; Pfeiffer et al., 2011).
Except for their eyes, the facial features of these characters were
static in order to prevent the influence of non-verbal information
other than gaze. Male participants interacted with the male char-
acter (exemplarily depicted in Figure 1B) and female participants
with the female character, respectively. The potency of virtual char-
acters to elicit social presence and the advantages of their usage in
experiments on social cognitionhas beendemonstrated previously
(for detailed discussion, see Loomis et al., 1999; Bailenson et al.,
2003; Vogeley and Bente, 2010).
The 32 object stimuli used here were taken from a previously
published study (Bayliss et al., 2006) and consist of two differ-
ent categories of everyday-life objects, i.e., typical “kitchen” and
“garage” objects (Figure 1B). They were standardized with respect
to likeability (M = 4.75, SD= 0.97 on a nine-level scale) and to
participants’ ability to assign them to their respective category
(accuracy M = 95.3%, SD= 2.66). Each of the objects was used
in two different colors (blue and red) and was mirrored to cre-
ate two different orientations (i.e., the handle pointing to the left
or the right). They were presented within a gray rectangle with a
size of 306× 108 pixels. All pictures were analyzed with respect to
their size and their luminescence to ensure physical consistency.
The manipulations of color and orientation yielded a total of 128
different pictures, which allowed for the presentation of two new
pictures in each trial. Figure 1B depicts an example of a stimulus
screen.
1http://www.neurobs.com
2www.spss.com
FIGURE 1 | (A) Illustration of the interactive eye-tracking setup with the real participant on one side and the interaction partner – a confederate of the
experimenter – on the other (taken from Pfeiffer et al., 2011, p. 2). (B) Example trial depicting the male anthropomorphic virtual character and pictures of two
real-life objects.
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COVER STORY
Participants were led to believe that they would engage in a
gaze-based interaction task with another participant and that the
interaction would not be vis-à-vis but via virtual characters serv-
ing as avatars of their gaze behavior.More specifically, participants
were instructed that their eye-movements would be conferred to
a virtual character displayed on the screen of their interaction
partner. Likewise, the eye-movements of their interaction partner
would be visualized by a virtual character displayed on their screen.
In fact, however, the interaction partner was a confederate of
the experimenter and the virtual character’s eye-movements were
always controlled by a computer program to ensure full exper-
imental control. Participants were debriefed about this manip-
ulation after the experiment and belief in the cover story was
controlled during a post-experiment interview.
PROCEDURE
In the beginning of each experiment the participant and the
confederate were seated in front of two eye-tracking devices.
Female participants interacted with a female confederate, and
male participants with a male confederate, respectively. Sub-
sequently, they received written instructions on the computer
screen. A room-divider visually separated both persons. After
both of them indicated that they had understood the instruc-
tions, the participant’s eye-tracker was calibrated. To sus-
tain the cover story, the experimenter pretended to be cal-
ibrating the eye-tracker of the interaction partner as well.
In addition, during the experiment both persons were asked
to wear ear protection so that the participant was not dis-
tracted from the task and to make verbal communication
impossible.
EXPERIMENT 1A
The first experiment aimed at assessing at which latencies par-
ticipants experienced gaze reactions – either gaze-following or
gaze aversion – of another person as contingent on their own
gaze shifts. It consisted of two main conditions: (1) JA trials
in which the virtual character followed the participant’s gaze
and (2) NJA trials in which the virtual character did not fol-
low the participant’s gaze but shifted its gaze toward the other
object. In both conditions the latency of the virtual charac-
ter’s gaze reactions was varied from 0 to 4000ms in steps of
400ms. This yielded eleven sub-conditions which were repeated
eight times throughout the experiment, thereby resulting in
a total of 176 trials which were presented in a randomized
fashion.
Each trial started with an initiation phase in which partici-
pants were instructed to fixate the virtual character. Upon fixation
two objects appeared to the left and the right of the virtual char-
acter. Participants were asked to shift their gaze to one of these
objects as quickly as possible and to wait for the reaction of the
virtual character. After the character’s gaze reaction the scene
remained static for another 500ms before participants had to
indicate by button press how strongly related they experienced
the gaze reaction of the other to their own gaze shift on a four-
item scale (very related – rather related – rather unrelated – very
unrelated). Each trial was followed by a short break in which a
fixation cross was presented with a latency jittered between 1000
and 2000ms. The total duration of the experiment was about
25min.
In this experiment, 30 volunteers participated, out of which
27 (Mean age= 27.63, SD= 6.29, 15 female/12 male) entered the
analysis. Two had to be excluded from data analysis because of
technical problems and another one due to disbelief in the cover
story.
EXPERIMENT 1B
In order to enhance participants’ sensitivity to the timing of gaze-
following, Experiment 1a was repeated without the non-JA condi-
tion, that is, the virtual character followed participants’ gaze in all
trials. Participants were instructed that their putative interaction
partner was instructed to always look at the same object. As each
sub-condition (i.e., reaction latencies from 0 to 4000ms in steps
of 400ms) was repeated 16 instead of eight times, Experiment 1b
did not differ structurally from Experiment 1a.
There were 24 participants in this experiment. Only 21 (Mean
age= 23.86, SD= 5.74, 14 female/7 male) were included in the
analysis as two had to be excluded due to technical problems and
one due to disbelief in the cover story.
EXPERIMENT 2
The aim of this experiment was to assess whether the theoret-
ically proposed processes of JA and SA differ with respect to
the interaction dynamics. The experimental design contained a
between-subject and a within-subject factor. The within-subject
factor was the order of initiation of the interaction sequence (self-
initiated vs. other-initiated) and the between-subject factor was
task instruction (JA vs. SA). Prior to the experiment, participants
were assigned in a randomized but gender-balanced fashion to
either a JA or a SA group. In the JA group, participants were
instructed to press a response button as soon as they themselves
were aware that both they and their interaction partner directed
their attention to the same object. In the SA condition, participants
were asked to press the button as soon as they were convinced that
both of them were aware of each other directing their attention to the
same object. Particular caution was exerted to avoid any explana-
tion that went beyond the descriptions written in italics above and
any cues toward the theoretical concepts of JA and SA or related
psychological processes.
In both JA and SA groups, the order of initiation of the
interaction sequence (i.e., the within-subject factor) was manip-
ulated block-wise. The initiator of a trial is the person who is the
first to fixate one of the two objects on the screen. Participants
either started with the self-initiated block in the first half of the
experiment and then proceeded in the other-initiated block in the
second half or vice versa. To avoid sequence effects, participants
started with the self- or other-initiated block in an alternating
fashion. Each block consisted of 32 trials. In the beginning of each
trial two objects were shown for 3000ms on the left and the right
side of the screen so that participants could become acquainted
to them and subsequently concentrate on the interaction task.
After the acquaintance period the virtual character appeared in
the center of the screen. This served as a cue to the initiation of the
interaction. Participants were instructed that the establishment
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of mutual gaze with the virtual character was a prerequisite for
the interaction sequence to start. Depending on the experimental
block, there were two ways the interaction period could be initi-
ated. (1) In trials of the self-initiated block participants were told
to choose one object by fixating it and the virtual character fol-
lowed their gaze. (2) In contrast, in trials of the other-initiated
block the virtual character commenced the interaction by shift-
ing its gaze to one of the objects. Participants were instructed
to follow its gaze. As soon as the first gaze fixation on the vir-
tual character (in the self-initiated condition) or on the chosen
object (in the other-initiated condition) was detected, the dynamic
interaction period started.When the participant looked at the vir-
tual character, it responded by shifting its gaze to the participant
to establish eye contact. When the participant looked back at the
object, the virtual character followedhis or her gaze.Gaze reactions
of the virtual character followed with a latency that was jittered
between 400 and 800ms (i.e., latencies experienced as“natural” for
human gaze reactions according to Experiments 1a and 1b). This
interaction continued until participants – depending on the group
they had been assigned to – indicated the experience of JA or SA
(as described above) by pressing a button and thereby ending the
current trial.
Overall, 43 participants participated in the study. As three of
them were excluded due to technical problems, only 40 of them
(Mean age= 24.75, SD= 5.15, 20 female/20 male) were included
in the analysis.
RESULTS
EXPERIMENT 1A
The ratings of relatedness of the avatar’s gaze reactions are
depicted in Figure 2A. A two-way ANOVA for repeated-measures
with the factors gaze reaction (joint vs. non-joint) and latency
(0–4000ms in steps of 400ms) showed a main effect of gaze
reaction: as expected, gaze-following reactions resulting in JA
were experienced as more related to participants’ gaze shifts as
compared to gaze aversion resulting in NJA, F(1, 26)= 67.09,
p< 0.001. In addition, there was a main effect of latency on par-
ticipants’ ratings of relatedness, F(5.83, 92.54)= 5.38, p= 0.001
(Greenhouse–Geisser corrected, ε= 0.36, due to a violation of
the assumption of sphericity). For both joint and NJA tri-
als, participants rated immediate reactions with a latency of
0ms as considerably less related to their own gaze shift than
reactions with higher latencies. In addition, ratings of relat-
edness seemed to decrease linearly for latencies greater than
800ms (see also the “Combined Analysis of Gaze-Following
in Experiments 1a and 1b” below). There was no significant
interaction between these two factors, F(6.3, 163.76)= 1.26,
p= 0.28.
EXPERIMENT 1B
Figure 2B shows the ratings of relatedness of the avatar’s gaze
reaction to participants’ own gaze shift as a function of the latency
of the reaction. A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA revealed
that, similar to the results of Experiment 1a, there was a main
effect of latency on participants’ rating of relatedness of the other’s
gaze reaction, F(17.07, 54.87)= 26.78, p< 0.001 (Greenhouse–
Geisser corrected, ε= 0.27). This effect was described by a highly
significant linear trend, F(1, 20)= 53.14, p< 0.001, indicating a
continuous decrease of relatedness ratings with increasing latency
of gaze reactions.
COMBINED ANALYSIS OF GAZE-FOLLOWING IN EXPERIMENTS 1A
AND 1B
In a separate set of analyses, we focused only on JA and com-
pared the JA trials from Experiment 1a to Experiment 1b. The
crucial difference between these two experiments was that in
Experiment 1a the putative interaction partner had an additional
option to react and could also avert his/her gaze, whereas in
FIGURE 2 | (A)The results from Experiment 1a, in which the interaction
partner could either follow the gaze of the participant to engage in joint
attention (JA) or avert his/her gaze to the other object to engage in non-joint
attention (NJA). (B) In Experiment 1b the interaction partner always engaged
in JA, only the latency of the gaze reaction is varied. For better
comparability, the joint attention data of Experiment 1a (JA in the context of
NJA as another option to act) are plotted together with the data from
Experiment 1b (JA only).
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Experiment 1b the virtual character would always follow par-
ticipants’ gaze, which participants were informed of during the
instruction. In order to assess the influence of a second option
to react on the perception of latency of gaze-following, we con-
ducted a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA including only the
JA trials from Experiment 1a and all trials from Experiment
1b with experiment as a between-subjects factor. There was a
significant interaction between the factors experiment and relat-
edness rating, F(4.27, 196.3)= 11.02, p< 0.001 (Greenhouse–
Geisser corrected, ε= 0.43). As Figure 2B shows, ratings from
Experiment 1b (open circles), which consisted only of JA tri-
als, suggest that participants experience gaze-following reactions
as most related to their own gaze shift when they follow with
a latency of 400ms (M = 3.26, SD= 0.68). In Experiment 1a
(filled circles) ratings for gaze reactions with a latency of 400ms
were significantly lower (M = 2.86, SD= 0.61), as shown by a
t -test for independent samples, t (46)=−2.16, p= 0.038. Here,
visual inspection of data suggests that maximum relatedness rat-
ings were not reached before 800ms. Furthermore, in Experi-
ment 1b there was a continuous linear decrease of relatedness
ratings beginning at 400ms. This was confirmed by a highly sig-
nificant linear trend, F(16.06, 42.67)= 53.14, p< 0.001, which
is absent in the data of Experiment 1a, F(0.47, 17.49)= 0.7,
p= 0.41. Taken together, these results suggest that when the
interaction partner has no other choice but following partici-
pants’ gaze, relatedness ratings peak earlier as compared to a
context in which the other can either react by gaze-following
or by gaze aversion. In addition, participants’ are less sensi-
tive to the latency of gaze-following in the context of action
alternatives.
EXPERIMENT 2
An independent samples t-test indicated that significantly
more gaze shifts were required to reach a situation of
shared (M = 2.55, SD= 1.26) as compared to JA (M = 1.23,
SD= 0.35). Furthermore, standard deviations indicate that
the inter-individual variance was much higher in SA. This
between-subject variance is also depicted in the box plot in
Figure 3A. Importantly, the establishment of mutual gaze
was a prerequisite for the initiation of the interaction to
ensure that scan paths always began with a fixation of
the virtual character. The increased number of gaze shifts
also resulted in significantly longer trial durations in shared
(M = 3886.39ms, SD= 1838.91ms) vs. JA (M = 2040.11ms,
SD= 974.64ms), t (28.89)=−3.97, p< 0.001, r =−0.58. Inter-
estingly, in JA participants showed significantly more gaze shifts
in self-initiated trials (M = 1.41, SD= 0.68) compared to other-
initiated trials (M = 1.07, SD= 0.10), t (19.79)= 2.18, p= 0.042,
r = 0.33, while there was no such effect of initiation in SA,
t (38)= 0.24, p= 0.81 (see Figure 3B), indicating that only the
gaze dynamics of JA were influenced by the initiation of the
interaction.
DISCUSSION
The present study introduced a novel interactive eye-tracking par-
adigm suitable to study multiple facets of triadic interactions
between two agents and real-world objects in real-time. On a
methodological level, this provides an important complement to
previous work by our group which has not involved real objects
but rather concentrated on the dyadic aspects of gaze-following
and JA (Schilbach et al., 2010; Wilms et al., 2010; Pfeiffer et al.,
2011). This methodological advancement was used for the empir-
ical investigation of temporal and dynamic aspects of social gaze
as a socially salient form of embodied actions with great eco-
logical validity. In Experiments 1a and 1b, participant’s sense of
agency was measured as a function of both the congruency and
latency of another person’s gaze reaction. In Experiment 2, differ-
ences in gaze dynamics and trial duration resulting in JA and SA
were examined. These results provide interesting insights into gaze
behavior and the experience of gaze reactions in an ecologically
FIGURE 3 | (A) A box plot illustrates the inter-individual variance of the number of gaze shifts before indicating the experience of joint as compared to shared
attention. (B) Whether participants initiated the gaze-based interaction only affected the number of gaze shifts required to report a state of joint, but not shared
attention.
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valid but experimentally controllable setting. Conceptual as well
as methodological implications are discussed in the following.
EFFECTS OF THE CONGRUENCY OF GAZE REACTIONS
Experiments 1a and 1b investigated how related participants expe-
rienced different latencies of gaze reactions to their own gaze
behavior by varying these latencies and the congruency of reac-
tions (i.e., gaze-following vs. gaze aversion) systematically. In the
following, we suggest that the experience of relatedness can be
taken as a measure of the sense of agency (Pacherie, 2012).
It was first predicted that the congruency of the other’s gaze
reaction (gaze-following vs. gaze aversion) strongly influences
participants’ sense of agency, as measured by their experience
of relatedness. Indeed, results indicated that gaze-following is
experiencedmore strongly related to one’s own gaze shifts as com-
pared to gaze aversion. It is highly plausible that this relates to
a positive valence that has been associated with gaze-following
in comparison to gaze aversion. The literature provides indirect
evidence for positive and negative evaluations of gaze-following
and gaze aversion, respectively. In a recent study aiming at unrav-
eling the expectations of participants’ regarding the behavior
of a human interaction partner, we asked participants to inter-
act with a virtual character in a similar interactive eye-tracking
setup as in the present study (Pfeiffer et al., 2011). In order
to distinguish social from non-social interaction, participants
were led to believe that in any given interaction block con-
sisting of a number of gaze trials the virtual character could
either be controlled by another person or a computer algorithm.
Their task was to decide based on the virtual character’s gaze
reactions whether they had been interacting with a human or
a computer. Unbeknownst to participants, the reactions were
always controlled by a computer algorithm to allow full exper-
imental control. Results demonstrated that the proportion of
human ratings increased linearly with increasing numbers of
gaze-following trials in an interaction block, thereby indicating
that in such simple gaze-based interactions, gaze-following and
JA are taken as most indicative of true social interaction. This
supports the present finding that gaze-following results in an
enhanced experience of agency as expressed by higher ratings of
self-relatedness.
Another set of studies emphasizes the positive valence of
gaze-following in contrast to gaze aversion. A recent study used
interactive eye-tracking in an MRI scanner to compare other-
and self-initiated situations of JA and NJA and demonstrated a
specifically positive valence of self-initiated JA (Schilbach et al.,
2010). Results indicated that self-initiated JA correlates with activ-
ity in the ventral striatum, a brain region which is a part of
the brain’s reward system and whose activation has been linked
to hedonic experiences (Liu et al., 2007). There is also evidence
for negative affective evaluations of gaze aversion. For example,
Hietanen et al. (2008) showed in an EEG study that watch-
ing pictures of persons averting their gaze leads to avoidance-
related neural activity, whereas watching pictures of persons
with direct gaze correlated with approach-related signals. Fur-
thermore, persons who avert their gaze are judged as less like-
able and attractive as compared to persons exhibiting direct
gaze (Mason et al., 2005) and gaze aversion is understood as
a non-verbal cue to lying and insincerity (Einav and Hood,
2008; Williams et al., 2009). It is conceivable that the intrinsi-
cally rewarding nature of initiating social interaction by leading
someone’s gaze in combination with the implicitly negative eval-
uation of averted gaze plays a prominent role in the increased
feeling of relatedness for gaze-following as compared to gaze
aversion.
THE INFLUENCE OF REACTION LATENCIES AND ACTION POSSIBILITIES
ON THE EXPERIENCE OF GAZE REACTIONS
We hypothesized that, while very short latencies might be per-
ceived as coincidental, reactions with long latencies might be
experienced as non-contingent upon one’s own behavior. Indeed,
the most obvious finding was that in all conditions reactions
with a latency of 0ms were experienced as considerably less
related than the subsequent latency levels of 400 and 800ms.
This result is plausibly explained by the fact that a certain min-
imal delay needs to be present until a reaction can be experi-
enced as causally linked to (or launched by) any given preceding
action and not just as mere coincidence (Scholl and Tremoulet,
2000). Literature suggests that the natural latency of normal
saccades (i.e., not express saccades) to any form of visual dis-
placement on a screen is between 200 and 250ms (Saslow, 1967;
Yang et al., 2002). Although our results do not precisely show
at which latencies a reaction is experienced as merely coinciden-
tal, it is conceivable that saccadic latencies are implicitly taken
into account in participants’ ratings of relatedness and that gaze
reactions with latencies below 250ms are therefore considered
unrelated. However, further experiments are needed to investigate
in detail how latencies of gaze reactions between 0 and 400ms are
experienced.
Notably, however, the experience of different latencies of a gaze-
following reaction appears to depend on the other person’s options
to act. When the other person can choose to follow or to avert her
eyes, there is hardly any effect of latency on the experience of relat-
edness and even reactions with a substantial delay of 4000ms are
experienced as rather related. In contrast, when the other person
always engages in gaze-following relatedness ratings decrease lin-
early starting at a latency of 400ms. Furthermore, reactions with
latencies of more than 2000ms are experienced as unrelated to
one’s own gaze shifts – they fall below the dashed line symboliz-
ing a neutral rating in Figure 2B, and thereby reach the level of
unrelatedness that is associated with NJA.
The effect of the other person’s options for action is interesting
in that it throws new light on the role of perceived causality for
one’s sense of agency, which traditionally has to do with predict-
ing the sensory consequences (avatar gaze shift) of self-produced
actions (owngaze shift). Thismeans that in a joint context,whereas
my sensorimotor cues with respect tomy own action remain iden-
tical to non-joint situations, I perceive the consequences of my
actions in the actions of the other person. Therefore, the nature
of the other person’s behavior will have a bearing on my expe-
rience of self-agency. In particular, as Pacherie (2012) notes, the
strength of the sense of agency is related to how well our pre-
dictions regarding another person’s reaction to our own actions
match with the actual reaction. This is specifically true in small-
scale interactions – as in our experiments – in which every aspect
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of the interactors’ behavior is accessible. Rather than investigating
sense of agency in an all-or-none fashion, we therefore interpreted
participants’ ratings of relatedness of the other’s gaze reaction as a
measure of how strongly they experienced agency in a given gaze
trial.
Adopting this view of agency, the results of experiments 1a
and 1b could reflect the role of perceived causality for one’s sense
of agency. Haggard et al. (2002) have suggested that sense of
agency depends crucially on the intentionality of the agent and
found that it decreases with increasing action-outcome delays,
as it does in Experiment 1b, and to a lesser degree in Experi-
ment 1a. Subsequent research has shown that not only inten-
tionality, but also perceived causality is crucial for the sense of
agency. Buehner and Humphreys (2009) found that, when keep-
ing action-outcome constant, given a strong perceived causal link,
intentional binding was preserved at action – outcome delays
of up to 4 s, as in Experiment 1a. However, there is a less per-
sistent sense of agency in Experiment 1b although the actual
causal link is stronger due to the avatar always following my
gaze. This could mean that perceived causality is less important
for my sense of agency in an interactive context. More plausi-
bly, it could be that in an interactive context, since I am dealing
with another agent, the evaluation of my own actions as causally
efficacious is only meaningful when I know that the other has
different options for action. Put otherwise, if I have to evalu-
ate my own sense of agency, given that the effect is observed
in the behavior of another agent, my judgment could be influ-
enced crucially by the sense of agency I am able to attribute
to the other (as suggested in Schilbach et al., in press). Further
research is needed to look at the interdependency of one’s sense
of agency for self and other in interaction, but the data from
the first experiment show that there is a difference between how
sense of agency is experienced in social as compared to non-social
situations.
DIFFERENCES IN GAZE DYNAMICS BETWEEN JOINT AND SHARED
ATTENTION
In Experiment 2, the dynamics of gaze behavior in situations of JA
and SA were assessed while making use of the temporal parame-
ters uncovered in Experiment 1b.As described in the introduction,
the necessary criteria for joint attention require only one of the
interaction partners to be aware of the joint focus of attention.
Shared attention, however, warrants both gazer and gaze-follower
to be simultaneously aware of focusing on the same object and
on each other’s awareness of focusing on the same object (Emery,
2000). Results clearly indicate that participants required a signifi-
cantly higher number of gaze shifts between objects and the virtual
character in order to establish SA as compared to JA. As a conse-
quence of this, trial length was considerably longer. JA required
only slightly more than one gaze shift on average and is reached
significantly earlier in self- vs. other-initiated trials. This indicates
that participants were able to make inferences about the emer-
gence of JA by focusing on the object and seemingly observing
their partner’s gaze reaction at the same time. Due to the impos-
sibility of fixating two spatially separated objects simultaneously,
these data demonstrate that a peripheral and quick recognition
of the other’s gaze reaction is sufficient for the establishment of
JA. In contrast to SA, the establishment of JA happens rapidly
and is characterized by considerably less inter-individual invari-
ance (see Figure 3A). This suggests that JA is characterized by the
mere detection of the other’s focus of attention, thereby possibly
representing a visual detection task rather than a mentalizing
task. Unfortunately, it is not directly possible to compare reac-
tion times between the present results and findings on visual
detection. Previous studies have not used interactive settings but
concentrated on the detection of objects in real-world scenes
(Biederman, 1972) or on the detection of gaze direction in sta-
tic displays (Franck et al., 1998). Using interactive eye-tracking,
however, the link between JA and visual detection could now be
assessed specifically.
In contrast, such an observation of the other’s gaze behavior
“out of the corner of the eyes” appears to be insufficient for a
reliable identification of a situation of SA. It has previously been
argued that SA might be characterized by an increased level of
interactivity (Staudte andCrocker,2011).According toKaplan and
Hafner (2006), true SA requires a monitoring and understanding
of the intentions of the other in a coordinated interaction process
and is only reached when “both agents are aware of this coordi-
nation of “perspectives” toward the world” (Kaplan and Hafner,
2006, p. 145). The increased number of gaze shifts between the vir-
tual character’s face and the object and the correlated increase in
trial length are indicative of such a coordinated interaction aimed
at an alignment of intentions. Determining whether another per-
son is aware of the object jointly focused upon as well as of “us”
being aware of us being aware requires thinking about the other’s
mental states. This is reflected by the dynamics of gaze behav-
ior which exceed the simple detection of a gaze shift to a joint
focus of attention. In the vast majority of trials in the JA con-
dition there is not a single look back to the virtual character’s
face, while this is practically always the case in the SA condi-
tion (Figure 3): participants have to re-establish eye contact at
least once before they indicate to experience SA. It has recently
also been shown in an interaction task within a minimalist virtual
environment that higher complexity and reciprocity in the dynam-
ics of a tactile interaction leads to the experience of interacting
with another human agent (Auvray et al., 2009). The experience
of non-verbal social interaction therefore more generally seems
to hinge upon certain elaborate dynamics between actions and
reactions.
A final observation refers to the substantial inter-individual
variance in the number of gaze shifts participants exhibit before
indicating the experience of SA (cf. Figure 3A). This connotes
that gaze behavior as an embodied correlate of mentalizing is sub-
ject to greater inter-individual differences as compared to gaze
behavior in a visual detection task. Literature suggests that inter-
individual differences in personality traits and behavioral dispo-
sitions strongly influence the performance in different types of
mentalizing tasks, i.e., tasks that require reasoning about other
persons’ mental states. For example, self-reported measures of
empathy (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004) or of the drive
to do things systematically (i.e., systemizing, Baron-Cohen et al.,
2003) as well as the personality trait of agreeableness (for a
detailed discussion, see Nettle and Liddle, 2008) have been shown
to affect mentalizing in a variety of tasks. More studies are
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required in order to determine which personality traits or behav-
ioral dispositions result in the observed variance of gaze patterns
in SA.
Taken together, the findings reported in this paper can
be taken as a first fine-grained description of the tempo-
ral and spatial dynamics of social gaze in triadic interac-
tions and their influence on our sense of agency and aware-
ness of the mental states of others. Further assessment of
the underlying mental processes is required to understand
how manipulations of these aspects change our experience
of a social interaction and our perception of the interaction
partner.
OUTLOOK
Interactive eye-tracking paradigms incorporating virtual char-
acters have proven specifically useful for the study of social
interaction face-to-face and in real-time (Schilbach et al., in press).
One major asset of such studies is that the results can be imme-
diately fed back into novel designs with even greater ecological
validity. This can stimulate the development for therapeutic tools
to learn or improve non-verbal communication in autism spec-
trum disorders. These are characterized by impairments of the
ability to interact with others, as well as by a specific deficiency
in reading information from the eye region and interpreting gaze
cues (Senju and Johnson, 2009). For example, autistic persons
have problems engaging in JA – this is most apparent for the
initiation of JA, although responding to another person’s bid
for JA can also be problematic (Mundy and Newell, 2007). In
a recent report on attempts to teach autistic children to initiate
and respond to bids of JA, they were required to engage in tri-
adic interactions with an instructor and different kinds of toys
(Taylor and Hoch, 2008). As this setting made eye contact diffi-
cult, JA was initiated by the instructor by pointing at an object
instead of gazing at it. In the condition in which the children
were supposed to initiate JA, they were prompted verbally to do
so and explicitly told how to do it. A gaze-contingent display
would be advantageous here for several reasons: first of all, the
interaction with an avatar would be less distressing for autistic
persons than real social interaction. Especially in the beginning of
a training program this might be beneficial. Secondly, the train-
ing program could be designed in a highly structured manner.
Features of the avatar’s gaze behavior such as timing, gaze direc-
tion, or the length of direct gaze could be varied systematically
while other facial features can be kept constant in order to pre-
vent sensory overload. Thirdly, the simultaneous recording of
eye-movements can be used to analyze scan paths in order to
detect difficulties or peculiarities in the participant’s gaze behav-
ior. Furthermore, using interactive eye-tracking allows changing
the avatar’s reactions depending on the participant’s gaze behav-
ior in real-time. Lastly, a virtual setting provides more options
to highlight and manipulate objects, prompt certain actions, or
deliver reinforcement for correct behavior.
Very recently, first attempts have been made to design gaze-
contingent virtual reality applications (Bellani et al., 2011; Lahiri
et al., 2011). Lahiri et al. (2011) designed a virtual reality
application for autistic adolescents in which they are required to
interact with a realistically designed virtual classmate. Their task
was to make this classmate as comfortable as possible by their
behavior. They were positively reinforced the more they looked
at the eyes of the character or followed their movements to an
object on the screen. A gaze-contingent algorithm inspired by
the one invented by Wilms et al. (2010) was used to detect fix-
ations within predefined regions of interest (i.e., eyes, face, object)
and to determine the kind of reinforcement depending on when
and how long these regions were fixated. This provides a very
interesting example for an implicit training of non-verbal social
skills using a gaze-sensitive virtual environment. Although this
approach is promising, therapeutic tools still have difficulties pro-
viding the avatars with realistic gaze behavior (Bellani et al., 2011).
Although clearly more work is needed, results from the present
study could potentially be incorporated into virtual therapeutic
tools.
CONCLUSION
A thorough exploration and understanding of the parameters
of social gaze is crucial for the investigation and understand-
ing of social interactions in gaze-contingent paradigms (Wilms
et al., 2010; Bayliss et al., 2012; Grynszpan et al., 2012) and for
the formulation of hypotheses regarding people’s gaze behav-
ior in online interaction (Neider et al., 2010; Dale et al., 2011).
In addition, recent advances have been made to the develop-
ment of dual eye-tracking setups which allow for investigating
the gaze behavior of two participants interacting and collabo-
rating in a shared virtual environment (Carletta et al., 2010).
Although this approach is very promising, the design of tasks
allowing for an assessment of interaction dynamics while con-
trolling variables affecting the interaction still remains a chal-
lenge. Before true interaction without simulated others can be
investigated, the use of interactive eye-tracking paradigms pro-
vides an important tool to study social gaze behavior in persons
who experience being engaged and being responded to in an
interaction.
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Abstract
In social interaction, gaze behavior provides important signals that have a significant impact on our perception of others.
Previous investigations, however, have relied on paradigms in which participants are passive observers of other persons’
gazes and do not adjust their gaze behavior as is the case in real-life social encounters. We used an interactive eye-tracking
paradigm that allows participants to interact with an anthropomorphic virtual character whose gaze behavior is responsive
to where the participant looks on the stimulus screen in real time. The character’s gaze reactions were systematically varied
along a continuum from a maximal probability of gaze aversion to a maximal probability of gaze-following during brief
interactions, thereby varying contingency and congruency of the reactions. We investigated how these variations
influenced whether participants believed that the character was controlled by another person (i.e., a confederate) or a
computer program. In a series of experiments, the human confederate was either introduced as naı¨ve to the task,
cooperative, or competitive. Results demonstrate that the ascription of humanness increases with higher congruency of gaze
reactions when participants are interacting with a naı¨ve partner. In contrast, humanness ascription is driven by the degree
of contingency irrespective of congruency when the confederate was introduced as cooperative. Conversely, during
interaction with a competitive confederate, judgments were neither based on congruency nor on contingency. These
results offer important insights into what renders the experience of an interaction truly social: Humans appear to have a
default expectation of reciprocation that can be influenced drastically by the presumed disposition of the interactor to
either cooperate or compete.
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Introduction
In the last decades, considerable knowledge has been acquired
about how we perceive other persons, how we interpret their non-
verbal behavior, and how we ‘read’ their minds. However, most
experimental paradigms used to this end have relied on testing
individuals in isolation. Thus, social interaction is investigated
without interaction (‘offline’ social cognition), seemingly reflecting
the view that social cognition can be sufficiently understood by
investigating what a single person thinks or believes [1]. In recent
years, this cognitivist and individualist approach to social cogni-
tion has been subject to criticism as it fails to incorporate the
interaction process in itself, i.e. the embodiment of agents in an
interaction, and the situated nature of social interaction (‘online’
social cognition, [2]). Instead, enactive accounts of social cognition
have gained popularity and suggest to investigate interaction
partners in true dyadic interactions [1,3–5]. These accounts are
based on the propositions that i) perception and action are
inseparable from each other, and that ii) meaning emerges from
the active exploration of and coupling with the environment.
One major reason for the scarcity of truly interactive studies in
social cognition research might be the complexity of studying
complex social interaction processes involving the exchange of
subtle and transient cues under standardized laboratory condi-
tions. However rich everyday social interactions present them-
selves, it is of great importance that the bandwidth of the
interaction is restricted substantially in order to study core
processes of interaction whilst maintaining acceptable levels of
experimental control. Keeping this in mind, any endeavor of
assessing real social interaction in fact faces two major challenges.
First, an experimentally controllable domain of social cues needs
to be identified. Second, a task that reliably separates and contrasts
social and non-social interaction must be established.
The first challenge can be met by starting from a subset of
communicative cues, which have high explanatory value for social
cognitive processes and exchange in social encounters and are at
the same time objectively measurable and controllable in an
experimental setting. Such a cue system is ideally represented by
human gaze. Gaze behavior has long been demonstrated to
provide a highly informative window into social cognition [6,7].
Here, an important aspect of social interaction is the ability to
follow another person’s gaze and share a perceptual experience
with someone else, thereby engaging in triadic relations between
self, other, and the environment in joint attention [8]. Joint
attention is believed to be crucial for an understanding of other
minds [9]. An essential distinction has been made with respect to
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the person who is initiating joint attention and who is responding
to bids of joint attention [10]. In line with observations from non-
typically developing humans and research in non-human species,
Moll and Tomasello [11] argue that the natural motivation to
engage others in triadic interactions represents a uniquely human
cognitive factor which might ultimately foster the development of
a shared reality [12]. In addition, as the act of looking is both a
source of stimulation and a response, perception and action are
inseparable in this channel of non-verbal behavior and can hence
be subject to tight experimental control [13].
A powerful paradigm to analyze social gaze in a truly interactive
way has been introduced recently [14] using interactive eye-
tracking and gaze-contingent eye movement simulation. This
setup allows to track a person’s gaze on a stimulus screen and to
control the gaze behavior of an anthropomorphic virtual character
[15] dependent on the current gaze position. For the first time, this
permits the exploration of gaze-based social interaction in an
experimentally controllable way. In an initial study employing this
interactive eye-tracking setup in a functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) environment, it could be shown that self-initiated
joint attention, i.e. making the virtual character follow one’s own
gaze, recruits reward-related neurocircuitry consistent with the
above described idea of an intrinsic motivation to jointly attend to
aspects of the environment [16].
Based on this paradigm, we have developed a gaze-based
version of what is known as the ‘‘Turing test’’ in order to study
which parameters of gaze-based interactions influence humanness
ratings of the virtual character. The Turing test was proposed by
the British mathematician Alan Turing in order to address the
question whether machines can think, i.e., whether or under which
circumstances humans would ascribe human-like intelligence to
machines. In order to address this question he suggested various
experiments, one of which later became known as the standard
Turing test. In this test, a human participant engages in verbal
conversation via a computer screen with another human and a
computer placed in separate rooms via a computer screen and has
to judge with whom he is interacting [17]. If the participant cannot
reliably distinguish between the human and the computer
conversation partner, the machine is said to have passed the test.
The rationale of this paradigm was used in our study to investigate
humanness ascriptions during interaction.
For this purpose, we created a gaze-based version of the Turing
Test, which in the following will be referred to as the ‘‘non-verbal
Turing test’’. In this test participants engage in the ascription of
human agency during social interaction, which will be referred to
as ‘‘ascription of humanness’’ throughout this article. They have to
judge whether they interact with a real human or a computer
based on the gaze behavior displayed by an anthropomorphic
virtual character in response to their own gaze behavior (see
Fig. 1a), while in fact the latter is always the case and the putative
other participant is a confederate of the experimenter. Each
interaction between participant and agent consisted of six events,
during each of which the virtual character would either follow the
participant’s gaze toward an object that was also shown on the
screen or look away from that object (see Fig. 1b). The experi-
mental manipulation consisted in the systematic variation of the
number of gaze-following reactions from zero (i.e. character
always looking in the opposite direction) to six (i.e. character
always following) out of six possible times. In a between-subject
design, we also addressed the influence of prior knowledge about
the putative interactor’s behavioral predisposition in order to
model different social contexts. To this end, we introduced the
interactor as either naı¨ve to the task, cooperative, or competitive.
Based on the literature we hypothesized three distinct outcomes
in the different conditions: (1) Congruency-based judgment in naı¨ve
interaction: The significance of self-initiated joint attention in social
cognition has been highlighted above. Particularly the data by
Schilbach et al [16] suggest a motivational aspect of initiating joint
attention that is reflected both on the neural and the behavioral
level. This might be taken to suggest that humanness ascription
should increase with increasing congruency of gaze behavior, i.e.
that the experience of interacting with another person increases
with the degree of gaze-following when nothing else is known
about this person. (2) Contingency-based judgment in cooperative
interaction: In definitions of cooperation, particular emphasis is
put on the necessity of coordination between the cooperative
interactors [18]. Therefore, we hypothesize that any form of
coordinated reactions could be taken as indicative of a human
interaction partner. Importantly, not only maximal gaze-following
but also maximal gaze aversion is a highly coordinated interaction
pattern as both patterns are maximally contingent upon the
participant’s gaze. The difference with respect to the participant’s
gaze is that one pattern is congruent and the other is incongruent.
Hence, if coordination played a greater role in humanness
ascription when encountering a cooperative interactor, contingent
rather than merely congruent reactions should inform participant’s
Figure 1. The non-verbal Turing test. (a) Set-up of the experiment with a volunteer participating in the study on the right and a confederate of
the experimenter acting as a putative interaction partner on the left. (b) One exemplar interaction block of the experiment consisting of six
interaction events.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027591.g001
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judgments. (3) Unpredictability-based judgment in competitive interaction:
In the light of the hypotheses on how humanness is ascribed in
situations with a naı¨ve or a cooperative interactor, it might be
anticipated that participants would expect a competitive person to
avoid any patterned response and hence will not interpret any
form of congruency or contingency as indicative of a competitive
interactor. Figure 2 provides an illustration of these hypotheses.
Methods
Participants
In total, 128 healthy male and female volunteers aged 19 to 42
years (mean age = 26.7265.31), with no record of neurologic or
psychiatric illnesses participated in the study. They were recruited
using an internet-based system [19]. All participants were naı¨ve
with respect to the task and to the scientific purpose of the study
and were equally compensated for their participation (10 Euro/
hour). In the beginning of the study participants were asked to sign
a written consent form in which they approved that participation is
voluntary and that data are used in an anonymized fashion for
statistical analysis and scientific publication. The study strictly
followed the WMA Declaration of Helsinki (Ethical Principles for
Medical Research Involving Human Subjects) and was presented
to and approved by the ethics committee of the medical faculty of
the University of Cologne, Germany.
Setup and Materials
We made use of a recently developed interactive eye-tracking
paradigm [14]. This method allows participants to interact with an
anthropomorphic virtual character by means of their eye-
movements. In order to detect participants’ eye-movements we
used a high resolution eye-tracking system with a digitization rate
of 50 Hz and an accuracy of 0.5u (TobiiTM T1750 Eye-Tracker,
Tobii Technology AB, Sweden). Participants were seated at a
distance of 80 cm in front of the device. Stimuli were presented on
the 17’’ TFT screen of the eye-tracking device with screen
resolution set to 1024 by 768 pixels. The viewing angle was 32624
degrees for the whole screen. A PC with a dual-core processor and
a GeForce 2 MX graphics board controlled the output of the eye-
tracker as well as stimulus presentation at a frame rate of 100 Hz.
Via a fast network connection gaze position updates were
transferred to dedicated gaze extraction software (ClearviewTM,
Tobii Technology AB, Sweden) which produced real-time gaze
position output. This was made available to and used by the
Presentation software (PresentationTM, http://www.neurobs.
com) to control stimuli in a gaze-contingent manner.
Task
The interaction was organized in interaction blocks of six events
each (Fig. 2b). Each of these events had the following order:
Participants first had to look at the virtual character. Once the
program had detected a fixation of the virtual character two grey
squares appeared on the left and the right side of the screen (see
[14] for details on the gaze processing algorithm). Participants
subsequently had to choose one of the squares by fixating it. Upon
fixation the chosen square changed its color from grey to blue to
provide feedback about successful gaze detection for the
participant. Participants were told that their first gaze to one of
the squares (but not the color change) was transferred to the screen
of the eye-tracking device of the other participant in real time and
that they would see the other participant’s response to this as
visualized by the eyes of the virtual character visible on their
stimulus screen.
As part of the ‘‘cover story’’, participants were told that in a
given interaction block the eye-movements of the virtual character
could either be controlled by the partner or by a computer
program. After each block, the participant’s task was to judge
whether they had been interacting with the human partner or with
the computer program. In actual fact, the other person was a
confederate of the experimenter and the eye-movements of the
virtual character were always controlled by the computer
algorithm. Interaction blocks consisted of six interaction trials,
thus allowing for a systematic manipulation of the virtual
character’s gaze-following or gaze aversion behavior from zero
to six out of six (0/6 to 6/6) possible times. Gaze-following thereby
constituted a joint attention event, whereas gaze aversion
constituted a non-joint attention event. Overall, this resulted in
seven conditions (0/6, 1/6, 2/6, 3/6, 4/6, 5/6, 6/6) each of which
was repeated eight times in a fully randomized fashion during the
course of the experiment. The latency of the virtual character’s
gaze reaction was jittered between 350 and 600 milliseconds. This
resulted in gaze latencies that have previously been found to
appear natural to participants (unpublished data). Joint and non-
joint attention events were distributed randomly within each
interaction block. At the end of each block participants were asked
to indicate via button press whether they had been interacting with
the other person or the computer program.
Procedure
At the beginning, participants were seated at a distance of about
80 cm from the eye-tracking device. Instructions were provided in
a standardized manner on the screen. Participants were informed
that during the experiment they would be asked to engage in
interaction with a virtual character presented on a computer
screen in front of them by looking at the character and by looking
at objects also visible on the screen. After the participant was
briefed (see descriptions of experiments 1 – 5 for details), the
confederate (in the following referred to as the ‘‘interactor’’), who
was said to be instructed simultaneously by a second experimenter
in a different room, was brought into the testing room and seated
in front of the second eye-tracking device. The two persons were
placed about 4 meters apart from each other and were visually
Figure 2. Hypotheses of humanness ascription under changing
situational demands are depicted here as simple models. (1)
Naive interaction: The ascription of humanness is based on maximally
congruent reactions (solid line). (2) Cooperative interaction: The
ascription of humanness is based on the mere contingency of reactions
(dotted line). (3) Competitive interaction: The ascription of humanness
is neither based on congruency nor on contingency of gaze reactions
(dashed line).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027591.g002
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separated by a room-divider. The experimenter then engaged in a
brief, scripted conversation with the interactor, thereby repeating
some of the instructions to make the cover story believable for the
actual participant. Before the experiment started, the participants’
sitting position in front of the eye-tracker was optimized and the
eye-tracker was calibrated using a five-point calibration routine to
obtain valid gaze positions in a stimulus-related coordinate system.
The participant was lead to believe that exactly the same
procedure was applied for the interactor. Subsequently, the real
participant engaged in three interaction blocks to be familiarized
with the task. After this practice session, remaining questions of
the participant were answered. Both the participant and the
interaction partner were then instructed not to communicate
verbally with each other during the experiment and were asked to
wear headphones in order ‘‘to prevent acoustical interferences’’ with
their task performance. The eye-trackers were then recali-
brated and the experiment started. After 28 of the 56 interaction
blocks there was a 30 second break. Upon completion of the
experiment, the partner was brought to another room while the
participant was asked to fill out a brief questionnaire in which they
had to indicate how difficult they had found the task on a 4-point
scale, whether they had based their decision on considerations of
human behavior or computers, whether they had used a certain
strategy in the interaction, and whether there were specific criteria
on which they based their decision. They were also asked to
explicitly describe potential strategies and criteria. After completion
of this questionnaire, all participants were debriefed and informed
about the goal and purpose of the experiment. In total, the complete
experimental session lasted approximately 50 minutes.
Data Analysis and Presentation
All data were analyzed using PASW Statistics 18 (SPSS Inc,
Chicago, IL, www.spss.com). One-way ANOVAs for repeated
measures were used to analyze the effect of the degree of gaze-
following which was included in the analysis as a factor with seven
levels. In order to be able to apply parametric statistics on
proportional data, such as obtained from participant’s judgments,
all data were arcsine transformed [20,21]. Planned polynomial
contrasts were applied for trend analysis. In addition to the main
manipulation of the task, i.e. the systematic variation of the virtual
character’s gaze-following behavior, the gaze behavior of the
participants themselves was analyzed to detect possible influences
on the ascription of humanness. Whenever appropriate, i.e. for
main effects and planned contrasts, omega squared (v2) is reported
as a measure of effect size [22]. The following conventions for
interpreting v2 are suggested: Small effects: v2,0.06; Moderate
effects: v2.0.06 and v2,0.15; Large effects: v2.0.15 [23]. In the
graphs representing the data, non-transformed data are used with
error bars indicating the 95% confidence intervals. Post-experi-
ment debriefing questionnaires were analyzed by an independent
rater blind to the conditions of the study.
Results
Gaze Behavior of Participants
Before assessing the ascription of humanness based on the gaze
reactions of the virtual character, we aimed at excluding potential
effects of participants’ own gaze behavior on performance. Two
aspects of participants’ gaze behavior were evaluated. In a first
step, we investigated whether participants looked equally often to
the left and right objects across conditions. This was clearly the
case as indicated by left/right-ratios (Exp.1: 1.08, Exp.2: 1.04,
Exp.3: 1.1, Exp.4: 1.04, Exp.5: 1.08) and supported by a one-way
ANOVA comparing these ratios across conditions that did not
yield any significant differences, F(4, 108) = 2.08, p= .10. In
addition, the consistency of participants’ gaze behavior was also
taken into account. This is important because it is conceivable that
whereas some participants alternate randomly between the left
and right objects throughout interaction blocks, others chose to
always fixate one of the two objects, thereby expressing higher
consistency in their behavior. To assess the possibility that
differences in consistency influence how participants experience
the virtual character’s gaze reactions and thus possibly their
humanness rating, the longest chain of consecutive gaze shifts to
the same object was extracted from each interaction block and
used to calculate an average consistency index for each participant
and each condition. An ANOVA comparing the average
consistency across experiments did not yield any significant
differences, F(12, 408) = 1.11, p=0.35. Subsequently, the
humanness ratings of each condition with the consistency index
of that condition were correlated. The Pearson correlation
coefficients were then included as a covariate in the repeated-
measures ANOVAS employed for the within-group analyses of the
effect of the independent variable (i.e. character’s gaze-following
behavior) on the dependent variable (i.e. the ascription of
humanness) that will be described in the following sections.
Experiment 1: Interaction with a Naı¨ve Confederate
In what we consider as the baseline task, the confederate was
introduced as naı¨ve to the participants’ task. This means that he
did not know that the real participant had to answer the question
whether he had the impression to be interacting with another
human or a computer program. We explicitly instructed
participants that the confederate was unaware of the computer
program randomly taking control of the virtual character’s eye
movements and of their task and thus could not knowingly help
them in answering the question.
Participants. 26 healthy volunteers participated in this study
(M=26.34, SD=5.12; 14 female). One female and one male
participant needed to be excluded from the analysis due to
technical problems during the experiment.
Results. The effects of increasing degrees of gaze-following on
humanness ascription are depicted in Figure 3a. The results indicate
that the proportion of human ratings increases with an increasing
degree of gaze-following by the virtual character. A one-way
repeated measures ANOVA including the degree of gaze-following
as a factor with seven levels was performed on the data. Mauchly’s
test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated
(x2=59.83, p,.001). Degrees of freedom were therefore corrected
by using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (e= .54).
The results show a main effect of gaze-following on the ascription of
humanness, F(3.23, 74.34) = 5.31, p= .002, v2=0.12. Polynomial
contrasts revealed a significant linear trend, F(1, 24) = 13.54,
p= .001, v2=0.26, thereby confirming the initial observation.
Discussion. Consistent with the literature on social gaze and
social interaction, we hypothesized that participants would base
their decision on congruent reactions to their own behavior.
Indeed, the results show a highly significant linear trend and
demonstrate that, when interacting with a putatively naı¨ve
confederate, participants’ ratings in favor of a human interaction
partner increased with increasing degrees of gaze-following. This
indicates that during interaction with an unknown person there
might be a default expectation of congruent reactions.
Experiment 2: Interaction with a Cooperative Interaction
Partner
It has been argued that humans have a predisposition to interact
cooperatively as soon as they interact [24,25]. To assess whether
Non-Verbal Turing Test
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the introduction of an explicitly cooperative context would either
reinforce the congruency-based pattern of humanness ascription
found in the previous experiment or would rather lead to a
contingency-based pattern, we introduced the interaction part-
ner as being aware of the participants’ task in experiment 2.
In addition, he was described as having been instructed to
‘‘cooperate’’, thus making the task as easy for the participant as
possible. To stimulate a cooperative mindset, we also informed the
participant that they both would receive additionally money if
cooperation would lead to more correct decisions between human
interactor and computer program.
Participants. 28 volunteers participated in this experiment
(M=26.96, SD=6.65; 13 female). Two male participants were
excluded because they did not believe the cover story.
Results. Figure 3b illustrates the mean responses for
participants interacting with an interactor previously introduced
as cooperative. Mean responses provide a first hint that during
cooperative interaction the mere contingency seems to play an
important role in humanness ascription. Again, Mauchly’s test
showed that the assumption of sphericity was violated (x2=80.92,
p,.001), and the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used
(e= .40). Here, too, the degree of gaze-following had a highly
significant effect on the ascription of humanness, F(2.37, 59.3)
= 22.63; p,.001, v2=0.38. There were highly significant linear,
F(1, 25) = 20.48; p,.001, v2=0.20, quadratic, F(1, 25) = 38.3;
p,.001, v2=0.47, and cubic, F(1, 25) = 9.2; p= .005, v2=0.05,
trends describing the u-shaped response pattern. A repeated-
measures ANOVA including cooperativeness (experiment 1 vs.
experiment 2) as a between-subjects factor showed that there was a
significant difference in humanness ascription between experi-
ments 1 and 2, F(3.13, 150.17) = 7.04; p,.001.
Discussion. Introducing the putative interaction partner as
cooperative had a striking influence on the pattern of the ascription
of humanness to the virtual character, which primarily followed a
contingency-based pattern. Participants appear to discount the
expectation of congruency of an interactor’s reaction if the inter-
actor is introduced as cooperative, indicating that in a coopera-
tive context coordinated reactions seem to be more indicative of a
human interactor than simple congruent reciprocation.
Experiment 3: Interaction with a Competitive Interaction
Partner
This experiment assessed whether one of the prevalent response
patterns from experiments 1 and 2 would still appear in a
competitive situation. To this end, participants were informed that
the confederate was aware of their task and instructed that he
Figure 3. Experiments 1, 2, and 3: The ascription of humanness to a virtual character during interaction with an interactor that is (a)
supposedly naı¨ve to the participants’ task, (b) introduced as cooperative, (c) or as competitive.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027591.g003
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should behave in a competitive way, hence making the decision as
difficult as possible. To accentuate this manipulation, participants
were told that they could earn extra amounts of money depending
on their success rate. Conversely, the reimbursement of the other
person was said to depend on his ability to trick the participant. It
was hypothesized that participants would avoid the ascription of
humanness in situations of maximal congruency or contingency of
gaze reactions.
Participants. 21 healthy volunteers participated in this
experiment (M=29.9, SD=4.95; 9 female).
Results. In Figure 3c the ascription of humanness in the
presence of a competitive interactor is depicted. It is obvious that
none of the previously described response patterns can be observed.
Again, the assumption of sphericity was violated (x2=35.35, p= .02)
and the Greenhouse-Geisser correction (e= .57) was employed in an
ANOVA which did not show any significant effect of the degree of
gaze-following on humanness ascription, F(3.4, 61.16) = 1.11;
p= .364, and hence confirms the initial observation. Repeated
measures ANOVAs including experiment (experiment 3 vs.
experiment 1; experiment 3 vs. experiment 2) as a between-
subjects factor demonstrated that humanness ascription during
competitive interaction differed significantly from cooperative
interaction, F(3.31, 134.75) = 14.17; p,.001, and showed a
strong trend towards significance compared to the interaction
with a naı¨ve interactor, F(3.53, 148.21) = 2.34; p= .056.
Discussion. As predicted, when interacting with a competitive
interactor, neither congruency nor mere contingency of reactions
played a role in influencing the ascription of humanness. This
demonstrates that participants expect a competitive partner to avoid
reciprocation and coordination, thus further corroborating the
importance of congruency and contingency in experiencing an
interaction as an interaction with a human interactor.
Debriefing Questionnaires
For a better understanding of how participants addressed the
task their responses in the post-experiment debriefing question-
naires were analyzed (see Figure S1). These questionnaires
included four questions:
(1) Did participants base the ascription of humanness on
considerations of human behavior or the function of a computer?
Overall, the vast majority of participants based their ratings on
considerations about human behavior (90.52%) rather than solely
the function of computers (9.48%) while performing the task. This
suggests that the non-verbal Turing test did not assess participant’s
hypotheses about how computers are programmed but indeed the
experience of interaction with other persons.
(2) How difficult did participants rate the task on a scale from 1
(easy) to 4 (difficult)? The condition to which participants were
assigned had a significant effect on their difficulty ratings, F(2, 64)
= 6.04, p= .004. Tukey post-hoc comparisons of the three
experiments revealed that difficulty ratings of participants who
had interacted with a putatively cooperative interactor (i.e.
Experiment 2) were significantly lower (M=2.59, 95% CI [2.32,
2.88]) compared to difficulty ratings in the naı¨ve (M=3.1, 95% CI
[2.86, 3.35]), p= .017, or competitive (M=3.23, 95% CI [2.94,
3.51]), p= .004, condition. This indicates that the ascription of
humanness was easiest for participants who had interacted with a
cooperative interactor.
(3) Did participants use any behavioral strategy to unravel the
nature of their interactor? An analysis of the presence of a strategy
did not reveal any significant difference between the three
conditions, F(2, 67) = 1.84, p= .17, indicating that the nature of
the interaction partner did not have any effect on how strategic
participants addressed the Turing test.
(4) Could participants report any specific criterion for deciding
between having interacted between a human and a computer? A
one-way ANOVA revealed that the condition had a significant
effect on whether participants had a specific criterion for
humanness ascription, F(2, 67) = 10.99, p,.001. Tukey post-hoc
comparisons showed that participants who had interacted with a
putatively competitive interactor had significantly fewer explicit
criteria for humanness ascription (M=0.10, 95% CI [0.01, 0.24])
compared to the naı¨ve (M=0.46, 95% CI [0.37, 0.78]), p= .032,
or cooperative (M=0.58, 95% CI [0.37, 0.78]), p= .003,
condition. The proportion of explicit criteria did not differ
between the naı¨ve and the cooperative condition.
Eventually, we also looked at the comments in the question-
naires in a descriptive way. Notably, a considerable number of
participants indicated that they expected a human interactor to
either always follow their gaze or always avert their gaze and
simply counted the occurrence of the expected reactions. In the
following section two experiments including a concurrent cognitive
load task will address the issue whether the Turing test provides a
measure of strategic reasoning about humanness or rather of the
implicit experience of an interaction as social.
Experiment 4: Interaction with a Naı¨ve Confederate
under Increased Cognitive Load
The possibility that participants simply test ad hoc hypotheses
about human behavior in order to solve the Turing test provides a
potential problem to our approach which aims at unraveling the
factors that lead to the phenomenological experience of an
interaction as an interaction with another human rather than
strategic behaviors that might inform a decision between mind and
machine. Social cognition has been distinguished from other
domains of cognition by a high degree of automaticity and
reflexivity of its core processes [26,27]. An increase of cognitive
load in a so-called dual-task design is known to burden effortful
reflective rather than automatic reflexive processes due to competition
for limited cognitive resources [28]. In experiment 4 participants
were instructed in the same way as in experiment 1. However,
when the object changed color, a random number between 2 and
9 appeared superimposed on it. The concurrent cognitive load task
consisted in adding up all six numbers that appeared during one
interaction segment and to enter the sum after giving the response
with respect to the nature of the interaction partner. We expected
this manipulation to distract participants from any explicit strategy
they could employ to inform the ascription of humanness.
Participants. 26 volunteers participated in this experiment
(M=25.85, SD=3.3; 14 female). One participant needed to be
excluded from the analysis because he did not believe the cover
story.
Results. The results of humanness ascription during
interaction with a naı¨ve partner under cognitive load are
depicted in Figure 4a. As in experiment 1, human ratings
increase with increasing gaze-following. Mauchly’s test indicated
that the assumption of sphericity was violated (x2=90.23; p,.001)
and degrees of freedom were corrected using the Greenhouse-
Geisser estimates of sphericity (e= .36). The results of a one-way
repeated-measures ANOVA indicated a highly significant effect of
gaze-following on humanness ascription, F(2.16, 47.51) = 10.45,
p,.001, v2=0.24. Polynomial contrasts revealed both a highly
significant linear, F(1, 20) = 12.87, p= .001, v2=0.29, and
quadratic trend, F(1, 20) = 11.09, p= .001, v2=0.16, as in
experiment 1. A repeated measures ANOVA including experi-
ment as a between-subjects factor (experiment 4 vs. experiment 1)
showed that humanness ascription during interaction with a naı¨ve
partner was not significantly affected by the presence of a
Non-Verbal Turing Test
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concurrent cognitive load task, F(2.89, 137.51) = 0.59, p= .62, and
thus confirmed the results from experiment 1.
Participants of experiment 4 were eventually separated into a
high- and a low-performance group by means of a median split
based on cognitive load performance. A one-way repeated measures
ANOVA with performance group as a between-subjects factor
demonstrated a significant effect of cognitive load performance on
the ascription of humanness, F(2.71, 56.86) = 2.88, p= .049.
Polynomial trend analysis within these two groups indicates that
the high-performance group shows a stronger linear trend, F(1, 11)
= 21.9, p= .001, v2=0.59, compared to the low-performance
group, F(1, 11) = 6.84, p= .024, v2=0.28. This is illustrated by
figure 4a which demonstrates that participants in the high-
performance group (solid lines) show a much more pronounced
congruency-based response pattern than those in the low-perfor-
mance group.
Discussion. Overall, humanness ascription in the naı¨ve
condition did not change significantly under concurrent cognitive
load. However, splitting participants into a low- and a high-
performance group demonstrated a clear effect of the load
manipulation: Participants who obtained higher scores in the load
task showed a more pronounced linear trend in humanness
ascription, that is, they based their ratings maximally on the
congruency of the virtual character’s reaction. As higher
performance in the cognitive load task is indicative of greater
distraction by this task, these results emphasize that the congruency
of gaze-reactions is the most prominent cue for humanness
ascription when cognitive resources are burdened during the
Turing test. This can be taken to suggest that congruency-based
responses are produced in an implicit and automatic fashion rather
than being a product of strategic reasoning processes.
Experiment 5: Interaction with a Cooperative Interaction
Partner under Increased Cognitive Load
This experiment followed the same rationale as experiment 4
and assessed the effect of concurrent cognitive load on humanness
ascription during interaction with a cooperative interactor.
Participants. In this experiment, 29 healthy volunteers
participated (M=25.11, SD=4.42; 17 female). One male and a
female participant were excluded from the analysis due to
technical problems during the experiment.
Results. Effect of Gaze Reactions. As in experiment 3, the mean
responses suggest that again overall contingency seems to play an
important role in the experience of an interaction as social
(Figure 4b). The Greenhouse-Geisser correction (e= .47) was used
to correct for the violation of sphericity as indicated by Mauchly’s
test (x2=84.24, p,.001). Again, the degree of gaze-following had
a highly significant effect on humanness ascription, F(2.79, 72.64)
= 12.52, p,.001, v2=0.29, and displayed significant linear, F(1,
26) = 6.03; p,.021, v2=0.05, and quadratic trends, F(1, 26) =
25.42, p,.001, v2=0.44. As indicated by a repeated measures
ANOVA including the presence of the cognitive load task as a
between-subjects factor (experiment 5 vs. experiment 2) the
addition of a concurrent cognitive load task did not lead to
group differences in humanness ascription, F(2.75, 134.57) = 1.22,
p= .31.
Participants again were separated into high- and low-performers
by a median split of cognitive load performance. Unlike
experiment 4 including load performance as a between-subjects
factor did not yield any significant effect, F(2.65, 63.68) = 0.36,
p= .36. In contrast, humanness ascription differed significantly
between the two cognitive load experiments (experiment 4 vs.
experiment 5), F(3.12, 146,47) = 3.81, p= .011, thus indicating
that the difference in response patterns observed in naı¨ve
compared to cooperative interactions remained consistent despite
the addition of a cognitive load task.
Discussion. The results of this experiment confirmed that
humanness is ascribed based on the mere contingency of gaze
reactions when the Turing test is performed with a cooperative
interactor. Both high- and low-performers equally ascribed
humanness based on contingent rather than congruent
responses, indicating that contingency is the prevalent cue
irrespective of the degree of cognitive burdening imposed by the
cognitive load task. The cooperative interaction hence seems to
Figure 4. Experiments 4 and 5: The ascription of humanness to a virtual character while concurrently solving a cognitive load task.
A median split separated participants with high and low scores in the cognitive load task. Solid lines represent the mean humanness ratings of high
performers, whereas dashed lines represent low performers. (a) During naı¨ve interaction cognitive load performance had an effect on humanness
ascription (p=0.49). High performers show a stronger congruency-based response pattern compared to low performers. (b) In cooperative
interaction there was no effect of load performance on the ascription of humanness.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027591.g004
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induce an implicit expectation of contingency that is not altered by
any strategic reasoning.
Further Hints to the Implicitness of Humanness
Ascription
In the two cognitive load experiments the focus of the
manipulation was during the interaction phase. The rationale
was that the task would distract people from thinking about the
interaction process and engaging in strategic reasoning about the
task. Nevertheless, the decision between human or computer
might not emerge during but completely after the interaction. To
address this possibility we analyzed reaction times (see Figure 5d).
A one-way ANOVA including all experiments was performed and
demonstrated a main effect of experimental group on reaction
times, F(4, 116) = 3,79, p = .006. Pooling the data into load and
no-load experiments showed that this effect was due to
significantly higher reaction times in the load (M=2250.7,
SE= 94.4) compared to the no-load (M=1877.81, SE= 70.23)
tasks, t(119) =22,56, p= .012, suggesting higher cognitive
demands resulting from the combination of the humanness
ascription and the cognitive load task. A one-way ANOVA did
not reveal any significant differences of reaction times between the
no-load conditions (experiments 1, 2, and 3), F(2, 68) = 2.01,
p= .142. A comparison of the two load experiments (experiments 4
and 5) also did not show any significant difference, t(48) = .92,
p= .364. Although this suggests that the decision is made during
the interaction, it cannot be ruled out that reasoning processes
between the end of the interaction block and the button press play
a role in humanness ascription.
To investigate this matter, a median split of reaction times was
performed for all experiments (Figure 5a–e). In the naı¨ve
condition, a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a
significant effect of reaction time on humanness ascription, F(3.09,
70.99) = 3.02, p= .034, v2=0.12. Separate ANOVAs for
participants with short and long reaction times showed that the
degree of gaze-following only had an effect in the fast responders,
F(2.82, 33.79) = 5.39, p= .004, v2=0.32, who showed a highly
significant linear trend of humanness ascription, F(1, 12) = 13.02,
p= .004, v2=0.32. In the slow responders, there was no such
effect, F(3.4, 37.36) = 1.23, p= .31. In the naı¨ve condition
including cognitive load an ANOVA revealed an effect of reaction
time on the ascription of humanness, F(2.52, 55.48) = 5.44,
p= .004, v2=0.22. Similar results as in the naı¨ve condition
without cognitive load were indicated by separate ANOVAs for
slow and fast responders. Gaze-following only had a significant
effect in the fast responders, F(1.74, 20.83) = 17.13, p,.001,
v
2=0.44, where also a linear trend was present, F(1, 12) = 24.04,
p,.001, v2=0.43, but not in the slow responders, F(3.36, 33.55) =
1.8, p= .11. This suggests that the longer participants think about
their decision after the interaction, the lesser they take congruency
into account as a humanness cue. Interestingly, there was no such
an effect for experiments 2, 3, and 5, indicating that during
cooperative interaction, the ascription of humanness is implicitly
based on the contingency of gaze reactions without being influenced
by the time spent on thinking about the decision.
The reaction time data are supported by participant’s responses
to the questions whether they had behavioral strategies and
whether they could mention explicit criteria for humanness
ascription. Concerning the question whether they had used
specific strategies to investigate whether they had interacted with
another human or a computer (Figure S1c), this was significantly
less the case in the experiments including a concurrent cognitive
load task, x2(1) = 6.23, p= .013. In addition, although this was
only a statistical trend, participants did report specific criteria for
the ascription of humanness (Figure S1d) considerably less often in
the cognitive load experiments compared to the experiments with
increased cognitive load, x2(1) = 3.27, p= .07. These results
indicate that manipulation of cognitive load was successful in
reducing strategic behavior of participants as well as their
awareness of specific criteria for the ascription of humanness.
Discussion
In a series of experiments, we have made use of a novel
interactive eye-tracking paradigm to establish what we describe as
a non-verbal Turing test. This setup makes it possible to assess
parameters of gaze-based interaction which lead to the experience
of a truly social encounter with a real human interaction partner.
Hereby we could overcome the paradoxical situation of previous
studies on social cognition in which the behavior of a single person
is observed in isolation from others. The experience of being
involved in interaction is constituted by two aspects: Firstly,
participants in our experiments experience that they are directly
addressed by the virtual character whose gaze behavior is made
contingent on their own in real time. The necessity of ‘‘being
addressed as you’’ has recently been advanced as a second-person
approach to social cognition in the fields of social cognition and
neuroscience [5,29,30]. Secondly, the paradigm enables partici-
pants to directly observe the consequences of their actions on
another agent as it would occur in real-life interaction. This is vital
for making sense of one’s own behavior in an interactive context
and for its adjustment to situational requirements.
This newly developed approach provides important and novel
insights on the process underlying the ascription of humanness to
virtual characters in social encounters. In order to model different
social contexts, participants engaged in the non-verbal Turing test
under changing situational demands: Experiment 1 assessed
humanness ascription during interaction with an interactor who
was thought to be naı¨ve to the task in order to assess the default
ascription pattern when there is no knowledge about the
interactor. Consistent with our hypothesis, participants activated
a congruency-based expectation and increasingly ascribed hu-
manness to the virtual character with increasing degrees of gaze-
following. The results of experiment 2 demonstrate that this
pattern can be modulated depending on the previous knowledge
about the behavioral predisposition of the interaction partner and
changes to a contingency-based analysis of behavior in the
presence of a cooperative partner. As predicted, experiment 3
showed that the ascription of humanness during interaction with a
competitive interactor was neither based on congruency nor on
contingency of gaze reactions.
The Special Case of Gaze
Before turning to an in-depth discussion of our results there are
two controversial issues related to the operationalization of the
interaction process using gaze cues and to the resulting explan-
ations that need to be addressed.
First of all, it might be argued that gaze-following is merely a
form of motor mimicry which refers to a subtle imitation of the
behavior of an interaction partner. Consequently, the ascription of
humanness might rely on mimicry-related processes which are
known to increase rapport, empathy, and liking between mimicker
and mimickee and thereby result in increased bonding of the
interactors [31]. Although gaze-following naturally has an
imitative component, motor mimicry can clearly be distinguished
from gaze-following in a number of respects. Chartrand and Bargh
[32] describe mimicry as non-conscious imitation ‘‘such that one’s
behavior passively and unintentionally changes to match that of
Non-Verbal Turing Test
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others in one’s current social environment’’ (p.893). The
involvement of a distinct task as in our series of experiments
makes it difficult to argue that the other’s gaze-following is passive
or unintentional. Another important argument is that the appraisal
of the mimicker decreases and other positive social effects break
down once the mimickee becomes aware of being mimicked,
possibly because the imitative behavior is evaluated as an
intentional expression of conformity directed at the attainment
of reward or approval [33,34]. In our task it is obvious that the
participant is aware of the other following or not following his
gaze, as this is the criterion on which the decision between human
and computer is based. A further distinction concerns the function
of mimicry and gaze-following. Whereas the main function of
mimicry seems to be the general facilitation of dyadic interactions,
gaze-following is related to triadic rather than dyadic interactions
where it serves the purpose of keeping track of another person’s
focus of attention, thereby paving the way to an understanding of
this person’s mental states [9,10]. The distinct task structure,
participants’ awareness of the other’s reactions, as well as the
functional role of gaze-following clearly argue against any
substantial role of mimicry in the present study.
Secondly, a critical reader might ask whether the effects
demonstrated here are gaze-specific or whether they could
potentially be replicated using different channels of non-verbal
behavior. Undoubtedly, some of the effects reported in this article
might appear in a Turing-test-like study involving other forms of
interaction. However, the aim of the present study was to uncover
the basic aspects of ‘online’ social interaction that lead to the
experience of this interaction as an interaction with another
human. In order to obtain a valid operationalization, we identified
and aimed at fulfilling two main criteria without which the task
could not provide a valid experimental investigation of online
social interaction. First, the task needs to provide a high level of
ecological validity, i.e. both channel and process of the interaction
must be highly salient in everyday social interactions. Second, the
task must provide a high degree of experimental control.
Obviously, other cue system could be used to model contingency
and congruency of an interaction in an experimentally controllable
fashion. For example, a similar study design could involve pressing
a button, moving a cursor, producing a sound or any combination
of these cues. However, this would not satisfy the criterion of
ecological validity as these activities are not part of every-day social
interactions. Furthermore, social gaze is distinct from other
communicative channels in one crucial aspect. Already more
than 40 years ago, Gibson and Pick noted that gaze ‘‘can be
treated as a source of stimulation as well as a type of response. The
eyes not only look but are looked at’’ ([13], p.386) and that hence
in the act of looking perception and action are inseparable. Taken
together, for the following reasons, social gaze seems most ideally
suited for a Turing-test-like assessment of social interaction: (i) It
readily occurs in natural interaction, (ii) it is linked to an
understanding of other’s minds, (iii) it is easily controllable in an
experimental setting, and (iv) it combines stimulation and response
in one action.
The Valence of Gaze Aversion and Gaze-Following
As a key finding, our studies demonstrate that human beings
who interacted with a putatively naı¨ve partner displayed an
implicit expectation of gaze-following behavior and experienced
an interaction as social when the interactor followed their gaze and
engaged in joint attention with them.. This effect is surprisingly
robust given that the only piece of information available to the
Figure 5. Reaction times of humanness decisions split by median. Grey bars indicate mean ratings. Mean ratings of fast responders (reaction
time below median) are indicated by green scatter plot, mean ratings of slow responders are indicated by red scatter plot. Effects of response time
are indicated in brackets. (a) Naı¨ve interactor (p= .034): In fast responders humanness ascription is driven more strongly by congruency than in slow
responders. (b) Cooperative interactor (n.s.). (c) Competitive interactor (n.s.). (d) Naı¨ve interactor + cognitive load (p= .004): Fast responders show
stronger congruency-based response patterns compared to slow responders. (e) Cooperative interactor + cognitive Load (n.s.). (f) Mean reaction
times for all experiments (see text for details).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027591.g005
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participants was that the partner had been instructed to react to
their gaze by ‘‘freely choosing to look to the same or the other
object’’ without being able to willingly help them to solve the task.
Why is maximally averted gaze not indicative of a human interactor? In
the first instance, this might be related to the fact that in the domain
of social gaze valence is an inherent property of the contingency
continuum which ranges from maximal gaze aversion to maximal
gaze-following [6]. The neglect of maximal gaze aversion as a cue to
humanness during interaction with a naı¨ve interactor might be
related to the negative valence of gaze aversion that has been
demonstrated on various levels. For example, in a study on the
effects of gaze cues on person construal it has been shown that
participants produced higher ratings of both likeability and
attractiveness for pictures of people shifting the gaze towards them
compared to pictures of people averting their gaze from them [35].
In another study [36], participants viewed video sequences
displaying a human face either directing its gaze at them or
averting it by looking left or right from time to time. As a between-
subjects factor the degree of gaze aversion was varied. After having
watched the movies, participants had to fill out a social rejection
questionnaire which showed that feelings of exclusion and ostracism
increased with increasing total duration of gaze aversion. In
addition, gaze aversion generally increased feelings of negative
mood and decreased prosocial attitudes. Additional evidence for the
negative valence of gaze aversion comes from an EEG experiment
in which participants viewed live faces displaying either direct or
averted gaze [36]. An analysis of EEG activity revealed that direct
gaze elicited left-hemispheric frontal activation which has been
related to approach motivation. On the contrary, averted gaze
resulted in right-sided frontal activation that has been related to an
avoidance motivation, suggesting that gaze aversion triggers neural
responses related to negative affect [37].
Is there comparable support for a positive valence of gaze-following and joint
attention? A crucial distinction has been made between other- and
self-initiated joint attention. One can either respond to bids of joint
attention by others or initiate joint attention by leading someone’s
gaze. Whereas gaze-following has been observed in other species,
the ability and spontaneous motivation to lead someone’s gaze is
uniquely human. Its function is to share interests and pleasant
experiences regarding objects in the environment with others [10].
For the present study, a recently discovered motivational aspect of
self-initiated joint attention is of great importance. Schilbach and
colleagues [16] report that being involved in joint attention,
irrespective of its initiator, results in the activation of regions of the
so-called ‘‘social brain’’, such as the medial prefrontal cortex. This
region has been implicated in mentalizing, i.e. in thinking about
other person’s goals and intentions [38]. Initiating joint attention
oneself, however, is associated with increased neural activity in the
ventral striatum as part of the brain’s reward system whose activity
changes have been linked to hedonic experiences and the
anticipation of reward [39,40]. In addition, there was a significant
correlation of the strength of striatal activation with ratings of the
pleasantness of joint attention obtained in a post-scan question-
naire. These findings indicate that self-initiated joint attention
triggers reward-related processing and hence provides an intrinsic
motivation for engaging others in joint attention. In other words,
we seek for reciprocation and enjoy being able to elicit congruent
responses from others to our actions. Taken together, we believe
that these positive connotations of gaze-following may be crucial in
informing the ascription of humanness.
From Joint Attention to Joint Action by Cooperation
Our results provide compelling evidence for the significant
impact of prior knowledge about the goal of the presumed
interactor on the experience of an interaction. When the interactor
was explicitly introduced as cooperative, the ascription of
humanness was not based on congruency but rather followed
the actual contingency of the virtual character’s reactions more
closely. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis and indicates
that people were, in fact, not blind to the actual contingencies, but
only integrate them when the interactor’s disposition to cooperate
is known.
How can cooperation lead to the discounting of the expectation of congruent
gaze reactions? Cooperation, in the traditional view, is a behavior
that is selected to provide mutual benefit to both the actor and the
recipient. Cooperation often requires that immediate benefits are
discounted in order to gain a delayed reward [41,42]. However,
cooperation has not only been defined in terms of its fitness
consequences, but also in a mechanistic sense as a form of
behavioral coordination [18]. In this definition, particular emphasis
is put on the necessity of coordination between the cooperative
interaction partners which is regarded as an ‘‘important proximate
mechanism needed to accomplish cooperation’’ ([43], p. 7).
Interestingly, the coordination of behaviors is not only pivotal for
cooperation, but also for joint action [44]. For example, musicians
playing instruments in a band, a couple dancing together, or
construction workers building a house demonstrate cases of joint
action. It is hence possible that the discounting of mere congruency
in the cooperative condition is a consequence of participants
interpreting the interaction as a form of joint action. An analysis of
the degree of coordination expected by participants from a human
interactor and an assessment of the criteria that an interaction needs
to fulfill in order to be classified as a joint action might help to assess
this option.
Does cooperative interaction in the non-verbal Turing test qualify as a joint
action? There are two salient coordinated behavioral patterns that
occur in the Turing test, namely maximal gaze-following or
maximal gaze aversion. Data from the naı¨ve condition suggest that
maximal gaze-following constitutes the most basic and effortless
form of coordinative behavior which seems to be expected ‘‘by
default’’ when people engage in interaction. In the cooperative
situation, any form of contingency is judged as indicative of a
human interaction partner, thus indicating that participants expect
a higher degree of coordination. This strong expectation of
coordinated behavior irrespective of the congruency of reactions
might be taken to suggest that participants understand the
cooperative interaction as a situation of joint action. Fiebich and
Gallagher [45] have recently identified three conditions that need
to be satisfied before interactors can be said to be engaged in joint
action: i) they need to have a shared goal or intention, ii) they must
have common knowledge of aiming at this goal together, and iii)
they have to participate in coordinated patterns in order to reach
this goal. These criteria are fulfilled in the cooperative version of
the Turing test: (i) The shared goal of increasing the common
monetary reward is easily identified for the interaction with a
cooperative interaction partner. (ii) As this has been communicat-
ed explicitly, the participant can also assume that they are aiming
at this goal together. (iii) The contingency-driven response pattern
indicates that participants strongly expected the other to
coordinate his behavior to their actions on a higher level than
mere congruency. We speculate that this demonstrates an intrinsic
expectation of higher-order coordination in cooperation compared
to the unrestrained interaction format in the naı¨ve condition and
thus provides evidence that the interaction with a cooperative
interactor is automatically interpreted as a situation of joint action.
Experiencing Interaction or Thinking about Inter-
action?. It might be argued that the ascription of humanness
could have been based on reasoning processes which are not
Non-Verbal Turing Test
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 10 November 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 11 | e27591
related to the experience of social interaction. Social cognition has
been described as being largely constituted by automatic processes
are fast, unconscious, and do not require willful regulatory efforts
[27,46]. Hence, if participant’s judgments were the outcome of
conscious, deliberate, and strategic thought processes this would
pose a problem to our claim of presenting these judgments as
measures of the experience of interacting with another human. We
assessed this possibility in several respects. First of all, the addition
of a concurrent cognitive load task in experiments 4 and 5
specifically aimed at interfering with strategic processes during
the interaction process by burdening the cognitive system of
participants.
The results of these experiments clearly demonstrated that
during naı¨ve interaction the increase of cognitive load lead to an
increased in congruency-based humanness ascription. Notably,
participants who obtained high scores in the cognitive load task
based the ascription of humanness more strongly on congruency
than participants with low scores. This indicates that the inter-
ference created by the load task unraveled implicit or automatic
response patterns. In cooperative interaction, on the other hand,
the presence of the cognitive load task had no effect on humanness
ascription, demonstrating that contingency-based responses rep-
resent implicit judgments of humanness. Overall, participants in
the experiments including cognitive load reported that they used
less strategies and less explicit criteria of humanness ascription,
thereby further corroborating the effectiveness of the load
manipulation. Considering that the decision between human and
computer could take place completely after the interaction itself,
reaction times were analyzed by splitting participants into fast and
slow responders. In interactions with a naı¨ve interactor, irrespec-
tive of the presence of a cognitive load task, fast responders base
humanness ascription more strongly on congruency than slow
responders. Taken together, these findings indicate that we were
able to address the implicit processes leading to the experience of
an interaction as an interaction with a human agent rather than
results of careful deliberation that might inform a decision between
mind and machine.
Outlook and Conclusions
Insights into how congruency and contingency of reactions to
our own gaze behavior lead to the experience of an interaction as
social address the interests of various fields of research. For
instance, the current paradigm is likely to provide a useful tool to
investigate impairments of the ability to engage in online social
interaction in psychiatric disorders, such as it is observed in
schizophrenia and autism [2]. The current methodological
developments and empirical results could also inform research
on human-computer interfaces aiming at the development of
virtual agents that appear and behave human in a natural way in
order to facilitate smooth interaction [47,48]. Clearly, such
developments can benefit from research unraveling the core
aspects of human social interaction by using truly interactive
paradigms. Most obviously, however, the adaptation of the present
experimental design for neuroimaging studies will provide a
powerful tool for the study of the neural underpinnings of social
interaction. In this respect, it can be hypothesized that gaze-based
interaction with a naı¨ve confederate might lead to an increase in
neural activity in areas of the mentalizing system such as the
medial prefrontal cortex [49]. In addition, conditions with highly
congruent reactions might correlate with increased activity in
brain areas implicated in the processing of reward such as the
amygdala and the ventral striatum [16,50,51]. While competitive
interaction might also concur with an increase of neural activity in
mentalizing areas it would be interesting to investigate whether the
competitive context could also lead to a decrease of activity in
reward-related neurocircuitry when observing joint attention.
Likewise, an interesting question concerns the neural substrates
of contingency evaluation in a cooperative context: Does the
presence of a shared goal lead to a decrease of activity in the
mentalizing system in favor of activation of brain areas implicated
in coordinated behavior (e.g., [52])? Furthermore, it will be
interesting to investigate whether changes in activation of the
reward system in response to positively contingent gaze-reactions
could generalize to contingent reactions irrespective of their
valence depending on the situational context.
In summary, our results demonstrate that the use of innovative
methodology and experimental designs makes it possible to
address the interaction process itself instead of focusing on the
study of single minds in isolation [1]. Though still rare, truly
interactive paradigms have also been advanced by other
researchers in psychology and cognitive neuroscience [1,53–56].
This emphasizes the need for such studies if we want to understand
why and how we interact with others in a more sophisticated way
than any other species.
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Abstract:  
There is ample evidence that human primates have a need for social contact and experience 
interactions with conspecifics as intrinsically rewarding. However, little is known about the 
neural mechanisms underlying this component of behavior. Using a unique combination of eye-
tracking, neuroimaging, and computer-animated virtual agents, the current investigation 
demonstrated that gaze-based interactions with a perceived human partner are associated with 
activity in the ventral striatum, a core component of reward-related neurocircuitry, while 
interactions with a computer-driven agent activate attention networks. In addition, comparisons 
of neural activity during interaction with a behaviorally naïve and an explicitly cooperative 
partner show that that cooperation is not necessary, but that the mere experience of engagement 
in social interaction is sufficient to recruit the reward system. 
 
 
One Sentence Summary:  
The experience of being engaged in social interaction with another human per se is associated 
with reward-related activity in the ventral striatum and may provide an explanation as to why we 
interact with others in the first place. 
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Main Text:  
 
Introduction 
In the hierarchy of human needs, the need to affiliate and interact with others has been located 
directly after physiological needs and prior to egoistic needs related to self-actualization and 
esteem (1, 2). This implies that social interaction should represent a reward in itself, and led to 
the proposal of an intrinsic motivation for social interaction unique to the human species (3–5). 
Neuroeconomic studies have indeed found reward-related brain activity during social 
interactions (e.g. 6–9). However, the application of economic games in the study of social 
interaction typically involves high-level concepts such as trust, fairness, or cooperation (10). As 
a consequence, the claim that being in interaction with others is per se rewarding has never been 
put to the test (11).  
The current study addressed this notion by studying the brain activity of humans engaged 
in gaze-based interactions. Gaze constitutes a crucial domain of everyday social encounters (e.g. 
12) and has the additional advantage that it can be implemented inside an fMRI scanner due to 
the minimal involvement of body movements. Ecological validity and experimental control were 
balanced by visualizing gaze behavior via computer-animated virtual agents (13). Each block of 
the interaction task comprised five trials in which the agent would either engage in joint or non-
joint attention with the participant (Fig. 1A/B). Participants believed that during each block the 
agent was either controlled by a computer algorithm or another participant. In fact, the other 
participant was a confederate to permit systematic manipulation of the agent’s gaze behavior by 
the computer algorithm. This was accomplished by varying the proportion of joint attention trials 
from zero to five out of five possible times (S 3.1). Participants’ task was to decide on the nature 
of their opponent based on the agent’s reactions during a given block. While other studies 
explicated the nature of the opponent a priori (7, 14, 15), the present design assessed the neural 
mechanisms underlying the subjective experience of social interaction (16). 
Unconstrained as well as cooperative interaction contexts were established in two 
experimental phases in which the interaction partner was either introduced as naïve to 
participants’ task, or as a collaborator motivated to help them to distinguish human interactions. 
Based on the claim that social interaction is per se rewarding, we hypothesized that an explicitly 
cooperative context is not required to recruit reward-related neurocircuitry. Furthermore, we 
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predicted that the striatum would encode reward components related to a motivation to interact, 
whereas the orbitofrontal cortex was expected to encode the rewarding experience. Finally, the 
interaction contexts should differentially affect the neural processing of the agent’s behavior. 
 
Results 
The contingency of the agent’s gaze reactions had a differential effect in the two contexts (see 
S6.1 for results). In the naïve context (Fig. 1C), the proportion of blocks rated as ‘human’ 
correlated linearly with the number of joint attention trials per block, which argues for a 
particular importance of congruent reactions during unconstrained interactions. In the 
cooperative context (Fig. 1D), ‘human’ ratings were more closely related to the general 
contingency of reactions: the engagement in joint as well as non-joint attention was interpreted 
as indicative of a human opponent when this behavior was consistent over an entire block. This 
replicates results of a behavioral between-subject version of the present task (16). A series of 
regression analyses assessed how trial type (joint vs. non-joint) at a given trial position biased 
participants’ rating of an interaction as ‘human’. This yielded a measure of the integration of 
information during decision-making (Table S1, see S6.2 for details). In the naïve context, already 
the second trial had a significant influence on the final rating, with ‘human’ becoming 
significantly more likely than ‘computer’ if the agent engaged in joint attention on that trial. 
Such an early component was absent in the cooperative context, where the influence of trial type 
increased roughly linearly until end of a block. 
 Initial fMRI analyses (see Table S2 for an overview of analyses) were driven by 
participants’ ratings (Fig. 1C/D). Blocks rated as ‘human’ (humall_block>comall_block) were 
accompanied by enhanced activation of the ventral striatum (VS) and the medial orbitofrontal 
cortex (mOFC; Fig. 2A, Table S3a). In contrast, during blocks rated as ‘computer’ 
(comall_block>humall_block) there was increased activation of a fronto-parietal attention network 
(FPAN, see 17) including the inferior parietal cortex, precuneus, and the lateral prefrontal cortex 
(Fig 2B, Table S3b). When considering only the naïve context (humnaïve_block>comnaïve_block), 
‘human’-rated blocks engaged the mesolimbic reward system (18), while there were no 
significant results in ‘computer’-rated blocks (comnaïve_block>humnaïve_block). Conversely, in the 
cooperative context, there was increased activation of the FPAN during ‘computer’-rated blocks 
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(comcoop_block>humcoop_block, Table S3d), while no regions were active during ‘human’-rated 
blocks (humcoop_block>comcoop_block). 
 Further fMRI analyses were driven by the finding of early versus linear integration of 
gaze reactions in the naïve and cooperative context. Accordingly, VS activity during the first two 
trials of a block (humnaïve_first>comnaïve_first) was predictive of participants’ ratings exclusively in 
the naïve context (Fig. 3B, Table S3e). On the contrary, only in the cooperative context, linear 
parametric analyses including trial progression as a parametric regressor 
(humcoop_param>comcoop_param) revealed an increase of VS activity over the full length of blocks 
rated ‘human’ (Fig. 4, Table S3f). 
The processing of single gaze reactions was assessed using event-related analyses, while 
contingencies established by the agent’s gaze reactions over a block (see S3.1) were analyzed 
using the total number of joint attention trials within a block as a parametric regressor. In the 
naïve context, joint attention trials (JAnaïve>NJAnaïve) recruited regions associated with the ‘social 
brain network’ (19) involving the bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and the left 
amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), temporal pole, and superior temporal sulcus (Fig. 
S2, Table S5a). However, parametric analyses of increasing positive contingency (naïveincrease_JA) 
revealed increases of activity in the bilateral paracentral lobule, but not in social brain regions 
(Fig. S3A, Table S4a). In the cooperative context, there was no enhanced activity for joint 
attention on a single-trial level (JAcoop>NJAcoop), but a parametric increase with increasing 
positive contingency (coopincrease_JA) in the dorsal striatum, the thalamus, the ACC and the mPFC 
(Fig. S4A, Table S4c), suggesting that the social brain network is recruited by behavioral 
consistency rather than single events. Increased negative contingency (coopincrease_NJA) recruited 
the FPAN (Fig. S4B, Table S4d).  
 
Discussion 
These findings provide first-time evidence that the mere experience of social interaction with 
another human is sufficient to recruit the mesolimbic reward system (20). A recent study showed 
a correlation between social reward dependence – i.e. a measure of an individual’s propensity to 
engage in social interaction – and gray matter density in the VS and the mOFC. The structural 
predisposition for social interaction thus overlaps with brain regions involved in the processing 
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of primary rewards (4), thereby further lending support to the hypothesis that social interaction 
constitutes a primary reward.  
Notably, the processing of rewards has been divided into ‘wanting’ and ‘liking’ 
components (18). In the naïve context, striatal activity during the first two trials reliably 
predicted that an interaction will be rated as ‘human’. Concordantly, post-hoc ratings revealed 
that participants largely relied on their intuition in this context (Fig. S1B), and preferred thinking 
about the behavior of a human conspecific rather than a computer when making the decision 
(Fig. S1D). As the agent’s behavior during the first two trials is actually still inconclusive 
regarding the nature of the opponent, we presume that this early preference represents the 
‘wanting’ component associated with the human need to interact (1). This is consistent with the 
previous observation that the VS conveys automatic incentive signals to the mOFC during initial 
stages of impression formation (21) and thereby contributes to a larger picture attributing the VS 
to an automatic valuation system which encodes preferences irrespective of stimulus modality 
and task demands (22).  
If a need for interaction represents the ‘wanting’ component, its fulfillment by the actual 
experience of being in social interaction should correspond to reward ‘liking’. Indeed, 
participants’ post-experience ratings indicated that they experienced social interactions as more 
pleasant than non-social interactions (Fig. S1C). The subjective hedonic experience of rewards 
has been attributed to the mOFC rather than the VS (23). The mOFC was active during blocks 
rated as ‘human’ irrespective of interaction context. This finding might reflect the ‘liking’ of 
being engaged in interaction, and is further supported by the observation that the VS plays 
different functional roles depending on the context. 
In the cooperative context, there was no early activation, but a gradual parametric 
increase of VS activity with increasing trial progression. Considering that the interaction partner 
allegedly helped participants in their decision, consistent behavior had to be detected by an 
accumulation of information over time, rather than by trusting an intuition (16). A recent study 
examined whether VS activation correlates with such an accumulation of evidence in general, or 
the accumulation of value in particular (24). In a buying task, positive and negative ratings of a 
product were sequentially disclosed to participants. The VS and the mOFC specifically updated 
the representation of value when positive ratings were disclosed, but not generally when novel 
information was revealed or when information was negative. In our study, each trial of 
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interactions experienced as social provided positive evidence that the agent is controlled by an 
actual human cooperator. The differential linear increase of striatal activity with these trials 
therefore reflects the accumulation of value rather than evidence per se (Fig. 4).  
The modulation of gaze processing by interaction context provides further insights into 
the integration of information underlying reward-based decisions. In the naïve context, activity in 
social brain regions such as the mPFC and the aSTS was confined to single events of joint 
attention. These areas are known to be involved in an the inference of other individuals’ mental 
states (12, 25, 26), thereby demonstrating that gaze behavior is processed in a trial-by-trial 
fashion. In cooperative interactions, single events are only indicative of a human opponent when 
part of temporally contingent behavior. Accordingly, positive contingency was processed by the 
dorsal striatum, while negative contingency recruited the FPAN. This interplay of reward and 
attention networks possibly reflects a distribution of cognitive resources required to ensure that 
joint attention – a cue that is behaviorally relevant and rewarding (12, 26) – is only considered as 
a social event when the contingency of reactions is high.  
The dorsal striatum has also been recruited in iterated trust-games (8), which require 
participants to monitor a cooperators’ actions across multiple rounds and demand similar 
temporal binding of positively contingent information as the present task (27). Furthermore, this 
region plays a role when participants experienced contingency between their actions and a 
reward, thereby linking the sense of agency to reward-based decisions (28). This is consistent 
with the recent observation that the initiation of joint attention results in an increased experience 
of agency (29). The reward value of cooperative interactions hence appears to rely on the 
establishment of contextually meaningful contingencies between one’s own actions and another 
individual’s behavior rather than intuitive valuations of reactions.  
 In sum, our study provides evidence that the basic sociability of human nature rests upon 
an urge to interact and a predisposition to experience active participation in social interactions as 
motivating. While humans might have a predisposition to cooperate, these results suggest that we 
cooperate for a more basal motive – namely to sustain the interaction with another person. 
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Figures 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Structure of interaction task and behavioral results. A) In each of five trials of an interaction block, 
participants initiate an exchange of gaze shifts. The detailed sequence of events is described in the figure. B) At the 
end of each block participants indicate whether they experienced this interaction as social (‘human’) or non-social 
(‘computer’). This block exemplifies a 3/5 condition in which the agent engages three out of five times in joint 
attention. C) In the naïve context, the proportion of ‘human’ ratings correlates with increased congruency of gaze 
reactions. D) In the cooperative context, the mere contingency of gaze reactions modulates the experience of social 
interaction. 
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Fig. 2. Neural systems activated during the blocks rated as ‘human’ and ‘computer’ independent of the interaction 
context. A) The experience of interaction with another human participant recruits the ventral striatum (VS) and 
medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC). B) The experience of an interaction as non-social is associated with activity in 
a fronto-parietal network related to attentional processing, which includes the inferior parietal sulcus (IPS), 
precuneus (PC), premotor cortex (PMC), and lateral prefrontal cortex including IFG and MFG (statistical threshold: 
p < .05 corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level). 
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Fig. 3. In the naïve context, the reward system is activated during the experience of engagement in social 
interaction. A) Blocks rated as ‘human’ recruit the mesolimbic reward system relative to ‘computer’-rated blocks. 
This includes the ventral tegmental area (VTA), substantia nigra (SN), subthalamic nucleus (STN), and the ventral 
striatum (VS). B) The activity of the VS during the first two trials of a block is predictive of participants’ ratings. 
This finding parallels behavioral data showing that there is an early critical component in the decision-making 
process exclusively in the naïve context (threshold: p < .05 cluster-level-corrected for multiple comparisons; error 
bars depict 90% CI). 
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Fig. 4. During interaction with a cooperative interaction partner, activity in the ventral striatum (VS) unfolds over 
the time course of interaction blocks rated as ‘human’. This indicates an accumulation of value towards the decision 
(threshold: p < .05 cluster-level-corrected for multiple comparisons; error bars depict 90% CI). 
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Materials and Methods 
 
 
S1 Participants 
 
In total, a group of 32 healthy right-handed volunteers without any records of neurological or 
psychiatric illnesses participated in the study. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. They were naïve with respect to the task and were equally compensated for their 
participation (15 Euro/hour). All participants signed a written consent form in which they 
confirmed that they participated voluntarily and approved that data are used in an anonymized 
fashion for analysis and publication. The study followed the WMA Declaration of Helsinki 
(Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects) and was approved by the 
ethics committee of the Medical Faculty of the University of Cologne, Germany. Four 
participants had to be excluded due to excessive head movements causing uncorrectable signal 
spiking. Another six participants were dismissed due to technical problems with the eye-tracker 
which resulted in data due to invalid trials greater than 25 percent. Finally, two participants had 
to be excluded as they did not believe the cover story. Consequently, 20 participants (9 
female/11 male, M = 27.75, SD = 6.44, age range from 21 to 42 years) were included in the 
analysis.  
 
 
S2 Materials 
 
S2.1 Stimulus presentation and eye-tracking 
Visual stimuli were presented to participants using a custom-built and shielded TFT screen 
attached at a distance of about 100 cm from the end of the scanner (viewing angle: 14° x 18° 
horizontal x vertical). They were displayed to participants via a mirror that was mounted on the 
head coil. Participants’ eye-movements were monitored via the same mirror system using the 
MRI-compatible long-range mount version of the EyeLink 1000 eye-tracking system (SR 
Research, Missisauga, Canada) installed at the rear end of the scanner bore. Raw gaze data were 
collected at a sampling rate of 500 Hz on a dedicated EyeLink host computer and made available 
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to the software package PresentationTM (Version 14.9, Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA) to 
control stimulus presentation in a gaze-contingent fashion using an interactive eye-tracking 
algorithm (for details see 30).  
 
 
S3 Experimental design 
 
The paradigm used here is an fMRI adaptation of the ‘non-verbal Turing test’ which has recently 
been validated in a behavioral study as a tool allowing the separation of the experience of social 
and non-social interaction (16).  Participants’ task was to engage in gaze-based interaction with 
an anthropomorphic virtual agent with a neutral facial expression in brief interaction blocks (see 
supplementary text S7 for a discussion of the use of virtual agents). To ensure comparability of 
results, the same agent was used as in previous studies (12, 16, 29, 31).  
 
S3.1 The interaction task 
Participants had to interact with a virtual agent in a series of interaction blocks. They were 
instructed that in each given interaction block the gaze reactions of the agent could either be 
controlled by a real person or a computer algorithm. Based on the gaze behavior of the agent, 
their task was to indicate whether it had been controlled by another human participant or a 
computer program at the end of each block. In fact, the interaction partner was a confederate of 
the experimenter and the gaze reactions of the agent were always controlled by an algorithm. 
This allowed for systematic variation of gaze reactions. Each interaction block comprised five 
gaze trials (Fig. 1A/B) in which the agent would either engage in joint or non-joint attention with 
the participant (see S8 for a discussion of joint attention). Systematic manipulation of the agent’s 
gaze reactions therefore resulted in six experimental conditions (0/5, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 4/5, and 5/5 
times of joint attention). In addition, a ‘high-level baseline’ in which the agent closed its eyes 
during each trial of a block was modeled separately and served as a control condition. A similar 
control condition has been used in other studies on joint attention (26, 32).  
In sum, participants’ ratings provided a way to experimentally distinguish the subjective 
experience of being engaged in social interaction with another person from a non-social form of 
interaction – i.e. an interaction with a computer-animated virtual agent. Participants’ decision 
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thereby was a dependent, instead of an independent variable as in other studies employing a 
human-computer distinction (7, 14, 15). Furthermore, the systematic manipulation of the agent’s 
gaze behavior on a trial-by-trial basis resulted in an equally systematic manipulation of the 
agent’s behavioral contingency over time. Contingency hereby refers to a consistent causality 
between one’s own actions and another person’s reactions during a given interaction block. In 
the present design, behavioral contingency increases the more often an agent displays the same 
reaction to a participant’s gaze shift during one interaction block, irrespective of the nature of 
this reaction. This means that an agent engaging in joint attention in each trial of a block behaves 
as contingent as an agent engaging in non-joint attention in each trial. The increase of the former 
is referred to as positive congruency (i.e. congruency), whereas the increase of the latter is 
referred to as negative contingency. 
 
S3.2 Structure of gaze-based interaction blocks 
Each trial followed a particular sequence (Fig. 1A depicts an exemplary trial): First, participants 
were required to look at a virtual agent appearing on the screen within 1000 milliseconds. Once 
the algorithm had detected a fixation of the agent, two grey squares appeared on the left and the 
right side of the screen. Subsequently, participants had to choose one of the squares by fixating 
it. In case the agent was not fixated within 1500 ms following the start of the trial, or in the 
absence of any successful object fixation within 1500 ms, the trial was aborted and the next trial 
of the interaction block began. Blocks containing aborted trials were registered as invalid. Upon 
successful fixation, the selected object was marked in blue in order to provide participants with 
feedback about successful registration of their gaze. Participants were informed that their initial 
gaze shift to the square (but not the color change) was transmitted to the screen of the other 
participant in real-time and that they would see the other participant’s response to their gaze shift 
as visualized by the gaze of the agent on their screen. With a latency jittered between 400 and 
600 ms which has previously been demonstrated as ‘natural’ for human gaze reactions (29), the 
agent would then either follow the participant’s gaze to the selected object or avert its gaze to the 
other object. This resulted in situations of joint and non-joint attention, respectively (S8). The 
resulting screen configuration was displayed to participants until the trial ended after 3500 ms. 
Next, a blank screen was shown for 400 – 600 ms before the next trial started. This was signaled 
by the re-appearance of the agent’s face. The duration of the whole trial amounted to 4000 ms.  
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After each block of five trials, participants were asked to indicate whether they believed 
they had been interacting with the other human participant or a computer algorithm (i.e. the 
dependent variable). They did so by pressing one of two buttons with their index fingers within a 
response window of 1500 ms. The side of the buttons for the two options was balanced between 
participants. The response window was followed by a fixation cross that was shown for a jittered 
period of 5000 to 7000 ms until the next block started. Blocks in which responses were missing 
were marked as invalid.   
 
S3.3 Naïve and cooperative interaction contexts 
The experiment consisted of two phases to distinguish unconstrained from cooperative 
interactions. In the first phase, the confederate was introduced as naïve to the participant’s task. 
Participants were told that their interaction partner had been instructed to react to each of their 
gaze shifts by looking at one of the two objects without any additional information. They were 
explicitly informed that their interaction partner thus could not willingly help them in their 
decision. This condition was included to provide a spontaneous and unconstrained interaction 
context in which participants had no a priori assumptions about their interaction partner’s 
behavior. In the second phase, the other participant was introduced as explicitly cooperative. To 
this end, participant were instructed that the interaction partner had been debriefed about the 
participant’s task and the involvement of a computer algorithm randomly taking control over the 
agent’s gaze reactions in certain interaction blocks. Participants were further told that the 
interaction partner’s task during the second phase of the experiment was to behave explicitly 
cooperative, that is, to react to their gaze shifts in such a way that would make it as easy as 
possible for them to distinguish between human and computer interaction. It was not specified in 
which exact way the interaction partner was supposed to achieve this. Each phase of the 
experiment consisted of two runs (see S3.4). During each run, the six experimental conditions 
and the control condition were repeated three times in a randomized fashion. Each gaze 
condition was thus repeated six times during the naïve as well as during the cooperative phase.  
The order of the two experimental phases could not be randomized, as the naïve 
condition required participants to assume that their interaction partner did not have any 
knowledge about the nature of their task and reacted entirely and spontaneously based on their 
personal intentions. However, in order to control for novelty and habituation effects, participants 
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engaged in a practice session of 5 minutes before the start of the first run. In addition, 
participants received a detailed written explanation of the task and were able to ask questions 
after the practice session in case any aspect of the procedure was not clear to them. The 
experimenter closely monitored their eye-movements and behavior during the practice session to 
provide additional instruction, if necessary. As noted above, the design was a within-subject 
adaptation of a previous behavioral study. Behavioral results are an exact repetition of the results 
of the between-subject version in which different groups of participants interacted with naïve and 
cooperative partners (16). Furthermore, participants’ responses in the debriefing questionnaires 
did not indicate any differences between the within- and between-subject version (compare 
Figures S1 of the present study and 16). For these reasons, we are convinced that potential 
sequence effects are negligible.     
 
S3.4 Procedure 
Upon participants’ arrival at the MRI facility, they were asked to take a seat in a room dedicated 
to the preparation of participants. It was disclosed to them that they would interact with another 
human participant outside the scanner in real-time by moving their eyes. The application of 
computer-animated virtual characters for the visualization of gaze was explained as being due to 
technical constraints. After the initial cover story, they received written instructions covering the 
exact procedure of the task. Upon reading these instructions, they were given the opportunity to 
ask questions for clarification of the instructions. Subsequently, the experimenter walked them 
past another room, where a confederate was sitting who was allegedly starting to read her 
instructions in that very moment. This person was quickly introduced as the interaction partner 
who was purportedly being instructed while the actual participant was prepared for MRI in the 
scanner room. It was made sure that participants only met for few seconds without being able to 
exchange more than a brief greeting. The participant was then led to the scanner room and 
prepared for the experiment. After the eye-tracker was calibrated, participants were informed that 
their interaction partner was now instructed about her task and ready to begin. 
The scanning session then started with a practice session consisting of a series of eight 
interaction blocks to acquaint subjects with the interaction paradigm. After the practice session, 
participants had the opportunity to ask questions for clarification if necessary. Eventually, the 
experiment started with the first phase, in which the interaction partner was introduced as naïve 
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to the task of the participants. After the first two runs of the experiment, there was a break of 
about 3 minutes before the second phase began (see S3.3) which again consisted of two 
experimental runs. Each run lasted about 10 minutes. Total scanning time including the practice 
session and short breaks between the runs therefore amounted 50 minutes. After the experiment, 
participants were led back to the preparation room where they were asked to fill out a post-
experiment questionnaire (Fig. S1). After data collection was completed, all participants received 
an email debriefing them about the deception with respect to the confederate. This email 
contained detailed information as to why this deception was necessary and explicated the 
purpose as well as preliminary results.    
 
 
S4 Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
 
S4.1 Data acquisition 
Scanning was performed on a Siemens Trio 3-T whole-body scanner (Siemens Medical 
Solutions, Erlangen, Germany). For the fMRI scans a T2*-weighted gradient echo planar 
imaging (EPI) sequence with the following parameters was used: TR = 2200 ms, TE = 30 ms, 36 
axial slices, slice thickness = 3.0 mm, in-plane resolution = 3.0 x 3.0 mm, field of view = 200.0 x 
200.0 mm. In each session, 280 images were acquired. The first five images of a session were 
discarded before image processing in order to eliminate potential saturation effects. 
 
S4.2 Preprocessing 
Images were analyzed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, 
UK) implemented in MATLAB 7.1 (Mathworks Inc., Natick, USA). DICOM images were 
converted to NIFTI format before further image processing. Preprocessing involved the 
following steps: Motion correction was completed by an affine registration procedure (33). 
Realignment was performed in two steps. Images were initially realigned to the first image of the 
time series and subsequently to the mean of these images. For normalization, the mean EPI was 
computed for each participant and spatially normalized to the MNI single subject template (34) 
using the unified segmentation function of SPM8 with a 2x2x2 mm isotropic resolution. The 
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ensuing deformation was then applied to the individual EPI volumes. Finally, spatial smoothing 
of the normalized images was performed using an 8-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. 
 
S5.2 Data analysis strategies 
The design of the study justified three lines of data analysis that are explained in the following. 
For a comprehensive overview of all analyses and contrasts see Table S2. 
(1) Analyses based on the dependent variable: Initially, data analysis was guided by 
participants’ ratings to examine differences in neural activity elicited by the experience of social 
and non-social interaction, that is, by ‘human’ (hum) and ‘computer’ (com) ratings, respectively 
[contrasts of interest: (humall_block > comall_block), (comall_block > humall_block)]. Stimulus events were 
defined by the onsets of interaction blocks and their duration until the start of the button press 
response window (20000 ms). If present, invalid blocks were modeled with a distinct regressor 
of no interest. Subsequently, the effect of the instruction was investigated by conducting separate 
analyses for the naïve and cooperative interaction contexts. Blocks rated as ‘human’ and 
‘computer’ were modeled separately for the two contexts [contrasts of interest: (humnaïve_block > 
comnaïve_block), (comnaïve_block > humnaïve_block), (humcoop_block > comcoop_block), (comcoop_block > 
humcoop_block)]. Two further analyses were informed by the output of the logistic regressions 
performed on the behavioral data which are described in section S6.2 of the supplementary text. 
Results of these sequential regressions demonstrated that during naïve interaction there was an 
early effect of trial type on the final decision, whereas during cooperative interaction the increase 
of the importance of trial type was roughly linear over the course of interaction blocks 
experience as social. As a consequence, one neural analysis aimed at investigating early 
components in the experience of social interaction by confining a stimulus event to the first two 
trials (8000 ms) of an interaction block [contrasts of interest: (humnaïve_early>comnaïve_early), 
(comnaïve_early>humnaïve_early), (humcoop_early>comcoop_early), (comcoop_first>humcoop_first)]. In the second 
analysis, trial progression was introduced as a parametric regressor to model increases of neural 
activity with increasing trial position towards the decision [contrasts of interest: 
(humnaïve_param>comnaïve_param), (comnaïve_param>humnaïve_param), (humcoop_param>comcoop_param), 
(comcoop_param>humcoop_param)].  
(2) Analyses based on the independent variable: As an independent variable, the 
contingency of gaze behavior was manipulated from zero to five out of five possible occurrences 
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of joint attention, thereby resulting in six experimental conditions. Driven by this manipulation, a 
combined categorical-parametric analysis was conducted to model increases and decreases of 
neural activity with increasing and decreasing numbers of joint attention trials (i.e. positive and 
negative contingency) per block. At the subject-level, the six experimental categories (0/5, 1/5, 
2/5, 3/5, 4/5, and 5/5 possible joint attention trials) were modeled as separate contrasts. In 
addition, there was a control condition in which the agent closed its eyes during each trial, which 
was modeled with a separate regressor. The effect of the increasing number of joint attention 
trials was then modeled over these categories as a linear parametric modulation of the 
hemodynamic response [contrasts of interest: (naïveincrease_JA), (coopincrease_JA)]. Accordingly, the 
effect of increasing numbers of non-joint attention trials (NJA) was modeled by an inverted 
linear parametric modulation [contrasts of interest: (naïveincrease_NJA), (coopincrease_NJA)].  
(3) Event-related analysis of single gaze trials: Finally, using event-related analyses we 
compared how JA and NJA trials were processed in the naïve and cooperative condition in order 
to further investigate the integration of single gaze trials. To this end, joint and non-joint 
attention trials were modeled as separate regressor. This was done irrespective of the 
experimental category (0/5, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 4/5, 5/5) a trial was presented in [contrasts of interest: 
(JAnaïve>NJAnaïve), (NJAnaïve>JAnaïve), (JAcoop>NJAcoop), (NJAcoop>JAcoop)]. Stimulus events were 
defined from the onset of a trial until the appearance of the blank screen, thereby amounting to a 
trial length of 3500 ms (Fig. 1A). Finally, the temporal derivatives of the hemodynamic response 
function were included in the model (35). 
 
S5.3 Statistics 
Data were analyzed using a General Linear Model as implemented in SPM8. Low-frequency 
signal drifts were removed from the fMRI time series using a high-pass filter with a cutoff of 128 
seconds (36). In each of the block-level analyses, experimental conditions were modeled by a 
boxcar reference vector which was convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response 
function. At the group-level, individual contrasts obtained from subject-level analyses were fed 
to a flexible factorial ANOVA with factors subject and condition using a random-effects model 
(37). Differences between conditions and deviations from zero were investigated using linear 
contrasts of the group-level parameter estimates. All effects were thresholded at p < .05 at the 
cluster-level, family-wise-error-corrected for multiple comparisons (pFWE-corr < .05), with an 
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underlying voxel-level threshold of p < .001, uncorrected. Anatomical localization of activations 
was achieved by using version 1.8 of the SPM anatomy toolbox (38) and the brain atlas of 
Duvernoy (39). Activation maps were superimposed on an SPM canonical T1-weighted image.  
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Supplementary text 
 
 
S6 Behavioral results  
 
S6.1 Effect of gaze condition and instruction on the experience of social interaction 
The effect of interaction context (naïve vs. cooperative) and gaze contingency (total number of 
joint attention trials per interaction block) on participants’ subjective experience of the 
interaction (i.e. their ratings) was analyzed using repeated-measures ANOVAs. Planned 
polynomial contrasts were applied for trend analysis to describe behavioral patterns statistically. 
Prior to data analysis, an arcsine transformation was performed as proportional data violate the 
assumption of normality (40). The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied in all analyses.  
Fig. 1 depicts the proportion of blocks rated as ‘human’ (i.e. the dependent variable) 
depending on the contingency of gaze reactions (i.e. the independent variable) during the naïve 
(Fig. 1c) and the cooperative condition (Fig. 1d). Results demonstrated a main effect of gaze on 
participants’ ratings, F(2.45, 46.55) = 13.19, p < .001, ω² = .23, and a significant interaction 
between instruction and contingency, F(3.13, 59.35) = 11.19, p < .001, ω² = .08. This interaction 
was scrutinized by analyzing the results of the naïve and the cooperative condition separately. In 
the naïve condition, there was a significant main effect of the factor contingency on participants’ 
ratings, F(2.76, 52.38) = 3.55, p = .023, ω² = .03. Planned polynomial contrasts revealed that this 
effect was characterized by a significant linear trend, F(1, 19) = 7.84, p = .011, ω² = .29, thereby 
indicating that the proportion of blocks rated as ‘human’ increased with increasing numbers of 
joint attention trials per interaction block (Figure 1B). In the cooperative condition, contingency 
also had a significant effect on participants’ ratings, F(2.79, 52.95) = 21.79, p < .001, ω² = .27. 
This was characterized by a significant linear trend, F(1, 19) = 20.21, p < .001, ω² = .19, and a 
quadratic trend, F(1, 19) = 36.63, p < .001, ω² = .39. These trends confirm that when interacting 
with a cooperative partner, the ascription of humanness is driven not only by congruency but also 
by contingency of gaze reactions (Fig. 1C).     
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S6.2 Influence of trial type 
Furthermore, to get more insight into how participants' decision-making process unfolded over 
an interaction block, we assessed how ratings were influenced by consecutive trials. We first 
performed a regression analysis that included ten predictors: five Trial predictors for the agent’s 
reactions on each of the five trials, and five Trial x Instruction predictors, to look at whether 
there were any differences in trial influence between instruction conditions (naïve vs. 
cooperative). In order to focus exclusively on the important factors within the set of ten, we used 
a Forward method, in which predictors are added consecutively, starting with the strongest, and 
predictors with decreasing strength are added to the model until adding a new predictor does fail 
to explain significantly more variance. The results are listed in the top half of Table S1. The final 
three trials show up as main effects across both conditions, with the fourth trial weighing in the 
heaviest: if on this trial the agent follows the participant's gaze, the chances of rating ‘human’ are 
over 1.59 times higher than when the agent looks the other way. Most importantly however, the 
second trial loads only in interaction with condition. We therefore performed separate Forward 
method regression analyses for each interaction context (naïve vs. cooperative), in which the five 
predictors were the agent’s reactions on the five trials (bottom of Table S1). Apart from 
confirming the persistence of the main effects for the final three trials, the analyses show that 
only in the naive condition there is an early component in the decision making process that is 
completely absent in the cooperative condition: the second trial has in fact the second biggest 
influence on the eventual humanness rating, with ‘human’ becoming 1.38 times more likely if 
this second trial consists of JA. In the cooperative condition, the second trial doesn't load at all. 
In sum, there is an early influence of trial type on participants’ ratings in the naïve context, 
which is absent in the cooperative context, where the integration of information related to 
decision-making is roughly linear. 
 
 
S7 Interaction with virtual agents 
 
Methods borrowing from virtual reality technology have found their way into numerous areas of 
neuroscientific research (13). Specifically in social psychology, the use of virtual agents has been 
promoted as they allow the isolation of a cue of interest, such as gaze reactions, while 
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neutralizing confounding variables (41). This becomes particularly evident in neuroimaging 
studies, which require a substantial reduction of the ‘band width’ of social interactions in order to 
maintain experimental control.  Recent research on so-called anthropomorphic virtual agents (i.e. 
as used in this study) - which have realistic human features while still being easily recognized as 
artificial - has suggested that they provide an excellent tool to study social cognition face-to-face 
and in real-time (42). More precisely, the interaction with anthropomorphic agents results in 
comparable reactions and social behaviors as the interaction with real humans. For example, 
socially induced inhibition as well as facilitation of task performance could not only be observed 
in the presence of another person, but also in the presence of human-controlled avatars (43). 
Likewise, participants’ regulation of interpersonal distance and approach behavior is comparable 
in immersive virtual environments and real social encounters (44). It was also demonstrated that 
participants displayed empathic concern for virtual agents in distressful situations, thereby 
demonstrating that encounters with virtual agents readily elicit prosocial behavior (45). Finally, a 
recent study showed that the simulation of gaze behavior by virtual agents in face-to-face 
interactions results in similar experiences of social presence and intimateness as real gaze 
behavior (46). In sum, the use of virtual agents enables a balance between ecological validity and 
experimental control and is thus ideally suited for the purpose of studying social interactions. 
 
 
S8 Joint attention and social interaction 
 
In the present task, social interactions have been operationalized by virtual agents who engage to 
different degrees in joint (JA) or non-joint attention (e.g. NJA) with participants. It shall hence 
briefly be explained here why JA is used to implement social interactions. JA represents a triadic 
interaction involving a ‘referential triangle’ of two individuals and some third entity in the 
environment (47). Considering that people look where they attend and where they intend to act, 
JA is considered fundamental to an understanding of other minds. An important distinction is 
made between responding to other people’s offerings of JA and initiating JA (48). While 
responding to a bid for joint attention by following someone’s gaze can also be observed in non-
human primates, the initiation of JA represents a uniquely human capacity. Accordingly, it has 
been demonstrated that starting at the age of 9 months, children show an intrinsic motivation to 
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actively share attention with parents and caretakers by directing their gaze to an object, and to 
reengage them in social interactions which have previously been interrupted (see 49 and 
references therein). JA thereby combines an intrinsic motivation to share with the establishment 
of perceptual common ground in a reciprocal fashion (50). This has been argued to create “a 
shared space of common psychological ground that enables everything from collaborative 
activities with shared goals to human-style cooperative communication” (51, p. 121). In sum, JA 
can be considered as an origin of any meaningful non-verbal social interaction. This suggests 
that constructing interactions by manipulating the engagement in JA allows studying engagement 
and participation in real-time social interactions in a socially salient and ecologically valid 
fashion. 
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Supplementary Tables 
 
 
Table S1. Regression coefficients for the logistic regression models (Forward method) for each condition 
separately, and for both conditions with interaction effects.  
 
            
  Coeff SE Wald Odds ratio 95 % CI 
NAIVE + COOP: Main effect of trials and 
interaction of trials*condition 
2nd trial (NJA vs JA) * Condition (NAIVE vs COOP) 0.284 0.087 10.70** 1.33 [1.12 - 1.58] 
3rd trial NJA vs JA 0.293 0.079 13.63*** 1.34 [1.15 - 1.57] 
4th trial NJA vs JA 0.464 0.08 34.08*** 1.59 [1.36 - 1.86] 
5th trial NJA vs JA 0.309 0.08 15.02*** 1.36 [1.17 - 1.59] 
            
NAIVE: Main effect of trials 
2nd trial NJA vs JA 0.32 0.113 8.07** 1.38 [1.10 - 1.72] 
3rd trial NJA vs JA 0.255 0.114 4.98* 1.29 [1.03 - 1.62] 
4th trial NJA vs JA 0.432 0.114 14.32*** 1.54 [1.23 - 1.93] 
5th trial NJA vs JA 0.264 0.115 5.31* 1.3 [1.04 - 1.63] 
COOP: Main effect of trials 
  
3rd trial NJA vs JA 0.328 0.111 8.76** 1.39 [1.12 - 1.72] 
4th trial NJA vs JA 0.489 0.112 19.09*** 1.63 [1.31 - 2.03] 
5th trial NJA vs JA 0.346 0.112 9.52** 1.41 [1.14 - 1.76] 
            
Notes: *** p<.001; ** p<.005; * p<.05. 
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Table S2. Overview of the different fMRI analyses with references to the respective results tables.  
 
 
All Naive Coop 
       
    Analysis by dependent variable 
       
Whole block 
   Human > Computer Table S3a Table S3c n.s. 
Computer > Human Table S3b n.s. Table S3d 
    
First two trials 
   Human > Computer - Table S3e n.s. 
Computer > Human - n.s. n.s. 
    
Parametric increase over trials 
   Human > Computer - n.s. Table S3f 
Computer > Human - n.s. Table S3g 
    Analysis by independent variable 
       
Parametric increase (pos. contingency) - Table S4a Table S4c 
Parametric decrease (neg. contingency) - Table S4b Table S4d 
    Event-related analysis 
       
JA > NJA - Table S5a n.s. 
NJA > JA - n.s. Table S5b 
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Table S3. Analyses based on participants’ subjective ratings reveal brain regions differentially activated during 
‘human’- and ‘computer’-rated blocks.  
 
Region Cluster Side 
MNI 
Coordinates T 
  Size pFWE-corr   x y z   
        Whole Block 
       
        a) humall_block > comall_block 
       
        Ventral striatum 468 .000 R 8 4 -10 4.96 
Ventral striatum 
  
L -6 10 -8 4.57 
        mOFC 326 .002 R 4 48 -16 4.61 
mOFC 
  
L -8 42 -12 3.98 
        b) comall_block > humall_block 
       
        Supramarginal gyrus 2919 .000 R 52 -42 36 4.88 
Intraparietal sulcus 
  
R 34 -60 44 4.88 
Precuneus 
  
R 10 -60 40 4.67 
        Intraparietal sulcus 1513 .000 L -30 -48 32 5.63 
        Inferior frontal gyrus 1455 .000 R 40 56 -2 5.04 
Lateral orbital sulcus 
  
R 46 48 -12 4.93 
Middle frontal gyrus 
  
R 52 38 22 4.39 
        Middle frontal gyrus 1207 .000 R 32 6 60 4.89 
Superior frontal sulcus 
  
R 22 14 42 4.82 
        Inferior frontal gyrus 332 .013 L -36 56 2 4.39 
Lateral orbital gyrus 
  
L -40 54 -8 4.21 
        c) humnaïve_block > comnaïve_block 
       
        Ventral striatum 836 .000 R 10 4 -10 5.17 
Medial orbitofrontal cortex 
  
R 6 22 -10 4.40 
Putamen 
  
R 24 20 0 4.14 
        Anterior cingulate cortex 299 .020 L -8 32 6 4.54 
Anterior cingulate cortex 
  
R 10 28 16 3.75 
        Ventral striatum 248 .039 L -10 2 -2 4.19 
Putamen 
  
L -8 16 2 4.14 
Medial orbitofrontal cortex 
  
L -8 28 -12 3.98 
        Substantia nigra/Subthalamic nucleus 243 .043 L -6 -6 -16 4.53 
Ventral tegmental area 
  
R 6 -24 -18 4.46 
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Ventral tegmental area 
  
L -6 -20 -18 4.07 
        d) comcoop_block > humcoop_block 
       
        Intraparietal sulcus 10451 .000 R 36 -44 34 6.23 
Precuneus 
  
R 8 -58 42 6.11 
Supramarginal gyrus 
  
R 50 -44 36 6.03 
Intraparietal sulcus 
  
L -32 -54 40 5.87 
        Inferior frontal sulcus 6743 .000 R 28 52 4 6.56 
Inferior frontal gyrus 
  
R 40 56 -2 6.29 
Middle frontal gyrus 
  
R 32 8 60 6.21 
        Middle frontal gyrus 936 .000 L -50 24 34 6.47 
Inferior frontal sulcus 
  
L -28 16 32 5.03 
        Lateral orbital gyrus 868 .000 L -35 56 -8 5.17 
Inferior frontal gyrus 
  
L -34 48 2 4.98 
        Middle frontal gyrus 452 .003 L -30 0 60 4.76 
        First two trials of a block 
       
        e) humnaïve_early > comnaïve_early 
        
Nucleus accumbens (Ventral striatum) 704 .012 L -12 6 -6 4.35 
Caudate nucleus (head) 
  
L -10 18 2 4.08 
Putamen 
  
L -18 18 -8 3.92 
Medial orbital gyrus 
  
L -22 14 16 3.93 
        Parametric increase over whole block 
       
        f) humcoop_param > comcoop_param 
        
Nucleus accumbens (Ventral striatum) 719 .000 R 6 6 -4 4.49 
Nucleus accumbens (Ventral striatum) 
  
L -6 10 -8 4.45 
Putamen 
  
R 20 14 -10 3.84 
        g) comcoop_param > humcoop_param 
       
        Angular gyrus 474 .001 R 42 -64 52 4.25 
Angular gyrus 
  
R 48 -64 34 4.07 
        Inferior frontal gyrus 201 .051 R 44 30 24 4.13 
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Table S4. Analysis based on the contingency of the agent’s gaze behavior. The number of joint attention (JA) trials 
per interaction block was used as a parametric regressor. Both the contrasts referring to increasing numbers of JA as 
well as increasing numbers of non-joint attention (NJA) trials were reported to obtain information about the neural 
integration of positive and negative contingency of gaze reactions. 
 
Region Cluster Side 
MNI 
Coordinates T 
  Size pFWE-corr   x y z   
        
        a) naïveincrease_JA 
       Paracentral lobule 217 .002 R 4 -32 54 3.89 
Paracentral lobule 
  
L -2 -22 58 3.63 
        b) naïveincrease_NJA        
Superior occipital gyrus 277 .009 R 30 -78 20 4.09 
Middle occipital gyrus 
  
R 30 -72 32 3.97 
        c) coopincrease_JA 
       
        Caudate nucleus 3048 .000 L -16 14 -6 5.38 
Anterior cingulate cortex 
  
R 2 20 22 5.15 
Caudate nucleus 
  
R 22 20 4 5.02 
Putamen 
  
L -18 14 0 4.98 
        Thalamus 495 .000 R 18 -16 12 4.20 
Thalamus 
  
R 0 22 6 3.98 
        d) coopincrease_NJA 
       
        Precuneus 2493 .000 R 10 -58 48 6.20 
Intraparietal sulcus 
  
R 40 -46 44 5.53 
Superior parietal lobule 
  
R 36 -60 62 5.09 
Supramarginal gyrus 
  
R 46 -36 40 4.96 
        Middle frontal gyrus 932 .000 R 50 24 34 5.91 
Middle frontal gyrus 
  
R 36 12 60 4.49 
        Intraparietal sulcus 878 .000 L -36 -56 40 4.77 
        Inferior frontal gyrus 869 .000 R 32 60 8 5.10 
Lateral orbital gyrus 
  
R 44 48 -14 4.68 
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Table S5. Event-related analyses of gaze reactions compared JA with NJA trials. 
  
Region Cluster Side 
MNI 
Coordinates T 
  Size pFWE-corr   x y z   
        a) JAnaïve > NJAnaïve 
       
        Precentral gyrus 3207 .000 R 26 -22 60 5.86 
Postcentral gyrus 
  
R 32 -30 62 5.31 
Postcentral gyrus 
  
L -20 -40 56 5.05 
Middle cingulate cortex 
  
R 12 -16 42 4.66 
Middle cingulate cortex 
  
L -8 -2 34 4.60 
Paracentral lobule 
  
R 4 -24 48 4.57 
Paracentral lobule 
  
L -8 -24 48 4.56 
        Amygdala 510 .001 L -22 -6 -14 4.82 
Medial orbitofrontal cortex 
  
L -22 8 -22 4.28 
Putamen  
  
L -20 8 -6 3.80 
        Thalamus 410 .003 L -4 -18 14 4.66 
        Superior temporal sulcus (anterior region) 398 .004 L -46 -6 -8 4.59 
Temporal pole 
  
L -54 8 -14 3.93 
        Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 364 .006 R 4 44 -16 5.17 
Anterior cingulate cortex 
  
R 4 36 10 3.90 
Anterior cingulate cortex 
  
L -4 38 2 3.61 
        Parietal operculum 249 .030 L -40 -24 26 4.59 
        Parietal operculum 227 .042 R 40 -36 24 5.61 
        b) NJAnaïve > JAnaïve 
       
        Supramarginal gyrus 1768 .000 R 38 -42 42 5.31 
Precuneus 
  
R 10 -58 48 5.05 
        Precentral sulcus 1528 .000 L -26 -4 58 5.68 
Precentral gyrus 
  
L -38 4 54 5.44 
        Superior fontal sulcus 1458 .000 R 32 4 44 5.41 
Middle frontal gyrus 
  
R 46 24 36 5.30 
        Intraparietal sulcus 419 .000 L -40 -46 36 4.40 
        Superior frontal gyrus 402 .000 L -2 22 56 4.47 
        Inferior frontal gyrus (p. orbitalis) 220 .005 R 30 58 -6 3.97 
        Lateral orbital gyrus 217 .005 L -44 44 10 4.25 
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Supplementary Figures 
 
 
Fig. S1. Participants were asked about their experience of the task in post-experiment questionnaires. A) Results 
indicate that the decision was more difficult in the naïve than in the cooperative context (naïve: M = 3.45, SD = 0.49; 
coop: M = 2.55, SD = 0.67, p < .001). B) During interaction with a naïve partner, the decision was not based on 
strategic thinking and explicit decision criteria, but on intuitive processes. C) Participants preferred grounding their 
decision on considerations about human behavior rather than about the functionality of a computer program. D) 
Interactions that were experienced as social interactions with another human participant were experienced as more 
enjoyable than non-social interactions.  
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Fig. S2. An event-related analysis of joint attention trials shows activation in regions of the social brain network 
including the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), amygdala (Amy), and the anterior region of the superior temporal 
sulcus (aSTS). In addition, activity in the paracentral lobule (PL) was enhanced (threshold: p < .05 cluster-level-
corrected for multiple comparisons; error bars depict 90% CI).  
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Fig. S3. Integration of gaze reactions over time in the naïve interaction context A) Parametric increases of activity 
with increasing numbers of joint attention trials per block in the paracentral lobule (PL). B) Parametric increase with 
increasing numbers of non-joint attention trials per block in the medial occipital gyrus, which corresponds to area 
V3 of the visual cortex (threshold: p < .05 cluster-level-corrected for multiple comparisons; error bars depict 90% 
CI).  
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Fig. S4. Integration of gaze reactions over time during cooperative interaction. A) Parametric increases of activity 
with increasing numbers of joint attention trials per block in the caudate nucleus (NC), the putamen (Put), the 
thalamus (Thal), the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). B) Parametric 
increases of activity with increasing numbers of non-joint attention trials per block in the FPAN including the 
precuneus (PC), intraparietal sulcus (IPS), and regions of the IFG and MFG corresponding to the dorso- and 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Parameter estimates are only shown for the maxima of the largest clusters (threshold: 
p < .05 cluster-level-corrected for multiple comparisons; error bars depict 90% CI). 
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